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ABSTRACT 
 
 From coal to oil, from wind to uranium, the American West has long been an 
important node of American energy extraction. This has become increasingly true over 
the last few decades, as thermodynamic havens such as the Bakken oil fields and the 
Gillette area coal mines have entered onto the global stage. Nevertheless, there has been 
little scholarship on the role that such energy production has played in the history of the 
region. This dissertation addresses this absence by taking one small slice of the West—
the Powder River Basin, a geological declivity that spans across parts of northeastern 
Wyoming and southeastern Montana—and using it as a spatial lens through which to 
examine the region’s thermodynamic past. Employing a bioregional framework, it 
examines the basin through a deep time scale, homing on particular energy sources and 
transitional moments. Each chapter takes as its subject a formative event in the history of 
the American West and the basin more specifically. It begins with the rise and fall of the 
nineteenth-century Crow, examining the tribe’s unrecognized role as protectors and 
benefactors of a thermodynamic utopia in the midst of one of the most unforgiving 
environments on the continent. It then moves to the paradigmatic range conflict of 
western lore, the Johnson County War, revealing the deep energetic roots of the quarrel. 
Next, it analyzes the greatest political scandal in American history, the Teapot Dome 
affair, showing its complex imbrication in the region’s early oil industry and its broader 
 xi 
thermodynamic past. Finally, it addresses the modern Gillette coal empire—since the 
1970s the largest energy producer in the world—unearthing a history of attempts to 
market the region’s unique low-sulfur coal that reaches back to the early-twentieth 
century. By analyzing diaries, newspaper articles, oral histories, company records, 
environmental reports, and government documents, this work challenges current beliefs 
about the role of energy in the history of the region. Using a thermodynamic lens through 
which to view that past, it overturns the long-accepted paradigm of boom and bust as a 
model for understanding historical development in the American West, replacing it with 
one of continuity and cyclical change. Instead of a region of aridity and romanticized 
conflicts, it presents the West as one of the energy capitals of the world, thereby 
establishing a new paradigm for its place in American history.
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Buried History of Western Energy 
 
On the edge of a prairie meadow, wedged down into the southeastern corner of 
the Montana plains, there sits a massive pile of bleached bones. Some of them are so 
bright that they are hard to look at, an incandescent white from extended exposure to the 
sun, though most are more of an old-coin gray, with bits of terrestrial residue caked to 
their surface like mold. Piled together in a haphazard manner, they have that swollen-
silhouette-look of an average county dump; move closer, though, and you can see that 
they are animal remains—bison to be exact—the last organic vestiges of thousands of 
indigenous hunts in what is now southeastern Montana. And there are so many of them 
because of this precise location, within a narrow drainage basin, abutting a horseshoe of 
eroded sandstone, at the point where geography and hunting efficiency auspiciously 
collide. It is in the bosom of a mythic country: just north of the Bozeman Trail, east of 
Little Bighorn, and west of Devil's Tower. Moreover, it is in the energetic heart of the 
world, in the midst of the largest coal mines the planet has ever seen. 
 This place, the Sarpy Creek Bison Kill Site, a 2,000-year-old relic on the Crow 
Indian Reservation, was inadvertently uncovered amidst a surge in coalfield expansion in 
2005, as various companies sought to satiate an ever-increasing domestic and foreign 
demand for affordable energy. The outfit operating the excavation, the Colorado-based 
 2 
Westmoreland Coal Company, had long been a major economic player on the Crow 
Reservation, owning the strip mine that, since the 1970s, had steadily grown into a quiet 
if reliable producer of coal, perennially hovering around the top twenty domestic 
producers.1 Operating some two-dozen mines across the United States and Canada, 
Westmoreland leased the land via public auction from the Crow Nation. In return, the 
Crow received royalties amounting to approximately two-thirds of the tribe’s annual 
budget.2 As with so many relationships between local communities and multi-national 
corporations, there were certainly problems, with each side often feeling that they were 
not getting their due. But if not a perfect relationship, it was, up to this point, at least a 
marginally symbiotic one, a partnership with thirty-plus years of contractual history 
undergirding it.3 
 But the bones changed all of this. In line with the 2008 Data Recovery Plan—a 
federal-level legal agreement approved by the Tribal Historic Preservation Office, 
Westmoreland, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Office of Surface Mining—
Westmoreland consulted with a handful of Crow tribal members, most notably Tribal 
Historic Preservation Officer Dale Old Horn. They then contracted the recovery work to 
G.C.M. Services, a small company specializing in archaeological and historical research 
management headed by one Gene Munson, who had been conducting mineral-related 
                                                
1 In 2014, it produced 6,557,844 short tons, compared to nation’s (and world’s) largest mine, the North 
Antelope Rochelle Mine, just outside of Gillette, which produced 117,965,515 short tons. U.S. Department 
of Energy. U. S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Coal Report 2014. By Lance Harris, JanAlyse 
Arena, Sundar Thapa, and Brian Park (Washington, D.C.: United States government Printing Office, 2016), 
15.  
2 Levi Flinn, “Crow Tribe General Council Meeting,” Big Horn County News (Hardin, MT), October 29, 
2015.  
3 The vexed history of Crow (and Northern Cheyenne) political relations with coal companies and the 
United States government over the past fifty years is admirably detailed in James Robert Allison III, 
Sovereignty for Survival: American Energy Development and Indian Self-Determination (Yale University 
Press, 2015). 
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excavations on the northern plains since the late seventies. 4 Over the course of the next 
two summers, the company quietly excavated the site, eventually unearthing more than 
30,000 pounds of bones and 13,000 pounds of fire-cracked rock, most in the form of 
atlatl darts, the weapon of choice for Late Archaic Peoples (3,000-1,600 years before 
present). When the excavation was complete, they filled a semitrailer with the most 
historically valuable materials, then used a backhoe to consolidate the remaining bones 
and rock—what had been deemed “redundant material”—into a pile abutting the pit. 
From there the expansion continued on as planned, with the new annex preparing to go 
online within the next few years.5 
 Four years later, in the summer of 2012, word of the bones began to trickle out to 
the rest of the tribe.6 Within a few weeks, a handful of local and national media outlets 
had picked up the story, and archaeological and anthropological specialists were brought 
in to survey the cultural rubble. Outside magazine ran a feature piece in their November 
                                                
4 “GCM Staff,” http://gcmservicesinc.blogspot.com/p/gcm-staff.html. Accessed August 15, 2017. The 
requisite work here was archaeological, in order to survey the proposed area of excavation “to recognize, 
save, and protect historic places in communities all over the United States.” Since 1996, Indian nations 
have been able to apply for funding through the Historic Preservation Fund whereby they sign an 
agreement with the National Park Service that funds this work via a Tribal Historic Preservation Officer 
whose job is “to protect and conserve important Tribal cultural and historic assets sites.” National 
Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, “Historic Preservation Fund,” 
http://ncshpo.org/issues/historic-preservation-fund/. Accessed October 15, 2018; “Tribal Historic 
Preservation Grants,” National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/thpo/grants/index.html. Accessed 
October 15, 2018. In yet another instance of thermodynamic circularity, “Funding for the HPF does not 
come from taxpayer dollars, but rather from offshore oil and gas lease revenues. The idea is that the use of 
one non-renewable resource is somewhat counter-balanced by the benefits of preserving other irreplaceable 
resources.” National Park Service, “Tribal Historic Preservation Office: Historic Preservation Fund Grant,” 
October 1, 2017, 5, available at https://www.nps.gov/thpo/grants/index.html. 
5 Leslie Macmillan, “Bison Bones, a Backhoe, and a Crow Curse,” Outside Magazine, November 9, 2012. 
Article available at https://www.outsideonline.com/1910586/bison-bones-backhoe-and-crow-curse.  
6 According to Two Leggings, Dale Old Horn “was supposed to work the cultural director and the cultural 
committee and the tribal elders, and none of that was done. My office was just across the hallway from his 
office at the time, and I was never aware of the Sarpy Creek site. Nobody was aware of it, even the 
chairman [of the tribe] wasn’t aware of it. Dale Old Horn made the decision by himself.” Quoted in Ron 
Catlett, “War on Coal: Tribal Politics Spell Demise of Ancient Bison Bone Bed, Liberal Groups Blame 
Coal Company,” Mediatrackers, October 29, 2012, http://mediatrackers.org/montana/2012/10/29/war-on-
coal-tribal-politics-spell-demise-of-ancient-bison-bone-bed-liberal-groups-blame-coal-company. 
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issue under the title, “Bison Bones, a Backhoe, and a Crow Curse,” with images of the 
moldering remains juxtaposed with the doleful faces of Crow onlookers.7 According to 
most of the scientists, reporters, and activists who flocked to the site, the archaeological 
dig had been shockingly incompetent, conducted in what they interpreted to be a 
purposely slipshod manner in order to save time and money, all beyond the purview of 
the Crow people (with the exception of that limited coterie consisting of the Old Horn 
family and the Tribal Historic Preservation Office). In the words of Burton Pretty on Top, 
the tribe’s cultural director at the time, “It’s disgusting what happened here. It’s sacred 
land here. They had ceremony here. It’s like someone going in and destroying St. Peter’s 
Basilica.” One of the most vocal critics was an outside academic, Judson Finley, an 
anthropology professor at Utah State University, who panned G.C.M. and everyone 
involved for what he deemed a reprehensible act of legal evasion. “Technically, it’s true,” 
he said, “they did it by the book. But it was a faulty process at best.” Instead of the next 
Head-Smashed-In-Buffalo Jump, a potential U.N.E.S.C.O. World Heritage Site and 
critical tourism destination, what the Crow were left with was a botched exhumation, a 
desecration conducted behind their backs and without their blessing.8 
                                                
7 This sensationalized title, occurring, as it did, with only the vaguest of connections to any “ghost story,” is 
a prime example of a phenomenon remarked upon by both Jared Farmer and Coll Thrush. While Farmer 
observes the desire of American settlers to imbue the past with (often made up) indigenous stories, Thrush 
alludes to the cultural and ideological dimensions of the “ghost stories” that writers and settlers often 
impose upon the past. “This is the power of ghost stories,” he writes, “they tell us more about ourselves, 
and about our time, than they tell us about other people or the past…hauntings are among the most telling 
of cultural phenomena, expressing powerful anxieties, desires, and regrets.” Jared Farmer, On Zion’s 
Mount: Mormons, Indians, and the American Landscape (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); Coll-Peter Thrush, Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-over Place (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2007), 6-7. 
8 Lorna Thackeray, “2,000-Year-Old Bison Bone Site Mired in Controversy,” Billings Gazette (Billings, 
MT), October 23, 2012; Adrian Jawort, “Sacred Bison Honoring Site Destroyed for Coal Underneath,” 
Indian Country Today, October 29, 2012, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/10/29/sacred-
bison-honoring-site-destroyed-coal-underneath-142867. 
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 As the months passed and the story began to percolate out across the country, 
picked up and distributed via various regional and national news outlets, two competing 
narratives emerged. The first, that propagated by Westmoreland, Old Horn, and many of 
the others involved in the excavation process, took what can be deemed a modern 
utilitarian outlook.9 It presented the dig and the resultant dispute as an unfortunate but 
necessary sidebar to the more important—they would say critical—issue at hand: the 
affordable extraction of coal, a fossil fuel that quite literally powered the world, including 
the homes and devices of even its most vehement opponents. According to this reasoning, 
the excavation was conducted in accordance with all of the requisite rules and 
regulations, those that had been put in place and agreed upon by each and every one of 
the concerned parties in the interest of achieving a larger goal: providing a vital energy 
resource to the country, even, in the long run, fulfilling something of a patriotic purpose.10 
This narrative was a more liberal—perhaps some might even say enlightened—version of 
what historian David Nye has described as a founding American myth: “America 
conceived as a second creation built in harmony with God’s first creation…They 
[narratives of second creation] express in secular form the beginnings of a new social 
world, and they establish the ideal ground rules of the society.”11 According to such an 
interpretation, Old Horn and company were simply bringing this narrative into its 
                                                
9 This view, of course, was promoted and summed up by Jeremy Bentham: “An action then may be said to 
be comfortable to the principle of…utility when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the 
community is greater than any it has to diminish it.” This, of course, leads to the corollary question: what is 
the community? Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon 
Press, 1879), 3. 
10 This is an area that I look to develop more in my dissertation—the concomitant narrative that, by mining 
these resources domestically, workers, companies, etc. are providing a critical industrial community in the 
wake of the country’s waning manufacturing industries. This is most typically exemplified by, on the larger 
scale, Wyoming branding itself as the “Saudi Arabia of Coal,” and on the smaller scale, the town of 
Gillette, Wyoming, dubbing itself “The Energy Capital of the World.” 
11 David E. Nye, America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of New Beginnings, New Ed 
edition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 3–4. 
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transmogrified, twenty-first century form, performing their duty as laborers in a new 
energy regime.12   
 While this view worked its way through the community, a competing narrative 
began to take form. Opined by much of the Crow Nation, the media, and the various 
environmental groups that descended upon the reservation, this narrative portrayed the 
excavation as yet the latest in a long history of Big Coal and Big Oil destroying the land 
in the interest of short-term profit—an example of what was, in the words of one author, 
“The Rape of the Great Plains.”13 In the wake of the discovery, a number of 
environmental organizations issued statements to this effect: the National Wildlife 
Federation proclaimed that situations like Sarpy Creek “allow for-profit companies to 
destroy tribal and public resources that should be celebrated and protected for 
generations,” while the Montana Environmental Information Center similarly declared, 
“This is an absolute tragedy, and very sad consequence of coal mining in Montana.”14 In 
short, Big Coal knowingly desecrated priceless cultural artifacts in the name of short-
                                                
12 Intriguingly, as larger archetypes, these two competing narratives have a lengthy lineage within 
environmental history, most prominently in the early-twentieth century debates over Hetch Hetchy Dam 
and other western conservation battles. These arguments pitted a utilitarian perspective, headed by Chief 
Forester Gifford Pinchot, that emphasized preservation and the efficient use of natural resources against a 
more naturalistic perspective, headed by Sierra Club founder John Muir, that emphasized conservation and 
the complete unadulterated protection of natural resources free from commercial interest. Crucially, in the 
Hetch Hetchy example, Pinchot won out. See Donald Worster, A Passion for Nature : The Life of John 
Muir (Oxford University Press, 2008). In some ways, this first narrative is one remarked upon by Richard 
White, who argues that “One of the great shortcomings—intellectual and political—of modern 
environmentalism is its failure to grasp how human beings have historically known nature through work. 
Environmentalists, for all their love of nature, tend to distance humans from it. Environmentalists stress the 
eye over the hand, the contemplative over the active, the supposedly undisturbed over the connected. They 
call for human connections with nature while disparaging all those who claim to have known and 
appreciated nature through work and labor.” Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the 
Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), x. 
13 K. Ross Toole, The Rape of the Great Plains: Northwestern America, Cattle, and Coal (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co, 1976). 
14 Catlett, “War on Coal.” 
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term capital gain. It was yet the latest instance of cultural myopia in the interest of some 
abstract greater good. 
Not surprisingly, the conflict over these narratives has continued through the 
present, with both sides claiming to be in the right. These are raw, convoluted issues, 
problems that have been steeped in a deep history of settler colonialism, broken treaties, 
and asymmetrical power relations. But it is important to realize that they are not the only 
matters that the conflict has raised. In the midst of all of the clamor over cultural 
desecration and eminent domain, a number of ancillary questions have been unearthed, 
ones that look to the past as much as the future. For instance, what do bison hunting and 
coal extraction have to do with each other? What would it look like to widen the field of 
view such that both activities fall under the same analytical category: the extraction of 
energy by human beings from their environment? And finally, what would such an 
examination do to our current understandings of the American West and its place in the 
larger thermodynamic landscape? This latter is the leading question that this dissertation 
addresses, for as we shall see, although energy sources of all varieties have played a 
critical role in the story of the American West, they have gone almost wholly 
unacknowledged in the larger historiography. This dissertation provides one of the first 
forays into this topic, using the Sarpy Creek incident as a starting point, a portal of sorts 
into the neglected thermodynamic history of the American West. By examining the role 
of grass, oil, and coal in the region’s seminal conflicts, it argues that not only does energy 
play a critical, heretofore unrealized role in the American West, but that a 
thermodynamic examination has the power to reshape our understanding of the region as 
a whole.  
 8 
 
Energy and Narrative in the History of the American West 
 As a field, environmental history has long probed questions of the Sarpy Creek 
type. Although its roots reach well back into the early-twentieth century, it did not begin 
to officially take off and develop a coherent, consciously fashioned intellectual 
foundation until the 1970s, when the mid-century environmentalist movement and works 
such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) prompted such a move.15 At its core, it 
seeks to do what other histories have failed to, “plac[ing] human society firmly in, rather 
than beyond or above, nature.”16 The result is a dialectic relationship between people and 
their environment, revealing not merely how humans have affected ecology through time, 
but, conversely, how ecology has affected humans. This approach can clearly be seen in 
one of the field’s first and most beloved texts, William Cronon’s Changes in the Land: 
Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (1983). The aim of this study was to 
provide “an ecological history of colonial New England…a history which extends its 
boundaries beyond human institutions…to the natural ecosystems which provide the 
contexts for those institutions.” Moving beyond traditional histories of early America, 
Cronon examined not only how colonists interacted with the natural world and the 
adaptations that they made as a result, but also the ways in which these connections 
“involved fundamental reorganizations—less well known to historians—in the region’s 
                                                
15 Although there is endless debate about the specific works that reified environmental history into its own 
viable subfield, there is little argument over the importance of Alfred Crosby’s 1975 monograph The 
Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492. As many historians have observed, 
it is rare that any scholar, especially one who is writing in a marginal field, is able to coin a term that 
becomes common parlance among those within the discipline and, to some degree, within society at large. 
And yet this was the case with “Columbian Exchange.” J.R. McNeill, “The State of the Field of 
Environmental History,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 35, no. 1 (2010): 349. 
16 Donald Worster, “History as Natural History: An Essay on Theory and Method,” Pacific Historical 
Review 53, no. 1 (February 1984): 6. 
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plant and animal communities.”  The result was a (for the time) powerful and in many 
ways revolutionary argument: Indian peoples consciously manipulated their 
environments too, planting crops, burning forests, and modifying habitats for better 
hunting. Although early Europeans saw an unpolluted primeval landscape that awaited 
colonization, in actuality they were dealing with ecosystems that had been carefully 
manipulated for millennia. 17  
 In the three decades since Changes in the Land’s publication, the field of 
environmental history has, in the words of one scholar, “grown like kudzu on a hot July 
day.”18 In the process, it has birthed a glut of disciplinary sub-fields: animal studies, 
marine histories, history of diseases and sickness, the study of the conservation 
movement, urban environmental histories, etc. Among these, one of the least familiar—
and yet, as it applies to the Sarpy Creek incident, most intriguing—is the inchoate field of 
energy history. Although not always codified as its own discipline, the study of energy 
has long been a central focus of environmental history. 19 Drawing upon the work of 
physicists, who began developing theories of thermodynamics in the mid-nineteenth 
century, historians have typically defined energy as the capacity to do work.20 But as 
more capaciously minded scholars have pointed out, “almost every form of energy that 
                                                
17 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1983), xv, 22. 
18 Paul S. Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of 
American History 100, no. 1 (June 1, 2013): 95. 
19 Note, however, that there is a broader, umbrella field known as “energy humanities,” which, in addition 
to history, encompasses the work of philosophers, literary scholars, geographers, artists, and more. In the 
words of one scholar, energy humanities is “an emerging field of scholarship that overcomes boundaries 
between disciplines and between academic and applied research [by] highlight[ing] the essential 
contribution that the insights and methods of the human sciences can makes to areas of study and analysis 
that were once thought best left to the natural sciences.” Dominic Boyer, and Imre Szeman. “The Rise of 
Energy Humanities: Breaking the Impasse.” University Affairs, 12 February 2014. Available online: 
http://www.universityaffairs.ca/opinion/in-my-opinion/therise-of-energy-humanities/.  
20 See, for example, White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River, 6. 
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we use comes, directly or indirectly, from the sun.”21 From this viewpoint, most early 
environmental histories—from Cronon’s Changes in the Land to Alfred Crosby’s The 
Columbian Exchange to Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature—were dealing with 
shifts in energy production through time, albeit in the context of larger environmental 
change.22 More recently, however, a handful of historians have narrowed their approach, 
arguing “that energy has played a specific, hitherto under-explored, and consequently not 
well-understood role in shaping the values, habits and beliefs that have generated the 
human-environment relationship.”23 Under this view, energy is the defining driver of 
history—not just one among many environmental factors—a subject that historians and 
associated academics have neglected in favor of more established methodological 
approaches.24 The result has been a number of critical reinterpretations of the past ranging 
                                                
21 Merle Rubin, review of Children of the Sun: A History of Humanity’s Unappeasable Appetite for Energy, 
by Alfred W. Crosby, Los Angeles Times, January 30, 2006. 
22 Alfred Worcester Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 
(Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975). 
23 Imre Szeman, “On the Energy Humanities: Contributions to the Humanities, Social Sciences, and Arts to 
Understanding Energy Transition and Energy Impasse,” SSHRC Imagining Canada’s Future Initiative 
(May 13, 2016), 7. For example, see Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment 
in Industrial America (New York: Knopf, 1985); Peter A. Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy 
Security in Industrial America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); Christopher F. Jones, 
Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Place of publication not identified: Harvard University 
Press, 2016); Christopher J. Manganiello, Southern Water, Southern Power: How the Politics of Cheap 
Energy and Water Scarcity Shaped a Region (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015); 
H. Lee Scamehorn and Lee Scamehorn, High Altitude Energy: A History of Fossil Fuels in Colorado 
(Boulder, Colo: Univ Pr of Colorado, 2002); Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in 
Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Martin V. Melosi 
and Joseph A. Pratt, eds., Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); Alfred W. Crosby, Children of the Sun: A History of 
Humanity’s Unappeasable Appetite For Energy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); Astrid 
Kander, Paolo Malanima, and Paul Warde, Power to the People: Energy in Europe over the Last Five 
Centuries (Princeton University Press, 2014); Jason P. Theriot, American Energy, Imperiled Coast: Oil and 
Gas Development in Louisiana’s Wetlands (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2014); David E. Nye, Consuming 
Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999); Rolf Peter 
Sieferle, The Subterranean Forest: Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolution, trans. Michael Osmann 
(Cambridge: White Horse Press, 2010).  
23 Vaclav Smil, Energy: A Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld Publications, 2017), 8–9. 
24 As Dale Jamieson puts it, “the story of human development has been the story of the increased use of 
energy.” Dale Jamieson, “Energy, Ethics, and the Transformation of Nature,” in The Ethics of Global 
Climate Change, ed. Denis G. Arnold (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011), 16. 
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from Vaclav Smil’s prolific body of work on energy transitions to Martin Melosi’s 
examination of urban power generation structures to, more recently, Andrew Needham’s 
multi-award-winning Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest, a 
powerful reimagining of southwestern history through an examination of electric 
infrastructure development, one that elucidates the potential that energy histories have to 
fundamentally challenge and restructure our understandings of the region.25 For the 
purpose of this dissertation, however, perhaps the most important energy history is 
Richard White’s slim but potent volume The Organic Machine, which elucidates the 
history of the Columbia River by focusing on the concepts of energy and work through 
time. White’s larger goal is to understand the place of labor in the natural world, to push 
back against environmental histories that portray work as by definition antithetical to 
nature. In doing so, he attempts to reconcile the natural world with capitalism and 
industrial development, promoting a strain of environmentalism that does not seek to 
distance humans from nature or return to a mythic bygone era. In his own words, “What 
this book suggests is that if we want to understand what we have done and how we have 
acted in nature, we might want to spend more time thinking about Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Lewis Mumford and less about Henry David Thoreau and John Muir.”26 By 
approaching a well-worn story through the lens of energy, White opens the path toward 
new histories and relationships with the natural world, in the process revealing the power 
                                                
25 Andrew Needham, Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest (Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
26 White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River, xi. 
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that an energy-centric examination has to reshape our understandings of both history and 
the modern world.27 
 Like many but not all environmental histories, The Organic Machine focuses its 
efforts on a narrowly delineated space: the Columbia River. One of the field’s most 
established and well-respected scholars, Dan Flores, has attempted to take this traditional 
approach and to refocus it, generating a methodology unique to environmental history. 
He calls such an approach “bioregional history,” which he defines as “a precise spatial 
application of Fernand Braudel’s longue durée…the ‘big view’ not so much through wide 
geographic generalizations in shallow time, but through analyzing deep time in a single 
space.”28 Crucial to this is a preference for ecologically delineated boundaries as opposed 
to the more prevalent political borders of most studies, the latter of which tend to warp 
and ignore environmental biomes that stretch across state and national divisions. Put 
simply, a bioregional history examines a small slice of land over a large span of time. By 
strictly limiting the spatial scope of the study, and by abiding by ecological borders 
instead of the more archivally and historically convenient political borders, Flores hopes 
                                                
27 This energy-centric view has also reshaped one aspect of Native American/Western history, that of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century equestrianism. See Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: 
The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” The Journal of American History 78, no. 2 (1991): 465–485; 
James E. Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic: High Plains Indians and Their Horses in the Region of 
the Arkansas River Valley, 1800-1870,” Environmental History Review 16, no. 2 (1992): 61–84; Elliott 
West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, & the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 1998); Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” The 
Journal of American History 90, no. 3 (2003): 833–862; Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Politics of Grass: 
European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power in the Southwest Borderlands,” William & 
Mary Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2010): 173–208; Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008); William A. Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo, 1821-1881,” The Western 
Historical Quarterly 27, no. 1 (April 1, 1996): 33–52. 
28 Dan Flores, “Place: An Argument for Bioregional History,” Environmental History Review 18, no. 4 
(December 1, 1994): 10. 
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to reveal a set of historical changes and trends that have been obviated by methodologies 
that are less in tune with environmental rhythms.29 
 Although Flores claims that “no one so far has quite written the kind of history I 
have in mind here,” he goes on to give a number of examples of pseudo bioregional 
histories—Richard White’s Land Use, Environment, and Social Change: The Shaping of 
Island County, Washington; Timothy Silver’s A New Face on the Countryside: Indians, 
Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests, 1500-1800; and Robin Doughty’s 
Wildlife and Man in Texas: Environmental Change and Conservation.30 But he singles 
out one work in particular—William deBuys’s Enchantment and Exploitation—as a 
paragon of what a bioregional history can do. The text—a revised dissertation—takes on 
a massive timescale, roughly 1500-1980, and provides a cogent case for why this place, 
New Mexico’s Sangre de Cristo Mountains, should matter to a general reader: “no other 
region in all of North America so richly combines both ecological and cultural 
diversity.”31 It is a powerful text, one that, in Flores’s words, is “place specific, 
temporally deep, [and] examines environmental change across sequential cultures…with 
effortless style.”32 But it is also one that can be occasionally abstract and frustrating. Its 
central claim—the assertion that, “in an unforgiving environment, small errors yield large 
                                                
29 Some of the most prominent bioregional histories include William deBuys, Enchantment and 
Exploitation: The Life and Hard Times of a New Mexico Mountain Range (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1985); William deBuys and Joan Myers, Salt Dreams: Land and Water in Low-Down 
California (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001); Thomas G. Andrews, Coyote Valley: 
Deep History in the High Rockies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015); Richard 
White, Land Use, Environment, and Social Change: The Shaping of Island County, Washington (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1979); Mikko Saikku, This Delta, This Land: An Environmental History of 
the Yazoo-Mississippi Floodplain (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005). 
30 White, Land Use, Environment, and Social Change; Timothy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside: 
Indians, Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests, 1500-1800 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Robin W. Doughty, Wildlife and Man in Texas: Environmental Change and 
Conservation (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989). 
31 deBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation, 6. 
32 Flores, “Place,” 14. 
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consequences”—is so widely applicable as to be almost impotent.33 Fortunately, however, 
there are a number of studies not cited by Flores that seem to embody the true promise of 
a bioregional history. The most apposite seems to be Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis: 
Chicago and the Great West. In part, Cronon chose Chicago for this work because it 
represented a broader set of transformations that swept the continent—the evolution of 
urban-rural relationships, the commodification of natural and agricultural products, the 
interwoven impact of culture and geography. But he also chose the city because it was the 
preeminent example of the changes that he sought to track. In other words, instead of 
making a broad claim about the ecological region as a whole, he picked a certain issue to 
trace through time, thereby obviating the broad, overly abstract claims made by deBuys 
et al. Consequently, Nature’s Metropolis hints that, for a bioregional approach to really 
work, there needs to be something special about that place, a quality, event, or resource 
that justifies the study of that particular location for a non-local audience.34 
 But there is another reason that Nature’s Metropolis is so effective. Part of the 
appeal of Cronon’s history—as compared to deBuys’s—is its focus on narrative. As 
David Nye puts it, “During the past decade, environmental historians have become 
interested in how narratives express values. Increasingly, they have realized that narrative 
is not merely a literary concern. People tell stories in order to make sense of their world, 
and some of the most frequently repeated narratives contain a society's basic assumptions 
about its relationship to the environment. To change our relationship with nature, 
                                                
33 deBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation, xix. 
34 In terms of Chicago’s unique place in American history, Cronon claims “Chicago became the link that 
bound the different worlds of east and west into a single system. In the most literal sense, from 1848 to the 
end of the nineteenth century, it was where the West began.” For its representativeness, he writes, “this 
book about Chicago has also been a book about The City, in its largest, most mythic sense as a place 
somehow separate from that other key human landscape, The Country.” William Cronon, Nature’s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 91, 384. 
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therefore, we need to change our stories.”35 Among others, Cronon has focused a great 
deal on how historians tell their own stories, elucidating the different narrative structures 
that they impose on the past, ultimately arguing that "the special task of environmental 
history is to assert that stories about the past are better, all other things being equal, if 
they increase our attention to nature and the place of people within it."36 And while this 
provides an important starting point for the role of narrative in environmental history, 
other scholars have moved beyond such an academic understanding of the topic, focusing 
instead on how historical actors—not historians—have narrated environmental change.37 
This understanding proceeds from Nye’s contention that “environmental history charts 
oppositions between different ethics, embodied in contrasting narratives that are rooted in 
incompatible conceptions of space.”38 Put another way, the narratives that we tell about 
environmental change not only shape the past and the present, but they fundamentally 
alter the future as well.39 
 A prime example of this latter view comes from two of the field’s preeminent 
practitioners: Jared Farmer and the prolific fire historian Stephen Pyne. Although much 
                                                
35 David E. Nye, “Technology, Nature, and American Origin Stories,” Environmental History 8, no. 1 
(2003): 8. 
36 William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” The Journal of American History 
78, no. 4 (March 1, 1992): 1375. 
37 It is also important to note that most cultural environmental histories analyze narratives, whether they 
explicitly state it or not. For instance, Joseph Taylor, in his study of the Pacific salmon industry, has 
written, “The way people used nature also reflected their technological sophistication and intellectual 
concerns. How they made collective sense of these and other issues is what we call culture. Seemingly 
ethereal matters of the mind, it turns out, matter greatly when trying to understanding the material 
consequences of everyday life. This is as true of the aboriginal first-salmon ceremony as of the capitalist 
commodification of nature, the development of scientific salmon management, or the preservation of 
ecosystems.” Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries 
Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 7. 
38 Cronon, “A Place for Stories," 1375. 
39 For one example of this perspective, see Kent Curtis, “Producing a Gold Rush: National Ambitions and 
the Northern Rocky Mountains, 1853-1863,” The Western Historical Quarterly 40, no. 3 (October 1, 2009): 
275–97. While not as explicitly cultural and linguistic as I have in mind here, Curtis definitively shows how 
the Montana gold rush needed to be “produced” in order to take place. 
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of Farmer’s work is concerned with story, On Zion’s Mount provides the best place-based 
history.40 The text looks at the cultural construction of place by examining the Mormon 
migration and, more specifically, the twentieth-century creation and transformation of 
Mount Timpanagos from a “mountainous space” to “the mountain-place called ‘Timp.’” 
Emerging out of the creation and propagation of a specious Indian legend in the early-
twentieth century, Brigham Young University Athletic Director Eugene Roberts, the 
B.Y.U. community, and the town of Provo culturally produced a landmark that drew 
upon—but crucially manipulated—the region’s history. In instances such as this, Farmer 
writes, “collective memory involves forgetting as much as remembering.”41 Beginning 
with the early Mormon migration and Indian interactions, Farmer surveys the broader 
historical landscape within which the Timp legend proliferated during the twentieth 
century, from the rise of mountain veneration to the spread of quasi-Indian place names 
and stories in folklore. In doing so, he traces both the popularization of the landmark and 
the conscious manipulation of Mormon historical memory; by the twentieth century, what 
began as a bounteous ecological milieu in the mid-nineteenth century had become 
memorialized as the divine conquest of a malignant desert environment.  
Similarly, Stephen Pyne has made cultural production the focus of much of his 
scholarship. This is perhaps most evident not in the numerous fire histories that he has 
produced but in a smaller volume, How the Canyon Became Grand: A Short History, 
which attempts to recast the history of the beloved canyon from the perspective of the 
stories that have been told about it. In doing so, Pyne portrays “a cultural Canyon, the 
                                                
40 Also see Jared Farmer, Glen Canyon Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2004); Jared Farmer, Trees in Paradise: A California History (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2013). Beyond Farmer, another example of this approach can be seen in W. 
Barksdale Maynard, Walden Pond: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
41 Farmer, On Zion’s Mount, 3, 12. 
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Grand Canyon as a place with meaning…[that] has been shaped by ideas, words, images, 
and experiences. Instead of faults, rivers, and mass wasting, the processes at work 
involved geopolitical upheavals and the swells of empires, the flow of art, literature, 
science, and philosophy, the chisel of mind against matter. These determined the shape of 
Canyon meaning. As they converged in place and time, they distinguished the Canyon 
from among hundreds of other, competing landscapes.”42 This is a decidedly cultural 
approach to environmental history, one that views the landscape as not simply material 
but cultural as well.43 It is in many ways antithetical to the more materially minded 
approach of most energy histories. And yet this is not the way that it has to be: as we 
shall see, it is a combination of these two approaches that has the potential to unravel the 
enigma that is the Sarpy Creek incident, in the process yielding new understandings of 
the history of energy in the American West. 
  
Place, Methodology, and Scope 
From a bioregional perspective, Sarpy Creek is part of an isolated expanse known 
as the Powder River Basin. Bisected by I-90, it is a geologic depression spanning large 
chunks of northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana, topographically bounded by 
                                                
42 Stephen J. Pyne, How the Canyon Became Grand: A Short History (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 
1999), xii. Even in his abundant fire histories, Pyne has made narrative one of the central concepts, 
outlining how our understanding of fire is based on the stories we tell, particularly the martial metaphors 
we tend to fall back on. See “Words on Fire: Toward a New Language of Wildland Fire,” speech given 
November 2, 2012, Oregon State University, https://liberalarts.oregonstate.edu/feature-story/dr-stephen-j-
pyne-words-we-use-describe-world-fire, and Pyne, Between Two Fires: A Fire History of Contemporary 
America (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015), 442. 
43 Also see Jan Bender Shetler, Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from 
Earliest Times to the Present (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 4, 24, who makes a similar 
observation: "The power of people to shape the landscape is dependent on how they imagine the landscape, 
which, in turn, is reproduced on the landscape.” Shetler’s stated goal—“My goal is to produce an account 
of the past that speaks to current debates and the concerns of common people's lives”—provides an 
important distinction from the more historiographical view of Cronon. 
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the Bighorn Mountains and the Black Hills. And although its boundaries are, even to the 
most erudite geologists, somewhat equivocal, it spans an area roughly 230 miles long and 
100 miles wide, in total comprising more than 20,000 square miles of territory. 
Demographically, it is a chronically under-populated, arid expanse, dotted with a handful 
of midlevel cities—Gillette, Buffalo, Sheridan, Casper, Douglas—and two Indian 
reservations—the Crow and the Northern Cheyenne. Outside of the region, it is little 
known.  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Powder River Basin 
https://www.elephantoilandgas.com/operations 
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And yet over the past century and a half it has been the subject of much historical 
study, with scholars and amateurs alike producing reams of work since the region was 
first colonized by Euro-Americans in the 1860s. Part of the basin’s appeal has been the 
number of mythic western history events that have taken place there: it was the home to 
some of the last great bison herds of the West, the Johnson County War, the Battle of 
Greasy Grass/Little Bighorn, the largest oil refinery in the world, the Bozeman trail, and 
now the largest coal mines in the world. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the region’s studies 
have focused on these events individually, with special preference given to the Indian 
Wars of the 1860s and 1870s.44 Although there are rare exceptions, the monographs that 
have centered upon the region have in large part been popular as opposed to academic 
texts, with publication dates that skew toward the first half of the twentieth-century.45 
With the exception of broad-scale county- and city-histories, none of these works has 
examined such events together; more tellingly, none have approached them from the 
bioregional perspective of the basin as a whole.46  
                                                
44 In addition to the innumerable histories on Little Bighorn/Greasy Grass, see Dorothy Johnson, The 
Bloody Bozeman the Perilous Trail to Montana (Mcgraw-Hill, 1971); Paul L. Hedren, Powder River: 
Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016); John D. 
McDermott, Red Cloud’s War: The Bozeman Trail, 1866-1868 (Norman, Okla: The Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 2010); Helena Huntington Smith, The War on Powder River (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1967); Margaret I. Carrington, Absaraka: Home of the Crows. Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1950. 
45 The scale of these is too numerous to list here. For examples on the Johnson County War, see Jack Flagg, 
A Review of the Cattle Business in Johnson County, Wyoming, Since 1882, and the Causes that Led to the 
Recent Invasion (Cheyenne: The Vic Press, 1892); Robert B. David, Malcolm Campbell, Sheriff. (Casper: 
Wyomingana, Inc., 1923); Ernest Staples Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1929; John W. Davis, Wyoming Range War: The Infamous Invasion of Johnson County. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012). For Teapot Dome, see Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome: Oil and 
Politics in the 1920’s (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1962); Ed Bille, Early Days at Salt Creek and 
Teapot Dome (Casper: Mountain States Lithiograph Company, 1978); Laton McCartney, The Teapot Dome 
Scandal: How Big Oil Bought the Harding White House and Tried to Steal the Country (New York: 
Random House, 2009);  
46 For county histories, see Heritage Book Committee. Pages From Converse County’s Past (Laramie: 
Wyoming Historical Press, 1986); Alfred James Mokler, History of Natrona County, Wyoming, 1888-1922; 
True Portrayal of Yesterdays of a New County and a Typical Frontier Town of the Middle West. Fortunes 
and Misfortunes, Tragedies and Comedies, Struggle and Triumphs of Pioneers. (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley 
& Sons Company, 1923).  
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This dissertation seeks to provide such a view. It does so by drawing upon the 
theoretical tools of energy studies, bioregional history, and narratology. At the same time, 
however, it attempts to overcome the shortcomings of each. In this section I will examine 
what I see as the drawbacks of these existing approaches; I will then outline the ways in 
which I intend to overcome them, combining the various approaches and methodologies 
to suit the Powder River Basin’s mottled thermodynamic past. 
As noted earlier, the field of energy history provides an important correction to 
traditional historical understandings by focusing specifically on thermodynamic 
resources. Nevertheless, in doing so, many of its works have relied upon a form of 
technological determinism, focusing on the material construction of energy 
infrastructures at the expense of more amorphous cultural factors.47 This can be seen in 
the work of Smil and Crosby, whose scholarship focuses so heavily on what they term 
“prime movers,” the technologies that utilize energy and therefore drive larger 
thermodynamic systems, and quasi-Turnerian progressions—known in the field as 
“energy transitions”—in which one fuel gives way to another. (E.g., the often-cited early-
twentieth-century transition from coal to oil.) A number of scholars have challenged this 
materialism—most notably, David Nye has built his career by examining the “different 
stories we tell each other to make sense of the transformations that accompany the 
adoption of new machines.”48 Nevertheless, technological determinism has remained so 
widespread and perhaps unconscious that even many of the more culturally inclined 
                                                
47 See for instance Vaclav Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations of 1867-1914 and 
Their Lasting Impact (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Vaclav Smil, Energy and 
Civilization: A History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017); Vaclav Smil, Making the 
Modern World: Materials and Dematerialization (Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley, 
2013); Melosi, Coping with Abundance; Brian Frehner, Finding Oil: The Nature of Petroleum Geology, 
1859-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Hughes, Networks of Power. 
48 David Nye, Narratives and Spaces (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 3. 
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energy historians have unwittingly upheld it, giving lip-service to the more abstruse, 
cultural factors of energy systems while in reality upholding extant approaches.49 As one 
scholar puts it, “instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a 
captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of ‘energy futures’ that 
imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.”50 In spite of all 
of the valuable changes that energy historians have brought about, their circumscribed 
approach has limited the power of those interpretations to affect our existing narratives. 
At first glance, the explicitly cultural works of Farmer, Pyne, and other 
environmental historians provide a potent antidote to such material determinism. By 
foregrounding the power of cultural narratives to shape the natural world, they push back 
against narrowly empirical studies. Upon closer examination, however, these works have 
remained rather limited in their reach, even within the narrow confines of environmental 
history. On the one hand, scholars such as Cronon have focused on how they, academic 
historians, use narrative to mold their own stories; on the other hand, Farmer, Pyne, 
Barksdale Maynard, and others have examined specific landmarks—places such as the 
Grand Canyon, Walden Pond, and the Catskills—probing how the stories told about them 
have veered and clashed through time.51 Such an approach lends itself well to studying 
these archetypal landmarks. And yet the problem is that it does not apply particularly 
                                                
49 See for instance, Christopher Jones’s Routes of Power. Although ostensibly cultural, the real focus of the 
book is one the development of energy infrastructure systems—what he calls “landscapes of 
intensification”—during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. As Jones puts it, “The roots of 
America’s energy transitions can be found in the building of routes along which coal, oil, and electricity 
were shipped.” By focusing on such energy transitions—the book is divided into three sections: coal, oil, 
electricity—Jones reinforces notions of neat, Turnerian progression in energy history. Christopher F. Jones, 
Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 2. 
50 Josh Byrne and Noah Toly, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse,” in Byrne, Toly, and 
Leigh Glover, Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict (Transaction Publishers, 
2011), 1. 
51 In addition to Pyne on the Grand Canyon and Maynard on Walden Pond, see David Stradling, Making 
Mountains: New York City and the Catskills (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007). 
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well to lesser-known places, the fly-over states and the thousands of towns, cities, and 
regions that do not possess a steady tourist stream, places such as the Powder River 
Basin, which people tend to drive through, not stop in, proceeding on their way to the 
more landmark-quality and narratively receptive locales of Yellowstone, Big Sky, and 
Glacier. In essence, it assumes that these places do not possess stories that are worthy 
enough to be heard. 
In contrast, this dissertation moves beyond cultural environmental history’s focus 
on landmarks—the Grand Canyon, Niagara Falls, Mount Timpanogos —in order to take 
on more impersonal, lesser-loved places and processes. To help achieve this realignment, 
it looks to the latest findings in the field of narratology. Founded as a literary sub-
discipline more than half a century ago, narratology has evolved from its nascent 
structuralist beginnings—with the attendant focus on unearthing universal grammars and 
forms, discovering the “what” and the “how” of narrative—to a more diversified, 
sprawling, and complex interdisciplinary field. This latter approach—deemed 
postclassical narratology—draws upon many of the earlier theories and approaches of the 
structuralists, but it also dives into the “why” of narrative, in the process unearthing the 
complexities, contradictions, and implications of the ways in which narrative is used in 
the world.52 From an environmental perspective, this means asking “how groups of 
people ‘story’ themselves into environmental relations, or how they understand their 
environmental connections, whether it is to defend or to exploit.”53 Drawing upon the 
work of Peter Brooks, Jerome Bruner, Ansgar Nünning, Monika Fludernik, David 
                                                
52 For an overview of the transition from structural of classical narratology to postclassical narratology, see 
Roy Sommer, “The Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies and the Consolidated Future of 
Narrative Theory,” DIEGESIS 1 no. 1 (December 4, 2012): 143-157. 
53 Raul Lejano, Mrill Ingram, and Helen Ingram, eds. The Power of Narrative in Environmental Networks 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013): 2. 
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Herman, and Paul John Eakin, this dissertation foregrounds the various ways that people 
have made sense of, narrated, and represented material change to a little-known 
landscape: the Powder River Basin.54 In doing so, it moves beyond the strictly historical 
and landmark-based perspectives of Farmer, Pyne, Cronon and the rest of the cultural 
environmental historians, embracing an understanding of environmental change that is 
not merely cultural but also narrative in its essence.55 
In doing so, this dissertation overcomes a corollary deficiency of energy histories: 
a lack of engagement with the American West. Since the field’s inception, environmental 
history has focused much of its work on the American West, producing discipline-
defining texts such as Thomas Andrews’s Killing for Coal, Sterling Evans’s Bound in 
Twine, Mark Fiege’s Irrigated Eden, David Igler’s Industrial Cowboys, Timothy 
LeCain’s Mass Destruction, and Greg Mitman’s Breathing Space. At the same time, the 
West is a region that has been home to the bulk of the country’s thermodynamic 
                                                
54 See, for instance Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992); Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 
18, no.1 (Autumn 1991): 1-21; Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999); Monika Fludernik, An Introduction to Narratology (New York: Routledge, 
2006); David Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013); Ansgar 
Nünning, Vera Nünning, and Birgit Neumann, eds. Cultural Ways of Worldmaking: Media and Narratives 
(New York: De Gruyter, 2010). 
Thomas Andrews “Review of Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest,” Western 
Historical Quarterly, 47, no. 2 (May 2016), 219 
55 The relationship between environmental change and narrative production in the form of memory is one of 
the central issues that I am interested in here. Somewhat surprisingly, it does not seem to have been dealt 
with extensively in the historiography. One notable example is W. Jeffrey Bolster, who has observed that, 
over the course of five- hundred years, declining fish catches in the Atlantic progressively led to each new 
generation viewing smaller numbers as “normal.” That is, the relatively slow progression of environmental 
change masked the larger transformations over time and ultimately led to the distortions of short-term 
memory, or what Bolster terms “shifting baselines.” At the same time, though, a slightly different form of 
this this relationship is crucial for our own current moment. The most notable example is the way that we 
make sense of and narrate climate change. The stories that we tell about this example of environmental 
change, I would argue, are critical in shaping our everyday behaviors, our perceptions of place (e.g., how 
we interpret this unseasonably warm Michigan winter), and the future actions that we will take. W. Jeffrey 
Bolster, The Mortal Sea: Fishing the Atlantic in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 34. For climate change, see, for example, Roderick McIntosh, Joseph Tainger, and 
Susan Keech McIntosh, eds., The Way the Wind Blows: Climate, History, and Human Action (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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resources for many years now—from the oil fields of the Bakken and Alaska to the coal 
fields of the Powder River Basin to (in the Canadian context) the tar sands of Fort 
McMurray. As such, it is surprising that the notoriously fecund cross-pollination between 
environmental history and the West has yet to trickle down to energy history. In spite of 
the West’s abundant western resources, I have been unable to find a single article in the 
Western Historical Quarterly archives that is explicitly concerned with energy.56 Of 
course, the major exception to this claim is Needham’s Power Lines, which so 
convincingly reinterpreted the process and history of power generation in the Southwest. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Power Lines is more the exception than the rule, 
a brief glimpse into what a focus on historical energy development can offer to the New 
Western History; furthermore, it is far more of a technological/social history than an 
environmental one.57 In other words, despite the field’s seeming ability to reshape 
worldviews by highlighting a thermodynamic past, energy history seems to be one of the 
few branches of environmental history that has yet to infiltrate the West. 
By combining the tools and methodological approaches of these disparate fields—
bioregional history, energy studies, and narratology—this dissertation examines cultural 
conceptions of energy in the Powder River Basin through time. The bulk of the narrative 
stretches from the late-eighteenth century through the present, though here and there it 
dips into deeper geological epochs to elucidate material sources. Throughout, its focus is 
on understanding how people have interacted with and understood bison, coal, and the 
                                                
56 The closest seem to be Michael A. Amundson, “Mining the Grand Canyon to Save It: The Orphan Lode 
Uranium Mine and National Security,” The Western Historical Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2001): 321–45. 
57 Note, too, however, that the focus of this book is largely material (on the creation of an infrastructure for 
both producing and moving electricity) and political (settler colonialism via the power industry). As 
Thomas Andrews has observed, “For all its strengths, Power Lines occasionally delves too deeply into the 
byzantine workings of the electrical utilities industry.” Thomas Andrews “Review of Power Lines: Phoenix 
and the Making of the Modern Southwest,” Western Historical Quarterly, 47, no. 2 (May 2016), 219. 
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host of other thermodynamic resources that have defined the Powder River Basin through 
time. To achieve this goal it draws upon a variety of historical sources to trace ecological 
change and cultural perceptions of energy in the past: newspaper stories, environmental 
reports, magazine articles, diaries, letters, political speeches, environmental reports, 
classroom lectures, archaeological studies, novels, short stories, and the occasional film.58 
In doing so, it seeks to trace the cultural construction of land and energy via the first 
bioregional history of energy in the American West. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
 The chapters of this dissertation are arranged thematically. Each one takes an 
important event or development in the history of the American West (and, more 
specifically, the Powder River Basin) and recasts it through the lens of energy and the 
cultural conflicts that surrounded that energy use. As a whole, they proceed roughly 
chronologically, though there are occasional overlaps. This latter has been done 
consciously, for as the incident at Sarpy Creek reveals, energy use by definition resists 
the clean elegance of both temporal and spatial delineation: throughout the history of the 
American West, disparate energy regimes have often overlapped in complex and 
unexpected ways. Understanding how and why this happened is one of the keys to 
understanding the role that energy has played in the West’s larger development. 
 Chapter one draws most directly upon the incident at Sarpy Creek by examining 
the role that energy played in the development of the nineteenth-century Crow. During 
the late-eighteenth and early- to mid-nineteenth century, the Crow possessed some of the 
                                                
58 While this is a method practiced most notably by Farmer and Pyne, the best example of this 
methodological approach is David E. Nye, America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of 
New Beginnings (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2004), 12. 
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most bountiful horse herds on the ecologically hostile northern plains. And yet 
historiographically, they have almost without exception been portrayed as tertiary 
regional inhabitants who suffered and were driven by the actions of their more powerful 
neighbors: the Lakota, the Northern Cheyenne, and the Blackfeet. This chapter 
reexamines this long held understanding by approaching the Crow’s rise and fall through 
the lens of energy use. While most northern plains indigenous histories have presented 
the region as a monolithic ecological entity, there were vast environmental differences 
between the Missouri and Yellowstone (Powder River Basin) ecosystems in the wake of 
American contact. The Crow viewed their Powder River homelands as being in “exactly 
the right place.”59 This chapter illuminates that claim from a thermodynamic angle, in the 
process recasting traditional understandings of Crow passivity and decline in comparison 
with the region’s other tribes. As an energy history shows us, far from being passive 
victims of Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and American attacks, the Crow were one of the 
first peoples to both realize and harness the Powder River’s thermodynamic bounty. 
 Chapter two reevaluates what is perhaps the most iconic of the West’s late-
nineteenth-century cattle conflicts: the Johnson County War. The traditional 
interpretation of this event is that it was a fleeting instance of violence borne out of long-
simmering class conflicts and rampant political greed: according to this view, the 
invaders, a group of wealthy cattle barons, attempted to physically eliminate a group they 
deemed “rustlers,” often-poor, newly settled ranchers and farmers whom they accused of 
stealing cattle. But what is often lost in this interpretation is that there were also critical 
environmental changes that took place during—and in many ways that helped to propel—
                                                
59 Crow leader Arapooish, quoted in Washington Irving, The Adventures of Captain Bonneville (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 165. See chapter one of this dissertation for more 
information on Arapooish. 
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this path to violence. Viewed from a thermodynamic angle, the invaders attempted to 
replace the region’s bison with domesticated cattle, viewing the latter animals as more 
civilized and efficient versions of the former. In doing so, however, they failed to realize 
that cattle are far less efficient conservers of energy in the harsh northern plains 
environment than bison. When the invaders’ ranching system inevitably failed, it was 
replaced not by a group of uneducated small farmers, but by men and women who 
practiced a new thermodynamic approach for managing cattle, what was then known as 
the inchoate field of range science. Drawing upon the best agricultural and livestock 
science of Europe and the United States, these so-called rustlers were at the forefront of a 
new system for cultivating and managing an ecosystem’s energy, one that would have 
important ramifications for the later oil and coal industries. As such, this chapter recasts 
this legendary class conflict from the perspective of energy extraction and an ecological 
relationship to the land. It looks at competing energy regimes in order to understand what 
the eventual conflict can tell us about larger shifts in energy imaginaries in the late-
nineteenth-century West. 
 Chapter three examines one of the most infamous cases of political corruption in 
American history, the Teapot Dome scandal. During the second decade of the twentieth 
century, the U.S. Navy leased a number of oil reserves in California and Wyoming to 
serve as emergency fuel sources. In 1922, however, one of these leases, northeastern 
Wyoming’s Teapot Dome, was secretly leased to private interests. The resulting case was 
a national sensation, one that eventually led to the first U.S. cabinet member in history to 
be sentenced for crimes committed while in office. It is a story that has been told 
countless times, one that is seemingly dredged up whenever there is even a hint of 
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political corruption in modern day Washington. But what is inevitably lost in these 
recapitulations is the local context of the case: the Teapot Dome lease was part of a much 
deeper history of the Powder River Basin’s burgeoning turn-of-the-century oil industry. 
During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the Casper area witnessed a 
battle not unlike that of the Johnson County War: wealthy absentee prospectors attempted 
but failed to capitalize on the region’s perceived oil wealth. As a consequence, experts 
out of Europe came in and leveraged a deep understanding of place and the latest 
scientific theories to locate and extract Salt Creek’s thermodynamic bounty. It would take 
some twenty years, but by the second decade of the new century, Casper was home to the 
largest oil refinery in the world. The story of this rise and Teapot Dome’s fall is the story 
of a larger energy history: increased extraction led to thorough understandings of 
landscapes and their subterranean ecologies; at the same time, however, increased fossil 
fuel use created that same energy’s ultimate abstraction from place. This is the paradox of 
modern energy economies, and it began in the Powder River Basin. 
 The dissertation’s final chapter examines the latter half of the Sarpy Creek 
incident: the rise of Powder River coal. Since the 1980s, the basin has been the largest 
coal provider in the world, contributing roughly forty percent of the United States’ annual 
product.60 Like most mineral rushes, this has come about thanks to a combination of 
geological bounty and shifts in coal’s economic and environmental reputation: Wyoming 
coal contains some of the lowest sulfur percentages in the world, leading it to be viewed 
by many as a cleaner alternative to the eastern coal that had for so long driven the 
American economy. This chapter looks into the deep past of the Powder River coal 
                                                
60 “Powder River Basin Coal Field,” Wyoming State Geological Survey, http://www.wsgs.wyo.gov/energy/ 
coal-prb 
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industry, one that extends far beyond the post-1970 boom. Coal has been mined in the 
basin for well over a century, but never with the success or scale that has been seen over 
the past fifty years. In the early-twentieth century, Peabody Coal and a handful of other 
companies were among the first to leverage narrative techniques in an attempt to market 
the region’s coal as a clean alternative to more popular eastern products. A decade later, 
the Northern Pacific used the latest industrial technology to open one of the first large-
scale coal strip mines in the world at Colstrip, Montana. This chapter picks up where the 
previous one left off, examining the rise of narrative in energy production and 
distribution. Instead of scientific knowledge of place, technological might emerged as the 
key to mid-century coal success. By combining these two approaches—narrative and 
technology—into a historical framework for understanding the modern energy landscape, 
this chapter presents the post-1970 rise of Powder River coal not as something new, but 
as the fortuitous combination of erstwhile failures. In doing so, it seeks to close the loop 
on the region’s energy history, revealing not only how and why the Sarpy Creek incident 
can be seen as the epitome of the Powder River’s thermodynamic past, but also how the 
future of the region-as-energy-provider emerges as much out of its past as its present. 
 
Conclusion 
 Among the chief criticisms of the Sarpy Creek incident was that it presented a lost 
opportunity. On top of the patent violation of a people, a landscape, and a past, Judson 
Finley argued that had it not been for the actions of Westmoreland, Sarpy Creek could 
have become a major tourist destination that gave visitors valuable insight into the 
region’s past. Not only would this have provided a much-needed revenue stream into the 
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Crow Nation’s coffers, but it would have filled an archaeological vacuum in the plains’ 
deep history: the dearth of ancient cultural remains when compared to other more 
bountiful regions.61 
 Viewed from another angle, however, the Sarpy Creek incident can be seen to 
represent an as-of-yet unrealized opportunity. On top of all of the cultural conflicts, the 
exhumation of bison bones in the search for coal has—both figuratively and literally—
unearthed the long buried, complexly intertwined history of energy in the American 
West. Taught for over a century now as a chronicle of boom-and-bust cycles, neatly 
delineated frontier progressions, and energy transitions, historians and the broader 
American public have come to view coal and bison as disparate entities, each belonging 
to its own distinct historical epoch. But as we examine the history of the region more 
closely, zooming in on the mythic events and places that have defined it, it becomes clear 
that the Sarpy Creek incident is not the only curious imbrication of energy in the basin’s 
history. The Johnson County invaders marched across active oil fields in order to defend 
their cattle empire; Crow and Lakota horses battled with American steamboats for the 
same food sources; and Gillette area companies have similarly unearthed bison bones in 
their coal excavations.62 Far from being anomalies, such energetic splicing highlights the 
connections that these heretofore disparate eras and events possess. By examining these 
and other critical moments in the Powder River Basin’s past through a thermodynamic 
lens, this dissertation challenges our existing understandings of the region and its place in 
                                                
61 This is one of Pekka Hämäläinen’s claims for why the “Comanche Empire” and others like it have been 
overlooked in most histories: they left no “ostentatious art and architecture…no imperial ruins to remind us 
of the extent of their power.” Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 4. 
62 In 1977, preliminary work for the Gillette-area Buckskin mine also uncovered a mass of buried bison 
bones and butchering tools dating back close to 9,000 years. Mary Kelley and the Campbell County 
Rockpile Museum, Coal in Campbell County (Charleston, South Carolina: Arcadia Publishing, 2013), 
1990. 
 31 
a broader continental history. Instead of the land of boom and bust or an untrammeled 
Edenic environment, it reveals a place of continuity, manipulation, and abundance. 
Instead of “the kindergarten of the American State” or the home of “independence, self-
reliance, and individualism,” it presents the American West as the energy capital of the 
world.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New History of the American West 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 57-58. 
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TIMELINE 
 
 
1700-1725: Crow reach the Powder River Basin 
 
1829: Fort Union constructed on Missouri River 
 
1830: Crow reported to have 10,000 horses 
 
1832: B.L.E. Bonneville finds oil near present-day Lander 
 
1851: Treaty of Fort Laramie 
 
1850s: Crow migrate to Platte during summers 
 
1859: F.V. Hayden notes the presence of coal on the Tongue River 
 
1863: First reported oil sale in Wyoming near present-day Casper 
 
1863: Crow kill two prospectors along Yellowstone River 
 
1878-1879: First substantial cattle herds enter the Powder River Basin 
 
1881: John Brisbin’s The Beef Bonanza published 
 
1882: Anticline Theory proposed by Israel White 
 
1883: First claim filed at Salt Creek 
 
1885: Cleveland’s proclamation to remove open range fencing 
 
1886: Peak of W.S.G.A. membership 
 
1886: Salt Creek’s first geological report 
 
1886-1887: The Hard Winter 
 
1887: Hatch Act
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1888: Buffalo Land Office Opens 
 
1888-1892: Major increase in Johnson County land filings 
 
1890: First commercial well brought in at Salt Creek 
 
1892: Johnson County War 
 
1893: Sheridan Fuel Company begins coal mining 
 
1896: First geological report devoted solely to Salt Creek published 
 
1901: Burlington Northern modifies trains to burn subbituminous coal 
 
1908: Big Dutch Strike at Salt Creek 
 
1915: Teapot Dome becomes Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 
 
1917: Second sands struck at Salt Creek 
 
1922: Jack Peabody creates Kleenburn brand for Tongue River coal 
 
1922: Casper’s Standard Oil refinery becomes the largest in the world 
 
1922: Teapot Dome Scandal breaks 
 
1923: First Gillette coal mines open 
 
1923: Peak of Salt Creek Oil 
 
1924: Northern Pacific opens Colstrip mine 
 
1925: Sheridan’s Hotchkiss mine sets world record for mining efficiency 
 
1935-1942: C.C.C. Camp 886 fights coal fires in Gillette  
 
1937: Ira Stephens Nelson publishes On Sarpy Creek 
 
1953: Last Sheridan-area mine closes 
 
1959: Northern Pacific closes Colstrip mines 
 
1967: Belle Creek oil field discovered in Powder River Basin, igniting brief boom 
 
1970: Clean Air Act Amendments Passed 
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1980s: Coal-bed methane production begins in Powder River Basin 
 
1988: Wyoming becomes country’s leading coal producer 
 
2000-2010: 7,000 coalbed methane wells drilled in the Powder River Basin 
 
2008: Powder River coal production peaks 
 
2012: Sarpy Creek Controversy 
 
2018: Vice President Mike Pence visits Crow coal mine 
 
2018: Talk of Powder River oil boom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
“In Exactly the Right Place”: 
Crow Thermodynamic Control of the Northern Plains, 1770-1860 
 
Early American travelers had little knowledge of the northern plains landscape, 
never mind of the intricacies of its complex thermodynamic topography. Time and again 
they relied upon the region’s indigenous inhabitants, whom they regularly plied for maps, 
transportation, and basic nutrition. We can see this not only in the mythic travels of 
Lewis and Clark, but also in the countless trappers and traders who followed in their 
wake, traversing the Powder River Basin and surrounding environs in search of the 
promised game and riches. One such trapper was the Irish-American Robert Campbell, an 
employee of the Rocky Mountain Fur Company who depended upon members of the 
Crow Nation to help guide and enable his operations in the 1820s and 1830s. In 
particular, he looked to the great warrior Arapooish, head of the River Crow.1 
Unfortunately we know very little about these encounters; the archival records are 
woefully incomplete. However, one exception does exist, an eloquent instance in which
                                                
1 Information and stories on Arapooish can be found in Dan R. Conway, “Arapooash: The Great Up-Sah-
Ro-Ku and Medicine Man,” Box 7, Folder 8, Joseph Medicine Crow Collection, Little Big Horn College 
Archives, Crow Agency, MT and Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper Missouri: 
Sioux, Arickaras, Assiniboines, Crees, Crows (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), 161–84. In 
most of the work his name is translated as “Sore Belly.” In Denig, however, it is mistranslated as “Rotten 
Belly.” 
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Arapooish outlined the Powder River Basin and its surrounding lands through the ever-
important lens of energy:  
“The Crow country is a good country. The Great Spirit has put it exactly in the 
right place; while you are in it you fare well; whenever you go out of it, 
whichever way you travel, you fare worse. If you go to the south, you have to 
wander over great barren plains; the water is warm and bad and you meet with 
fever and ague. To the north it is cold; the winters are long and bitter and there is 
no grass; you cannot keep horses there but must travel with dogs. What is a 
country without horses? On the Columbia they are poor and dirty, paddle fish is 
poor food.  To the east they dwell in villages; they live well, but they drink the 
muddy waters of the country; good water, good grass, plenty of buffalo. In 
summer it is almost as good as Crow country, but in winter it is cold; the grass is 
gone and there is no salt weed for the horses. The Crow country is exactly in the 
right place. It has snowy mountains and sunny plains, all kinds of climates are 
good things for every season. When the summer heats scorch the prairies, you can 
draw up under the mountains, where the air is sweet and cool, the grass fresh, and 
the bright streams come tumbling out of the snowbanks. There you can hunt elk, 
the deer and the antelope when their skins are fit for dressing; there you will find 
plenty of white bears [grizzlies] and mountain sheep. In the autumn when your 
horses are fat and strong from the mountain pastures you can go down into the 
plains and hunt the buffalo, or trap beaver on the streams. And when winter 
comes on, you can take shelter in the woody bottoms along the rivers; there you 
will find buffalo meat for yourselves and cottonwood bark for your horses, or you 
may winter in the Wind River valley, where there is salt weed in abundance. The 
Crow country is exactly in the right place. Everything good is to be found there. 
There is no country like the Crow country.”1 
 
It is a remarkable statement, not so much for its political import as for the dense 
environmental details that undergird it, the way that it paints the region from the 
perspective of someone who is intimately familiar with the land and its complex ecology. 
In an era in which indigenous voices are so often absent from the archive, Arapooish’s 
words provide rare insight into early-nineteenth-century Crow geography. As such, they 
serve as an apposite starting point for reevaluating perceptions of Crow power on the 
northern plains. 
                                                
1 Quoted in Washington Irving, The Adventures of Captain Bonneville (Norman, Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1961), 165. 
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 Not that there is much power to reinterpret. In the typical historical narrative, the 
Crow are painted as passive actors, American pawns who suffered at the hands of 
Blackfeet and Lakota forces and formed desperate alliances with the U.S.2 By taking an 
energy-centric perspective, and by comparing the Crow’s place in the Yellowstone 
River’s ecology with that of the neighboring Missouri River tribes, this chapter offers an 
alternative history, one that both portrays the Crow as critical and powerful cogs in the 
complex thermodynamic system of the northern plains. In doing so, it sheds light on 
Arapooish’s remarks and the diachronic roots of the Sarpy Creek controversy. Part of this 
has to do with a geographic shift. Historiographically, much of the nineteenth-century 
history of the northern plains has been centered along the Missouri River corridor, a 
riverine system not only unique for the northern plains but also for the continent as a 
whole. In the context of the region, however, this body of water is an aberration, a fluvial 
leviathan in the heart of the “Great American Desert.” To begin with, it is the only river 
that is truly navigable for large crafts, most notably the steamboat. One only has to recall 
that ubiquitous saying “a mile wide and an inch deep,” which has been applied to 
virtually every other stream in the region. But in contrast to the Missouri’s dominance, 
what is interesting about the Yellowstone is that it lies somewhere between these two 
poles—it is large and relatively deep and even, in a few places, seasonably navigable, but 
it resisted what we might call “steamboat colonialism” for nearly half a century after the 
                                                
2 For instance, Pekka Hämäläinen has written the following about the Crow: “their prosperity in horses was 
their undoing. Desperate to obtain guns and to block…incursions, Crows opened their lands to American 
fur traders and, inevitably, to the traders’ microbes…[They] faced a rapid decline….and tried to escape 
annihilation by forging a series of desperate alliances.” Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains 
Indian Horse Cultures,” The Journal of American History 90, no. 3 (2003): 854. 
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Upper Missouri gave way to the craft and its ecological corollaries.3 As Arapooish 
argued, it is “in exactly the right place.” For that reason, an alternative perspective needs 
to be applied to its history and, in consequence, to the Crow’s. Instead of being a road to 
the northwest, the Yellowstone was most notable as a life source, an energy mecca in the 
unforgiving landscape of the northern plains, one whose existence and ecological impact 
provides important clues into the incident at Sarpy Creek.4 Far from being passive victims 
of a Lakota and Blackfeet invasion, the Crow were the first peoples to recognize the 
thermodynamic bounty of the Powder River Basin. Centuries before Gillette coal would 
power the globe, the Crow were transforming the region’s energetic glut into geopolitical 
power. 
                                                
3 The term “steamboat imperialism” comes from Maya Jasanoff’s review of Walter Johnson’s River of 
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. As Jasanoff writes, “Steamboats were to 
nineteenth-century empire-builders what caravels had been to the conquistadores, and what satellites and 
drones are to us: they extended political and economic power into hitherto inaccessible regions.” And 
further, “Steamboats powered the push of white settlement into Indian territory, and facilitated the 
commercial development of the Mississippi Valley into perhaps the most profitable land in the world. The 
“Cotton Kingdom” was created by steamboat imperialism.” Maya Jasanoff, “Our Steamboat Imperialism,” 
The New York Review of Books. October 10, 2013, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/10/10/our-
steamboat-imperialism/.  
4 This claim owes much to Richard White, who, in writing of the Columbia River, remarks that “Like us, 
rivers work. They absorb and emit energy; they rearrange the world.” White, The Organic Machine: The 
Remaking of the Columbia River, 5. To do so, I draw upon the work of geographers and cultural theorists to 
inform my thinking. In particular, Laura Benton, has described the “corridors and enclaves” of colonial 
control, emphasizing the patchwork nature of territorial control and knowledge in legal discourse. 
Lefebvre’s work has stressed the intertwining of social spaces, what he describes as “a structure far more 
reminiscent of flaky mille-feuille pastry than of the homogenous and isotropic space of classical 
(Euclidean/Cartesian) mathematics.”4 In essence, I want to argue that historians’ treatment of the northern 
plains environment has often been similar, favoring what, drawing upon Bahktin, could be described as the 
monologic over the polyphonic, mosaic patterns that Benton and Lefebvre proffer. Brute control of it as a 
thoroughfare wasn’t nearly as important as was accessing its resources and adapting socio-political change 
to its ecology, an aspect which, I argue, the Crow excelled at during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
leading them not into the role of the imperial power of the Lakota and Blackfeet, but as dexterous 
diplomatic actors who reacted in concert with a particular ecological niche. Lauren A Benton, A Search for 
Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400--1900 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1–39. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1992), 86. 
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Figure 2: Map of Yellowstone River Watershed 
Yellowstone River: A Wildlife Paradise, https://www.americanrivers.org/river/yellowstone-river/ 
 
The Northern Plains’ Energy Hub 
 Like so many environmental histories, this story begins with simple ecology. 
Geographically speaking, historians of the American West have tended to delineate the 
plains via a latitudinal triad—the southern, central, and northern plains. And although the 
particular delineations of these sections vary according to the respective author and study, 
each is defined by its aridity.5 Historically speaking, this meant that during the plains 
equestrian period, stretching from roughly the mid-eighteenth century through to the 
                                                
5 This goes back to Walter Prescott Webb’s seminal 1931 study on the Plains, which, drawing upon John 
Wesley Powell’s 1879 “Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States,” defines aridity as 
“The third characteristic, and in reality the most important one in determining a plains environment as 
exhibited in the United States, is a sub-humid or semi-arid climate; that is, a climate deficient in rainfall,” 
which he defined as less than twenty inches of annual precipitation. Walter Prescott Webb, The Great 
Plains (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1931), 6. 
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1870s and the demise of the bison, of these three sections the northern plains harbored by 
far the fewest horses. In large part this was due to the notoriously brutal winters—
climactic records along the Yellowstone record temperatures ranging from -50 to 108, 
with average precipitation in much of the region below ten inches annually—which 
stunted floral growth and made it increasingly difficult for both humans and animals to 
conserve and access the plains’ limited energy sources.6 But beyond the northern climate, 
a handful of other less obvious factors influenced this austerity. Most notably, the 
northern plains—and the Powder River Basin in particular—has, in the words of one 
scholar, “one of the most variable climates in the world.”7 In simple terms, this means 
that climactic conditions—most notably precipitation, the primary driver of floral growth 
and therefore of all life on the plains—can and do vary wildly from day to day, from 
season to season, from year to year. Large-scale droughts descend upon the region 
roughly every two decades, with historical-grade shortages arriving every forty to fifty 
years.8 The result is the creation of immense “water stress,” a diminution of the region’s 
grasses that arises “when the rate of water loss by transpiration exceeds the rate at which 
it is replaced by absorption.”9 Over the course of even minor droughts, floral biomass can 
diminish substantially. To give but one example, during the 1930s Dust Bowl (which was 
                                                
6  Peterson, D.A., Wright P.R., Edwards, G.P., Jr., Hargett, E.G., Feldman, D.L., Zumberge, J.R., and Dey, 
Paul, 2009, "Ecological assessment of streams in the Powder River Structural Basin, Wyoming and 
Montana, 2005–06," U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2009–5023, 5; George Carr 
Frisson, "Archaeological Evidence of the Crow Indians in Northern Wyoming: A Study of Late Prehistoric 
Period Buffalo Economy," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967), 8.  
7 Wendy Ann Swanson Sutton, “Economic and Social Change during a Critical Transition: The 
Protohistoric in the Powder River Basin and Big Horn Mountains,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia 
University, 2004), 93. Similarly, Frisson observes, “The climate can best be described as that of violent 
contrasts.” Frisson, "Archaeological Evidence of the Crow Indians in Northern Wyoming,” 10. 
8 George M. Zeimens, Danny N. Walker, Archeology of the Eastern Powder River Basin, Wyoming (Bureau 
of Land Management, 1977), 23.  
9 R.W. Brown “Water Relations of Range Plants,” in Ronald Sosebee, ed., Rangeland Plant Physiology, 
(Denver: Society for Range Management, 1977), 107.  
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notably less severe on the northern plains than on the central and southern plains) one 
study observed that forage yield in Montana dropped from 1,586 pounds per acre to a 
mere 222 pounds per acre.10 Today this manifests as agricultural losses, but during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it meant a corollary variability in bison hunting. As 
the anthropologist Douglas Bamforth has observed, the predictability of grass density and 
therefore rainfall is the primary factor in establishing the success of year-to-year bison 
hunts. When dry years set in and grasslands wither, “animals move more often, farther, 
and faster” than they do during good or even average years. As a result, the hunt becomes 
more volatile, and the possibility of starvation begins to set in.11 
To some extent this is all an old story: as American settlers in the 1930s found 
out, the plains can be a brutally harsh environment.12 But what is most notable—and what 
provides us with a telling glimpse into the Sarpy Creek controversy—is that in this by all 
accounts merciless landscape, the Crow somehow managed not merely to survive but to 
paradoxically thrive, transforming themselves from a largely horticultural, Missouri-river 
dwelling tribe into one of the dominant equestrian powers on the continent. Both 
nineteenth-century traders and twentieth-century historians have remarked upon this 
anomaly, noting that at a time when the Comanche, inhabiting the far more hospitable 
southern plains, possessed on average eighty horses per family, the Blackfeet (to the 
Crow’s immediate north) managed a scant one-to-five. On the northern plains, this was 
the norm, for “the long and cold winters reduced the quantity, quality, and availability of 
                                                
10 Robert T. Coupland, “The Effects of Fluctuations in Weather upon the Grasslands of the Great Plains,” 
Botanical Review 24, no. 5 (1958): 288. 
11 Douglas B. Bamforth, Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains, Interdisciplinary 
Contributions to Archaeology (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 48–49. 
12 See, for instance, William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” The Journal of 
American History 78, no. 4 (March 1, 1992): 1347–76. 
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forage, exposing the animals to starvation and causing heavy winter losses.”13 And yet 
even in such a harsh environment, it was “not uncommon for a single family [of Crow] to 
be the owner of 100 of these animals…[and] most middle-aged men have from 30 to 
60.”14 The German Prince Maximilian estimated that by the 1830s the Crow had between 
nine and ten thousand horses in total, an equine bounty anomalous for the region.15 What 
we have, then, is the story of an extraordinary metamorphosis, of a tribe somehow 
managing to flourish in one of the continent’s most ruthless environments, where “the 
long and cold winters reduced the quantity, quality, and availability of forage, exposing 
the animals to starvation and causing heavy winter losses.”16 What we have is the 
beginnings of one of the West’s more remarkable thermodynamic powers. 
Unraveling this mystery requires a deeper understanding of Crow history and its 
relation to the region’s ecology. According to the tribe’s oral histories, by 1730 they had 
obtained their first mounts. The late tribal historian Joseph Medicine Crow has presented 
three different accounts for how this event came about. In the first, a Crow war party 
trekked across the Continental Divide and either traded for or stole an animal from one of 
the Columbia River tribes who, as a result of contact with the Spanish, were already in 
possession of them. Not surprisingly, the Crow were mesmerized by the animal, which 
“stood high as an elk but looked very different.” One of the men got too close and was 
kicked in the stomach, thereby bequeathing the name “Kicked In The Bellies” to the 
individual and later to the Crow band, one that still exists today. In the second narrative, a 
                                                
13 Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” The Journal of American 
History 90, no. 3 (2003): 845-847. 
14 Blackfeet estimate from. Crow estimated from Edwin Thompson Denig, Five Indian Tribes of the Upper 
Missouri: Sioux, Arickaras, Assiniboines, Crees, Crows (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), 
144–45. 
15 Prince Maximilian du Wied, Travels in North America, Part I, Early Western Travels, edited by Reuben 
G. Thwaites (Cleveland: A. Clark Company, 1905), Volume XXII, 351. 
16 Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” 846. 
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war party traveled south to Salt Lake, once again either trading for or carrying off a horse 
from a tribe in the region, possibly the Comanche. They then returned to their homelands 
with the animal, incorporating it into tribal lifeways. In the final rendition, a story that has 
received far less traction in twentieth-century historical narratives, a Crow man dreamed 
of the horse. He then set out on a journey in search of such a creature, ultimately finding 
a band of them in a lake. There he captured the animals and brought them back to the 
tribe, providing an all-important bridge into the equestrian period.17  
All three of these stories have own their historical merits, but the empirical 
validity is beyond our concern here. Regardless of how they obtained their initial mounts, 
within a decade the Crow had amassed a large enough surplus that they were able to trade 
with the Frenchman Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, Sieur de la Verendrye, and his 
company, who traveled amongst the Crow in the 1740s.18 Over the next half-century, they 
took quickly to the equestrian lifestyle, regularly traveling across the continental divide to 
obtain mounts via trade and theft from the Nez Perces, the Hidatsas, and the Flatheads, 
while also venturing out in war parties in other directions. As a result, by 1805, when the 
North West Company trader Charles Mackenzie encountered the Crow at the Hidatsa 
villages, he deemed them “the best riders in the world.”19  
 The key historical question is this: how were the Crow, living in the heart of one 
of the harshest environments on the continent, able to support such massive horse herds 
when the surrounding tribes struggled to harbor more than a scant two or three per 
                                                
17 Joseph Medicine Crow and Herman J. Viola, From the Heart of the Crow Country: The Crow Indians’ 
Own Stories, (Lincoln: Bison Books, 2000), 100-102; Hoxie, 42. As with most stories of early 
equestrianism, the details of early horse acquisition are debated. For an overview of the competing 
narratives, see Andrew Dewhirst, “A Society Under Siege: A History of Changing Crow Indian Land 
Boundaries, 1700-1904,” (Master’s Thesis, University of Wyoming, 1996), 24. 
18 Medicine Crow, From the Heart of the Crow Country, 102-104. 
19 “Charles Mckenzie’s Narratives,” in Wood and Thiessen, eds., Early Fur Trade, 245.  
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family? To arrive at an answer, we need to refer back to Arapooish’s initial remarks: as 
he observed, the Crow country was in “exactly the right place.” Once again, this is not to 
be dismissed as mere rhetoric or prejudice. Rather, for the purposes of historical study we 
are better off finding a way to translate his observations into the argot of twenty-first-
century western thought and its fetishization of rational empiricism. In essence, the 
disparity in Crow wealth boiled down to what we would now call thermodynamics, the 
vast storehouses of energy that were—and, as the Sarpy Creek story reminds us, are—
present in the Crow homelands.20 In the three hundred years that preceded Arapooish’s 
encounter with the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, the Crow had traveled over much of 
the Upper Midwest and Plains in search of land and energy. At some point they had been 
a part of the Hidatsa tribe, living in what is now southeastern Manitoba, near Lake of the 
Woods, surviving through a combination of farming and hunting. In the mid-sixteenth 
century, they broke off from the Hidatsa, traveling to present-day North Dakota and 
Devil’s Lake. By the beginning of the next century, the Crow were on the Missouri River, 
living with the Mandan in their great villages at the mouth of the Heart. According to oral 
histories, they remained there for some years, until a remarkable individual named Chief 
No Vitals proclaimed, “it is time I heed the Great Spirit’s instructions, I have tarried too 
long,” referring to a vision in which the Great Spirit instructed him to move “towards the 
land of setting sun and to inherit a wonderful land of many mountains abound with game 
and many good things to eat.” So the Crow traveled northwest along the Missouri, 
                                                
20 In simple terms, thermodynamics is “the science of energy flow and chemical kinetics,” which is how I 
will use the term in this chapter. Of course from a scientific perspective, the concept is much more complex 
and often focuses on what has been deemed the second law of thermodynamics, that entropy increases over 
time. Eric D. Schneider and Dorion Sagan, Into the Cool: Energy Flow, Thermodynamics, and Life 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2006), 4. 
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continuing up the Milk River and into present-day Alberta.21 From there they wandered 
south to Salt Lake before once again returning north, to a land “Where There is Fire,” a 
place that, according to Medicine Crow, “must have been an open and burning coal vein 
somewhere in southern Wyoming.” Finally they ventured onto their final stopping place, 
the Yellowstone Valley, reaching what would become their homeland sometime between 
1700 and 1725.22 According to one scholar, “for the Hidatsa and Crow…the vision 
experience was both disintegrative and regenerative, an exercise of power in the 
permeable domains of politics and the supernatural by men and women actively engaged 
in creating their own world.” As a result, “not only were they traversing a new land; No 
Vitals and his followers were constructing a new thought-world during their High Plains 
migration.”23 Emerging out of firsthand experience with the landscape and its thousands 
of different microenvironments, this worldview would lay the foundation for a new 
thermodynamic relationship, one that fully exploited the limited resources of the northern 
plains and paved the way for the Crow’s subsequent wealth and power. 
 By the early nineteenth century, then, after centuries of wandering and searching 
for the “wonderful land” that the Creator had promised to No Vitals, the Crow finally 
found and gained access to one of the great energy hubs of the northern plains, the 
                                                
21 One account puts them at present-day Devil’s Lake, North Dakota. See Dewhirst, “A Society Under 
Siege,” viii. 
22 Joe Medicine Crow, “Crow Migration History,” Box 7, Folder 8, Joseph Medicine Crow Collection, 
Little Big Horn College Archives, Crow Agency, MT; Joseph Medicine Crow “The Crow Country,” Box 6, 
Folder 15, Little Big Horn College Archives. For more on the Crow Migration story, see Frederick E 
Hoxie, Parading through History: The Making of the Crow Nation in America, 1805 - 1935, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 36–39; Peter Nabokov, "Cultivating Themselves: The Interplay of Crow 
Indian Religion and History," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989), 111-123; Raymond 
W. Wood, Alan S. Downer, "Notes on the Crow-Hidatsa Schism," Plains Anthropologist, 22 no. 78 
(November 1977): 83-100. 
23 James Brooks, “Sing Away the Buffalo: Faction and Fission on the Northern Plains,” in Beyond 
Subsistence: Plains Archaeology and the Postprocessual Critique,” edited by Philip Duke and Michael 
Wilson (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995), 145. 
 46 
Yellowstone River and its tree of tributaries—most notably for our purposes, Sarpy 
Creek and the larger Powder River after which the region is named.24 It was a major 
geopolitical coup, for as we shall see the Yellowstone is a truly remarkable river, nearly 
five hundred miles in length, by far the longest tributary of the Missouri, one that 
descends down from the peaks of the Shoshone Mountains, just outside of present-day 
Yellowstone National Park, sliding and meandering until it finally makes its confluence 
with the Missouri in present-day Fort Buford, North Dakota, the nineteenth-century 
location of the famed Fort Union, which will factor so centrally into our discussion here. 
Traveling through the region in 1805, Meriwether Lewis praised the “wide and fertile 
vallies…which occasionally unmasked by the wood on their borders disclose their 
meanderings for many miles in their passage through these delightfull tracts of 
country…the whole face of the country was covered with herds of Buffaloe, Elk & 
Antelopes,” while William Clark, in his characteristically terse manner, observed, “for 
me to mention or give an estimated of the different Spcies of wild animals on this river 
particularly Buffalow, Elk Antelopes & Wolves would be increditable. I shall therefore 
be silent on the Subject further.”25  
What the two men were noting was the key ecological feature of the region: its 
river bottoms, the nutrient-rich land that abutted the rivers and seasonally teemed with 
cottonwood, boxelder, sagebrush, peachleaf willow, and hundreds of other critical 
species.26 Also called riparian ecosystems, they are among the most diverse, dynamic, and 
                                                
24 Such descriptions continue into the present day. Medicine Crow, for instance, refers to the Crow 
homeland as “The promised land.” Joseph Medicine Crow Interview, OH 1862, Montana Historical 
Society, Helena, MT.  
25 Moulton, Journals of Lewis and Clark, 4:67, 8: 219. 
26 Dennis H. Knight et al., Mountains and Plains: The Ecology of Wyoming Landscapes, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014), 54–55. For instance, François Larocque, traveling with the Crow in 1805, wrote 
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complex ecosystems in the world.27 But nowhere is their role more integral than in those 
locations where water is at a premium. In arid environments such as the northern plains, 
riparian ecosystems present as ecological anomalies, rare ribbons of forest and shrubland 
that blossom in the heart of the “Great American Desert.”28 While trees were notably 
absent out on the plains proper, along the Powder and the Yellowstone cottonwoods 
regularly reached four feet in diameter, and sagebrush often grew “taller than a man on 
horseback.”29 This is because these ecological strips, occupying less than two percent of 
the plains landscape, end up supporting more than eighty percent of the region’s fauna.30 
In short, what these biomes are is natural energy factories, thermodynamic oases that 
slice through some of the world’s most arid environments. Richard White has made 
similar claims about the relationship between the Columbia River and energy in the 
Pacific Northwest, observing that “like us, rivers work. They absorb and emit energy; 
they rearrange the world.”31 But the situation with the nineteenth-century Crow was 
different in important ways. Unlike the Columbia, which wends its way through one of 
the continent’s more saturated environments, and where energy manifests as salmon and 
hydropower, the Yellowstone’s energy presents as a year-round source of moisture and a 
slurry of rich, ever-changing deposits from the more nutrient-dense climes of the 
                                                                                                                                            
that “the Powder River is…large with plenty of full grown trees…so that on our arrival we perceived 
diverse herds of Elk Deers through the woods.” François Antoine Larocque and Lawrence J. Burpee, 
Journal of Larocque from the Assiniboine to the Yellowstone, 1805 (Ottawa : Government Printing Bureau, 
1910), 30. 
27 Robert Naiman and Henri Decamps, “The Ecology of Interfaces: Riparian Zones,” Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics, 28: 623. 
28 Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” The Journal of American 
History 90, no. 3 (2003): 847. 
29 George Carr Frison, “Archaeological Evidence of the Crow Indians in Northern Wyoming,” 5-7. 
Cottonwood observation from Charles C. Bajza, “Powder River Basin: A Study in Regional Geography,” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1953), 147. 
30 Wetland and Riparian Areas of the Intermountain West Ecology and Management Edited by Mark C. 
McKinstry, Wayne A. Hubert, and Stanley H. Anderson, 2004, xi. 
31 White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River, 3. 
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mountains. In this, the Yellowstone is particularly notable, flowing during the early-
twentieth century with an average discharge of 10,250 second-feet and with a maximum 
of an astounding 96,300 second-feet. Compare this to smaller tributaries, streams like the 
Powder, which possesses an average discharge of 441 second-feet, and the Tongue, a 
mere 212.32 In its course down from the mountains, the Yellowstone not only injects 
water into this arid landscape, but it also imbues a batter of rich mountain minerals—
more than twenty-five million tons per years—into a landscape known for its alkali- and 
clay-based soils.33 In doing so, it creates a riparian biome in which energy is stored 
aboveground and therefore readily available for humans and animals, even during the 
notoriously brutal winter months.34 This is a crucial distinction, because unlike the 
eastern forests that were so familiar to Americans of the time, on the grasslands most of 
the biomass resides below ground, in the roots, an evolutionary adaptation in response to 
the plain’s aridity and the barrage of ungulate browsing to which it was repeatedly 
subjected.35 A single square yard of big bluestem—one of the major species of plains 
                                                
32 “Surface Water Supply of the United States, 1945, Part VI, Missouri River,” (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C.: 1947). 
33 Charles Bajza has an in-depth discussion of the different soil types within the Powder River Basin. In 
essence, along the river banks there was “Alluvial soil,” which, “Of all the basin’s soils their depth, fine 
sandy loam texture, and prismatic structure most readily qualify them for the easiest management, 
durability and largest capacity to produce crops. The rest of the basin is covered, in large part, by a mix of 
heavy clay soils, which are “extremely sticky and plastic when wet and hard and tough when dry. The fine 
texture provides abundant porosity but no permeability, an environment very unfavorable for soil water. 
Hence the sparse native mid- and short grasses, and the dry-farmed crops,” and heavily alkali, badlands-
type soils.  Bajza, “Powder River Basin,” 151-161. The estimation comes from 110-111. 
34 This is particularly apparent if you drive along I-90 or I-94 in Montana in the fall, when all of the 
cottonwoods along the Yellowstone turn gold and visually highlight the floral mass that these riparian 
environment possess. 
35 For an overview of the woodland/forest-bias in American and European thinking, see Simon Schama, 
Landscape and Memory (New York: Vintage, 1996) 23-244; Richard Manning, Grassland: The History, 
Biology, Politics, and Promise of the American Prairie (New York: Penguin, 1997), 1-10. Manning 
portrays the twentieth-century environmental movement as a direct descendant of “the European tree 
culture that ruled the nineteenth century.” 
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grasses—can contain twenty-five miles of rootlets, root hairs, and roots. 36 During winter 
on the plains, this biomass is buried and made inaccessible to animals and humans; 
consequently, the potential for starvation increases. But as Arapooish claimed, along the 
Yellowstone, “you can take shelter in the woody bottoms…there you will find buffalo 
meat for yourselves, and cottonwood bark for your horses.” Such an observation 
highlights two important thermodynamic effects of this riparian biome: (1) it made access 
to energy far more reliable by providing above-ground flora (cottonwood) and fauna 
(bison), and (2) it protected against wind, resulting in warmer temperatures than the 
upland prairies. In doing so, it acted as a moderating influence, protecting, warming, and 
feeding in winter, cooling in summer, and providing the basis of Crow power for much of 
the equestrian period.37  
 As a result of their control over this key thermodynamic haven, the Crow emerged 
as vital middlemen in the plains’ late-eighteenth-century trade, ferrying horses, bison 
meat, and prisoners from the Flathead and other tribes west of the continental divide to 
their erstwhile kin, the Hidatsa, and their neighbors, the Mandan, whose Knife River 
villages became the center of seasonal indigenous trade.38 In annual trips, the Crow would 
sell these horses, often commanding double the price they had paid and receiving a glut 
of European goods—guns, ammunition, kettles, and, of course, the carbohydrates 
                                                
36 Manning, Grassland, 40, 141. 
37 In more recent years, the late Crow historian Joe Medicine Crow has also highlighted the importance of 
local knowledge of Chinook winds in determining winter camping. As he observes, “Along the foot of 
the…Bighorn Mountains…is a Chinook belt that comes from the west. Warm winds comes [sic] along the 
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38 For the Mandan and, to a lesser degree, the Hidatsa, see Elizabeth A. Fenn, Encounters at the Heart of 
the World: A History of the Mandan People (New York: Hill and Wang, 2014). 
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produced by the village tribes, corn—in return.39 While staying with the Hidatsa in 1805, 
the Northwest Company trader Francoise-Antoine Larocque expressed awe over the sheer 
volume of goods that were traded between the Crow and the village tribes. In one 
encounter, he reported that the Hidatsa gave the Crow “two hundred guns, a hundred 
rounds of ammunition for each, a hundred bushels of corn, and other articles in return for 
which they received two hundred fifty horses and immense numbers of buffalo robes.”40 
By serving as the middlemen in a trading mechanism that spanned the continental divide 
and the breadth of the plains, the Crow steadily built themselves into one of the 
wealthiest peoples on the northern plains, leveraging their access to the best horse herds 
and the most bountiful agricultural products north of the Platte. 
 At first glance, such a rise seems inherently paradoxical. But the key realization is 
that the northern plains, like all ecosystems, consists of a mosaic of smaller, 
individualized micro-environments, and that the landscape of the Missouri was not that of 
the Yellowstone. Although as a whole the northern plains was defined by its severity—its 
resistance to human and animal survival—at smaller scales it offered some of the most 
hospitable climes on the plains, and by the late-eighteenth century, the Crow had located 
one such “green belt,” completing a multi-generation exodus that took them across the 
northern plains and beyond in search of “exactly the right place.”41 They had found such a 
location in the heart of the Yellowstone River valley and its energy-rich riparian 
ecosystem, a haven where they could tend to their bounteous horse herds and receive 
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1977), 42. 
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shelter from the worst of the northerly climate, all while neighboring tribes struggled to 
maintain a minimal equestrian lifestyle. 
 This line of thinking—of examining indigenous peoples in concert with 
ecological energy caches—is not unique. For the past few decades, historians of plains 
equestrianism have noted the thermodynamic transformations that these animals brought 
to indigenous peoples. Dan Flores was the first to latch onto this train of thought, 
claiming that “the horse-mounted Plains Indians…made very efficient use of the 
available energy on the Great Plains, something they seem instinctively to have 
recognized and exulted in.” By using horses to transform latent floral energy into 
movement, tribes such as the Comanche, Cheyenne, and Arapaho “exploited a greater 
volume of the thermodynamic energy streaming from sunlight into plants than the 
economies of any of their competitors.”42 Building upon this study, James Sherow has 
similarly examined the Cheyenne, contending that as mid-nineteenth-century travelers 
crisscrossed the central plains on their way out to California, Oregon, and Colorado, the 
environment changed dramatically, the most obvious manifestation being the denuded 
riparian flora of the Platte. According to Sherow, while American invaders supplemented 
their horse feed with grains and hay during the trying winter months, the Cheyenne failed 
to adapt in a concomitant fashion. As such, “the [Sand Creek] massacre was also the 
result of the Indians’ difficulties in adapting their horse-herding practices to the Great 
Plains.”43 Elliot West offers similar interpretations in his book-length study of the 
Cheyenne, taking a near-mystical approach to indigenous equestrianism, calling the 
                                                
42 Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” The 
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43 James E. Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic: High Plains Indians and Their Horses in the Region of 
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animals “living tools,” and “centaurs…a fusion of human will and animal strength into 
something wholly new, a fundamentally different creature that cannot be understood as 
just an aggregate of man and beast.”44 More recently, these works have been reformulated 
in the scholarship of Pekka Hämäläinen, who portrays the advent of the horse as a 
cultural change that empowered indigenous peoples but was also freighted with all sorts 
of unseen costs. Atop a horse, he writes, “the world became smaller and its resources 
more accessible.” Like those before him, Hämäläinen is sure to elucidate the solar 
potential that horses held for the Comanche, pointing out that in contrast to dogs, horses 
“drew their strength directly from plant life, allowing their masters to eliminate one 
arduous phase in their search for power. A conduit between immense, abstract solar 
energy and concrete, immediate muscle power, the horse redefined the realm of the 
possible, bringing Comanches a step closer to the sun.”45 In an instance of 
thermodynamic alchemy, they tapped into the region’s for-so-long-unavailable pool of 
floral energy, transforming it into mobility and power. 
 The work of these scholars has revolutionized the way that we think about 
equestrianism on the plains, in particular its evolution in the tumultuous decades of the 
mid-nineteenth century, as American expansion intensified and settlers—in concert with 
existing indigenous patterns—increasingly blighted the fragile grassland- and riparian-
ecosystems that constituted the region.46 But almost without exception the focus of these 
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works has been limited to the central and southern plains. Due in part to the comparative 
scarcity of horses on the northern plains, scholars have spent far less time examining the 
region and its unique environmental conditions, opting instead to focus on the bountiful 
herds that fueled expansionist indigenous powers. And yet the northern plains is a 
decidedly different sort of environment. Hämäläinen nods in this direction, stating that 
the “most revealing dynamics among horse cultures is latitudinal rather than 
longitudinal,” but he fails to follow this through to its ultimate conclusion.47 Because of 
its large-scale riverine systems that stem and branch out from the Missouri, the northern 
plains saw geopolitical developments that differed markedly from those other latitudinal 
swaths, most clearly in the advent and development of the fur trade. While the greatest 
environmental threat for indigenous peoples on the central plains was overland travelers 
and the military expeditions that followed in their wake, on the northern plains the 
ecological trajectory was far more subtle, depending upon a network of continental 
trading practices and the vagaries of river navigability. As such, the thermodynamic 
narrative is distinct from that of the central and southern plains; it is a story that deserves 
to be told on its own, with a focus on the disparities of its various microenvironments. To 
fully understand it, then, we need to dip back into the early-nineteenth century, to the 
Corps of Discovery and the subsequent fur trade that it unleashed. For it was in this 
setting that the differences between the Missouri and the Yellowstone were accentuated, 
and that the thermodynamic haven that the Crow inhabited—the lands that were “in 
exactly the right place”—came to be among the most desired on the continent. 
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Invaders: A Changing Thermodynamic Landscape 
On their return trip east from the Pacific in the spring of 1806, Lewis and Clark 
decided to split up in order to increase the area surveyed.48 Clark and eight others left the 
rest of the group, descending the Yellowstone, a body of water that the Corps had missed 
on the trip west. They observed great quantities of deer, antelope, beaver, and buffalo, 
noting “extensive Vally[s] open and fertile,” especially in the vicinity of the mouth of the 
Bighorn river.49 All went smoothly until July 19, when Toussaint Charbonneau, the 
French trader and husband of Sacajawea, reported seeing an Indian on a rise across the 
river. Later in the day, Clark announced that he had seen smoke coming from the same 
direction; nevertheless, he did not seem to think too much of it, and the Corps continued 
on their descent toward the Missouri, surveying the landscape, hunting elk and wolf, even 
building two new canoes along the way. Two days later, however, Clark and the men 
awoke to find half of the company’s horses—roughly two dozen in total—missing. He 
sent out two men to search for the animals, but they returned a few hours later without 
finding any sign. Clark “worried that the indians have Stolen our horses, and probably 
those who had made the Smoke a few days passed,” and sent out a party the next day as 
well, but “they serched for tracks all the evening without finding which course the horses 
had taken, the plains being so remarkably hard and dry as to render it impossible to See a 
track of a horse passing through the hard parts of them.”50 The men knew that they were 
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in Crow country, and as a group they desperately wanted to meet the tribe, one of only a 
few they had not encountered in the course of their travels, but no matter how hard they 
looked for their purloined horses or tried to locate a Crow camp, they were unsuccessful. 
Even though they knew they were in the heart of Crow country, traveling down the 
thermodynamic artery of the Yellowstone, they never found anything more than a few 
dated signs of the tribe’s presence. 
It was undoubtedly frustrating for the men. Lewis and Clark had long wanted to 
meet and exchange gifts with the Crow, whom they referred to as “the Yellowstone 
Indians,” and had even prepared a lengthy diplomatic speech in which they planned to 
amicably but firmly declare American sovereignty over Crow lands, thereby opening 
what they hoped to be a beneficial trade relation. Ironically, one of the clauses in this 
speech read, “Children Your great father has derected [sic] me to tell you not to suffer 
your young and thoughtless men to take the horses or property of your neighbours or the 
white people, but to trade with them fairly and honestly, as those of his red children 
below,” a section to which Clark, angry at his perceived mistreatment and apparently still 
hoping to meet with the tribe, emended, “Your Great father will be very sorry to here 
[sic] of the [blank space in MS.] stealing the horses of his Chiefs & warrors [sic] whome 
[sic] he sent out to do good to his red children on the waters of Missoure [sic.]”51 It is an 
intriguing footnote to the much-studied peregrinations of the Corps of Discovery, one 
that is often overlooked or remarked upon only in passing—as we shall see, on the 
Missouri, Lewis experienced far different interactions with the region’s indigenous 
peoples. But it is nevertheless a critical moment for understanding the Crow’s place in 
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the region’s ecology and larger geopolitical web. In responding in the way that they 
did—by remaining out of sight and pilfering company horses—the Crow effectively set 
the tone for their future relations with the Americans. It was not that they were 
uninterested in trade—as later developments reveal, they most certainly were—but that 
they would do so only on their terms. Consequently, their actions—as unscrupulous as 
Clark thought them to be—were closely tied to concerns with energy and protecting a 
tribe that, by the early-nineteenth century, was already beginning to feel the impact of 
American invaders.  
Part of this has to do with the northern plains’ recent history. As Lewis and Clark 
entered onto the grasslands, they were coming into a region that was in the midst of 
immense geopolitical change. Although the Crow had firmly established their homelands 
along the Yellowstone and amassed surprising equine wealth, their political position was 
nevertheless precarious: compared to many of the abutting tribes, they harbored a small 
population, one that was made all the more vulnerable by recent disease. Just a few years 
prior to the Corps’ arrival, a smallpox epidemic had hit the plains and devastated the 
Crow. Much more has been written about the 1780-1781 and 1837 epidemics, but in 
terms of timing and demographic harm, none had a greater effect on the Crow and their 
geopolitical position. According to most accounts, it started at the Great Lakes trading 
posts, on either Superior or Michigan, before spreading west across the plains, traveling 
down the Missouri and the out onto the rest of the grasslands. In the process, it decimated 
a number of tribes, reportedly killing half of the Osage and two-thirds of the Omaha.52 
And while many of the Missouri River peoples—most notably the Mandan and Hidatsa—
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would survive this plague with more manageable losses than they suffered in other 
epidemics, the Crow were ravaged. According to François Larocque, the disease reduced 
the tribe from 2,000 lodges (or 16,000 people) to mere 300 (2,400 people).53 Furthermore, 
after they contracted the disease, it continued to travel west, infecting the Flatheads and 
many of the tribes of the Pacific northwest. One direction it did not travel was north. As 
such, many of the Crow’s neighbors—the Blackfeet, the Cree, the Assiniboine—survived 
the plague relatively unscathed, maintaining and even augmenting their demographic 
power while the Crow were weakened, reduced from one of the more populous tribes in 
the region to one of the smallest.54 
As Lewis and Clark arrived in the early-nineteenth century, then, the Crow were 
an energetically wealthy but numerically weakened tribe. New diplomatic relations 
offered them an opportunity to transform the Yellowstone’s ecological bounty into 
material wealth. More surprisingly, however, it injected new sources of energy into the 
region. As we saw above, the Crow’s response to the Corps of Discovery was decidedly 
different than that of any of the other tribes on the northern plains. The Mandan and 
Hidatsa have become well known for the hospitality that they provided, for offering food 
and shelter during the Corps’ first winter. The Blackfeet and the Sioux, on the other hand, 
took a far different tactic. After the Teton Sioux attempted to physically halt the Corps’ 
progress up the Missouri, Clark called the tribe the “pirates of the Missouri.” Likewise, 
the Blackfeet were the recipients of the only instance of overt violence (in this case, 
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murder) during the Corps’ three-year travels.55 The disparities in these responses—the 
Mandan’s hospitality; the Sioux and Blackfeet’s relationship with violence, whether on 
the giving or receiving end; and the Crow’s theft—goes back to Arapooish’s claim that 
the Crow homelands were in “exactly the right place.” All of the aforementioned peoples 
were primarily centered around the Missouri River, a body of water whose ecology 
differed sharply from that of the Yellowstone and its tributaries, the rivers that the Crow 
dominated for the first half of the nineteenth century. Although we often think of the 
Lakota and other tribes as encroaching upon the Yellowstone and Powder River Valleys, 
the reality is that during the first half of the nineteenth century the Crow controlled this 
region, effectively transforming it into a thermodynamic factory (see Figure 3). And 
while certainly notable in the early nineteenth century, these environmental differences 
became increasingly defined in the wake of American traders and the sociopolitical 
changes they effected.  
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Figure 3: Reported Tribal Encampments and Villages, 1803-1845 
Map by Tony Osterling, Kent Island, MD, 201756 
 
To unpack these claims and to understand the further developments that took 
place in the northern plains trade and the broader geopolitical environment, it is necessary 
to examine the particular ways in which the Crow’s ecology differed from that of the 
neighboring Blackfeet and Lakota. In the wake of Lewis and Clark, American trade 
proliferated across the northern plains, spreading north and west from the central artery of 
the Missouri, into the various veins and capillaries of the river’s tributaries, where beaver, 
especially in comparison to the trapped-out eastern streams, teemed.57 And while the 
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Blackfeet and Lakota were an integral part of this economy, trading and obtaining goods 
like all of the other tribes, their interactions with American trappers were most notable 
for their hostility: more than any other peoples in the region, they responded violently to 
American incursions, often killing trappers and attacking steamboats and woodhawks.58 
The Crow, on the other hand, were more likely to embrace traders—often directly 
integrating them into the tribe—but they did so on their own terms and in line with their 
position in the greater Yellowstone ecology.59  
The root of the difference is thermodynamics. For the Blackfeet and the Lakota, 
the energetic artery was the Missouri, the longest river on the continent, flowing nearly 
three thousand miles through eddies and oxbows before dumping its contents into the 
Gulf of Mexico. Because of its size, the river proved to be the central thoroughfare of 
steamboat travel in the West, serving as the natural causeway for the nineteenth-century 
machines and their “annihilation of time and space.”60 In the South, New Orleans became 
the center of the industry, with St. Louis following as a close second. But on the northern 
plains it was Fort Union, the center of the American Fur Company’s western operations, 
a massive wooden structure erected in 1829 at the point where the Yellowstone entered 
the Missouri, at present-day Williston, North Dakota. Rebuilt in 1833 to make the 
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original post larger and more secure, the fort measured 237 feet by 245 feet with twenty-
foot tall pickets constructed from the river bottom’s cottonwoods, making it, in the words 
of Edwin Denig, the “principal and handsomest trading post on the Missouri River.”61 
American steamboats made their first trip to the northern plains with the Yellowstone 
expedition of 1819, but it was the construction of Fort Union—and the modification of 
the steamboat’s design to accommodate the northern plains’ notoriously shallow 
waters—that made such voyages an annual occurrence.62  
In a region in which so many trading posts were defined by the ephemerality, Fort 
Union became a multi-generational stalwart, persisting for nearly half a century until 
American settlement rendered it moot in the 1860s. For many of the tribes in the area, it 
proved to be a boon, a dependable site of supplies in a region defined by its 
unpredictability.63 But there were also a number of negative effects. The fort received 
hundreds of steamboat visits over the course of its career, a frequency that reaped far-
reaching effects on the area’s ecology. Despite their presumed efficiency, steamboats 
consumed massive amounts of fuel, typically requiring anywhere between twenty-five 
and thirty cords of wood for every twenty-four hours of running. 64 And because river 
bottoms proved to be both the most reliable and accessible providers of such fuel, 
steamboats inevitably harvested their supplies from these riparian environments over the 
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course of the trip. As one captain lamented, they cut so much wood from these sites that 
“we are more hours at the Bank tied up than we are Running.”65 Eventually the system 
was codified, and woodyards began to proliferate as a variety of individuals—mostly 
young American males, but also a handful of Indian and Métis men and women—went 
about the process of transforming a capricious space into one that was increasingly 
structured and commodified.66 From the perspective of travelers, such changes were 
obligatory. The average round trip from Omaha (slightly north of St. Louis) to Fort Union 
took just over three months in the best of circumstances, which added up to around 2,500 
cords of wood per trip, or, in terms of actual forest coverage, between 60 and 65 acres-
worth of trees per trip.67 And so it is not surprising that by 1850, when trader Thaddeus 
Culbertson traveled through the present-day Dakotas on his way up to the fort, he wrote 
that “the banks [of the Missouri] are destitute of [wood] entirely. I have been told that 
they go from Fort Pierre, one hundred miles above, to get timber for their boats and other 
purposes.”68 Over the previous two decades, the Missouri’s river bottoms had undergone 
significant degradation as cottonwoods were harvested for steamboat fuel and bison were 
slaughtered for both nutrition and simple expansionist recreation.69  
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For the tribes along the Missouri—most notably the Blackfeet and the Lakota—
this was nothing less than an environmental disaster. In a rather bizarre instance of 
ecological entwining, these changes created very real competition between horses and 
steamboats for the same set of Missouri River nutrients.70 Not surprisingly, there was a 
marked increase in Blackfeet and Lakota aggression. Trader Alfred Jacob Miller 
estimated the American losses to be forty to fifty men per season, his employees counting 
it as a good winter if only twenty perished.71 In later years, as steamboat travel increased, 
American woodyards would see more than fifty workers killed annually.72 There are 
numerous stories of such violence, but one of the most telling examples comes to us 
during this later period. In 1863, Indian Agent Samuel Latta ascended the Missouri 
aboard the Robert Campbell Jr. in order to deliver annuity goods to the region’s tribes. 
After distributing the first batch at Fort Berthold, where the Mandan, Hidatsa, and 
Arikara were in a near starving condition from a recent Lakota attack, the steamer 
continued on to deliver the remaining annuities upriver to the Assiniboine, Crow, and 
Blackfeet.73 On its way, however, it came under attack. For two straight nights the Lakota 
assaulted crewmembers as they were out cutting wood. The next day the ship came 
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around a bend to see the Shreveport, another steamer, stopped in the middle of the river, 
surrounded by several hundred Hunkpapa, Miniconjou, and Blackfeet Lakotas. As the 
Robert Campbell Jr. slid along the halted boat, Latta writes that the Indians “insisted that 
we land, saying that they had followed us three days; that we had as well give up, as they 
have us surrounded, and if we did not they would take us.” Finding himself thrust into the 
role of mediator, Latta ordered the captain to send a yawl ashore. The idea was to retrieve 
a group of Indian leaders for a talk on the steamboat, where Latta intended to deliver 
what he hoped to be pacifying presents. The pilot assented, and six men reluctantly 
paddled the dinghy to the group onshore. Unfortunately for them, after shaking hands the 
Lakotas opened fire, killing three and badly wounding two. The crew of the Robert 
Campbell Jr. and the Shreveport returned the volleys with rifles and on-board cannons, 
killing a handful of Lakotas in the process. The confrontation continued for another 
couple of hours, until the Lakota finally decided to abandon the river, leaving the 
Americans “penned upon the boat like a lot of sheep in the fold, afraid to go on shore on 
account of the redskins.”74 As Latta recalled, “there is but little doubt, from the new white 
blankets, cadet coats and pants, that were worn by many of them, that a portion of them 
were of the parties who were present at Fort Pierre eleven days before, and had received 
their annuities.”75 As American steamboats increasingly denuded the river’s valuable 
nutrients, such attacks on annuity-bearing vessels would become more regular, not 
merely challenging American expansion but threatening the promised annuities of the 
Crow and other tribes in the region.  
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On the Missouri, then, violence emerged as a response to the thermodynamic 
competition that existed between the region’s two kinetic vessels: the horse and the 
steamboat. But the Yellowstone presented a far different ecological landscape. In contrast 
to the staid presence of Fort Union, the Yellowstone River valley was beset by 
ephemeral—in essence, failed—trading posts. Fort Lisa, the first post in present-day 
Montana, was built at the mouth of the Big Horn River in 1807 but abandoned just four 
years later. For ten years there was no post in the territory, until 1822, when the Missouri 
Fur Company erected one on the same site as the now-defunct Fort Lisa, although this too 
was abandoned, in this case just one year later. In the M.F.C.’s place, the American Fur 
Company entered the region, building Fort Cass three miles below the mouth of the Big 
Horn. In 1835 it too was deserted, and Fort Van Buren was constructed at the mouth of 
the Tongue. This latter lasted until 1842, and the Yellowstone then went without a trading 
post until 1850, when Fort Sarpy was constructed along the Rosebud, soon to be 
overtaken by Fort Sarpy II, which was deserted in 1860.76 During the first sixty years of 
the nineteenth century, when Fort Union dominated the Missouri, we see the construction 
and abandonment of nine separate trading posts along the Yellowstone and its tributaries, 
with the average lifespan being a scant 3.2 years. In short, trading posts in the Crow’s 
Powder River homelands were without exception an interim affair. 
In one respect, this all points back to the ever-lurking presence of the steamboat: 
whereas it was a regular sight on the Missouri, it was absent on the Yellowstone. Once 
again, Arapooish’s remarks provide an important clue into the discrepancy. As he 
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observed, the tribes living along the Missouri were forced to drink its “muddy water.” 
The portion of the river that succumbed to the steamboat was a slow moving, mostly 
sand-bottomed section. William Lass, the preeminent historian of the craft, has dubbed 
this stretch the “Sandy River,” in contrast to the uppermost portion of the Missouri (the 
non-navigable tract north of present-day Great Falls, MT), which he termed the “Rocky 
River.” As Lass writes, “the 2,113-mile Sandy River, in contrast to the Rocky River, 
flows through an area of alluvial, easily eroded soil which muddies the waters of the 
stream. Since the banks are unstable and readily undercut, it is only natural that the river 
curves, or meanders.”77 The historic Yellowstone, on the other hand, was fast-flowing, 
possessing an average gradient that ranged anywhere from 3.5 feet per mile all the way 
up to seven. Consequently, it contained a number of ship-defying rapids—the most 
notable of which, Buffalo Rapids, was deemed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as 
“the single greatest obstacle to steamboat navigation on the Yellowstone,” and was the 
recipient of blasting and dredging during the late-1870s and early-1880s—which 
prevented steamboat expansion.78 As a result, it never evolved into the transportation 
conduit that the Missouri did. Steamboat traffic didn’t end up penetrating the river until 
the 1870s, at which point other factors had already altered the ecological and political 
landscape. Consequently, American traders not only never ended up traveling in the 
numbers that they did along the Missouri, but they also did not consume energy in the 
same manner or at anything like the same scale. Even well into the second half of the 
nineteenth century, as the Missouri was witnessing significant ecological destruction, the 
                                                
77 William Lass, Navigating the Missouri: Steamboating on Nature’s Highway, 1819-1935 (Norman, Okla.: 
Arthur H. Clark Co., 2008), 2. 
78 John Gordon MacDonald, “History of Navigation on the Yellowstone River,” M.A. Thesis, University of 
Montana, 1950, 3; Andrew J. Dewhirst, “A Society Under Siege: A History of Changing Crow Indian Land 
Boundaries, 1700-1904,” M.A. Thesis, University of Wyoming, 20. Schneiders, Big Sky Rivers, 228. 
 67 
Yellowstone was noted for its abundant growth. As the Jesuit priest Pierre-Jean de Smet 
wrote, the Yellowstone “is a fair broad river, whose waters are pure as crystal. It traverses 
very extensive plains, well wooded on both banks and offering beautiful grazing 
grounds.”79 It was a veritable energy factory on the plains. 
The difference is ecological. In fact, when viewed from a certain perspective, 
these traders can actually be seen to have injected energy into the Yellowstone Valley, 
not merely through the various trade goods that they distributed (i.e., chemical energy via 
food and gunpowder), but also via their own horses, that ever scarce and valuable 
resource on the northern plains. As Pekka Hämäläinen has claimed in regard to the 
Comanche, “raiding was not the antithesis of exchange but an alternative to it.” 80 Raiding 
was similarly crucial for Crow diplomacy and geopolitical power, but it was different in 
important ways from that practiced by the Comanche. The Crow’s use of such attacks 
was not merely a fallback strategy when peaceful exchange was not an option. Rather, it 
emerged as a means of controlling and limiting the traders who entered the Yellowstone 
Valley—of forcing them to conform to Crow expectations. And, like their interaction 
with and extraction of energy resources from the Yellowstone ecosystem, it seems to 
have been done in a more-or-less sustainable manner. Over the sixty-plus years of 
American trade in the Yellowstone Valley, we know of only a single trader who was 
killed by the Crow, and yet there are dozens and dozens of instances of Crows raiding 
horses and supplies from traders in the region.81 As the Crow explained to the Americans, 
they did not kill them because if they did, “the traders would not come back and they [the 
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Crow] would lose the chance of stealing from us [the traders]."82 They used the 
newcomers as energy caches from which they could periodically draw upon to 
supplement their own sources. 
Consequently, the Crow developed a reputation among American fur traders as 
“the most arrant rascals in the mountains,” a tribe who had “never been know to keep a 
promise or do an honorable act,” and who were “turbulent and hostile at all times, never 
omitting to rob white men when opportunity served.”83 When viewed from a Crow 
perspective, however, the tribe systematically harvested energy from American traders, 
but they did so in ways that ensured a constantly available, relatively undiminishing 
resource.84 In describing such practices, the previously mentioned De Smet took a slightly 
more enlightened approach: “the Crows are considered the most indefatigable marauders 
on the plains; they cross and recross the mountains in every direction, carrying to one 
side what they have stolen on the other…From their childhood they are practiced in this 
kind of larceny; they acquire an astonishing ability in it; their glory increases with the 
number of their captures, so that an accomplished robber is in their eyes a hero.”85 
Among the Crow, Arapooish was known to be one of the great horse thieves. In perhaps 
his greatest triumph, he led a body of some 400 warriors north to a Blackfeet camp, 
attacking the camp and killing one hundred Blackfeet while also taking two hundred 
women and children prisoners and stealing five hundred horses. In this encounter, the 
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Crow were only reported to lose twenty-two men.86 Although viewed as the behavior of 
“rascals” by the Americans, such actions had their roots in a thermodynamic worldview: 
instead of driving their competitors out, the Crow used them as sources of much-needed 
energy.  
In addition to the lack of steamboat competition, part of this discrepancy also had 
to do with the fur trade ontology. While beaver trapping along the Missouri was—as a 
result of the differing ecology—negligible, trappers flocked to the Yellowstone and its 
tributaries during the 1820s in an effort to establish what would later become known as 
the Rocky Mountain Trapping System. For the most part, the Crow welcomed such 
interlopers, even going so far as to use their own horses to pull the traders’ keelboats up 
against the current of the Yellowstone.87 During the initial year of trapping, eleven men 
shared winter quarters with the tribe, not only bartering for food and furs but obtaining 
valuable geographic information (from Crow leaders like Arapooish). After the 
Americans tried unsuccessfully to cross the continental divide in the depths of winter, the 
Crow informed them of a more manageable route just south of the Wind River Range. 
The trappers set out and successfully crossed the divide at this spot, what would become 
known as the famed South Pass. For the next few decades, employees of the American 
Fur Company, the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, and a handful of competing outfits 
would travel deep into the Rocky Mountains, spending long periods trapping along the 
Snake, the Green, and even some of the Yellowstone’s own tributaries, most often the 
Bighorn and the Powder. They would then gather for an annual rendezvous, an occasion 
marked by “mirth, songs, dancing, shouting, trading, running, jumping, singing, racing, 
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target-shooting, yarns, frolic, [and] all sorts of extravagances,” where independent 
trappers would sell their furs to the larger conglomerations, who would then ship them, 
whether down the Yellowstone or overland along the Platte, to St. Louis.88 While not 
always directly present at such rendezvouses, the Crow were consistently involved in 
such trade, either as direct participants, owners of the land, or as geographic aids.  
 As a result, the Crow were more likely than their indigenous neighbors to 
physically incorporate and subsume traders into their polity through marriage.89 There has 
been a great deal of scholarship on these cross-cultural relationships in the Great Lakes 
region during the eighteenth century, but there has been much less on the northern plains. 
Among other, traders James Beckwourth and Edward Rose took Crow wives and were 
adopted into the tribe. But the most notable was Robert Meldrum, the Scottish-born 
American Fur Company trader who married into and lived seasonally with the tribe for 
close to thirty years, taking on the name Round Iron for the presents with which he 
always preceded trade.90 According to James Bradley, the Crows called Meldrum, “the 
best white man that ever came to the Crow country.” He lived with his wife’s family, was 
in charge of their horse herds, and participated in battles against the Blackfeet. But he 
also spent a great deal of time working for American Fur Company trading posts, 
particularly in later years, serving from the 1840s to the late-1850s as the Crow’s 
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representative at various forts, ranging up and down the Yellowstone, the Little Big Horn, 
the Rosebud, the Tongue, and the Great Porcupine.91 In the historical records, there are 
numerous accounts of Meldrum being chastised by his superiors and coworkers for his 
wasteful use of gifts and his willingness to feed and house the Crow at the fort free of 
charge.92 As a result, the Crow bragged to traders that the posts were depots “where all 
their goods were stored beyond the reach of their enemies, and whence they drew their 
supplies as often as they had need of them.” They considered them “the property of the 
[Crow] nation, and that the whites who were in charge them were their own [the Crow’s] 
agents.”93 Interestingly, then, by incorporating traders like Meldrum and by raiding 
horses, the Crow seemed to have developed an almost ecological perception of the forts, 
viewing them as yet another energy cache in the region, something to be drawn upon 
when needed. Nevertheless, their means for doing so involved raiding and trading, in 
contradistinction to the more overtly violent means employed by the Blackfeet and 
Lakota.  
 All of this emerged out of changes in the Powder River’s thermodynamic 
landscape. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a chasm grew between the 
ecology and action of those tribes inhabiting the Missouri River and those living along 
the Yellowstone and its tributaries. For nearly half a century these two strategies 
remained different but stable: despite their attenuated numbers the Crow grew in power 
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and wealth, while along the Missouri, both the Blackfeet and Lakota saw their own power 
multiply as well (in particular the Lakota). Nevertheless, as the first half of the century 
gave way to the second, changes began to surface. The steamboat had been in operation 
for nearly three decades along the Missouri, denuding much of that once-fertile riparian 
ecosystem during that time. Consequently, the Lakota saw their homelands stripped of 
the very thermodynamic resources that they depended upon for their expansion. Not 
surprisingly, their gaze shifted to the West, to the fecund banks of the Yellowstone, the 
Tongue, and the Powder River, where the Crow were still living and thriving in “exactly 
the right place.” 
 
“Life in a Tightening Circle”: The Hazards of Energy Abundance 
 In the spring of 1855, the Crow gathered along the Yellowstone to await the 
annuities promised to them by the American government in the original Fort Laramie 
Treaty. The previous year, they had been forced to travel east to Fort Union to obtain 
their supplies, venturing across the land of the Lakota and the Blackfeet in the process, 
and on the return trek they were “attacked by enemies and had many people killed.”94 In 
1855, then, they refused to leave their territory, instead forcing the Americans to come to 
them. As had been the case with their interactions with the Rocky Mountain fur traders, 
this energy exchange would be on their own terms. 
 Unfortunately for the Crow, getting the goods turned out to be rather onerous. 
Although he traveled up the Missouri with the tribe’s goods, the Crow’s assigned agent, 
the Washington territorial governor Isaac Stevens, reported that he was unable to 
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personally deliver them “in consequence of the great risk and danger from the numerous 
war parties of the Sioux on the Yellow Stone river.” Lakota war parties “had assembled 
there with a view of stopping and robbing the boat as is passed up with the annuities and 
goods…intended for trade with the Crow bands.” Rather than risk such an encounter 
himself, Stevens contracted with a group of seven men from the Pierre Chouteau Fur 
Trading Company (formerly the American Fur Company), who still had employees 
ascending the Yellowstone. On May third, the traders loaded up the Crow’s goods and 
began their journey west. Within a week, however, they too were attacked by groups of 
Hunkpapa and Blackfeet Sioux, who seriously wounded two men before stripping the 
entire party of their arms, ammunition, and clothing, and forcing them to return to Fort 
Union naked.95 Instead of receiving their annual injection of food and supplies, the Crow 
now found themselves physically cut off, lacking one of their key thermodynamic 
resources.  
 In many respects, this ignominious encounter sums up the changes that came to 
the region in the 1850s rather nicely. As the first half of the nineteenth century gave way 
to the second, the Yellowstone-as-Crow-thermodynamic-haven began to give way to the 
Yellowstone-as-contested-territory. The geopolitical factors that had led to the 
Yellowstone’s preservation—its isolation, its lack of navigability—meant that by this 
time the Missouri had become heavily denuded, with bison populations and forage 
reduced to sub-livable levels. As such, indigenous peoples such as the Lakota, then at the 
apex of their continental power, pushed westward, searching out not merely, as is so 
often assumed, bison populations, but energy more broadly conceived—the forage and 
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flora that fueled society. As Frederick Hoxie, the preeminent scholar of Crow History, 
writes, this was a period of “life in a tightening circle” for the Crow.96 
 Many of these changes can be seen in the proceedings of the 1851 Treaty of Fort 
Laramie. This massive gathering, encompassing more than two weeks of negotiations and 
some ten thousand indigenous peoples, was an attempt by the U.S. government to impose 
a set of fixed territorial boundaries on plains peoples and thereby to attenuate much of the 
conflict in the region. In addition to the Lakota, Cheyenne, Mandan, Arikara, and nearly a 
dozen other tribes, the Crow were among those present. Led by Big Robber and 
accompanied by the ever-present Meldrum, the Crow acquired annual provisions worth 
$50,000 from the U.S. government. Further, their delineated territory matched up well 
with their own conceptions of their home: the Crow lands encompassed nearly the entire 
Yellowstone River system, stretching on the west from the base of the Continental Divide 
in present-day Yellowstone National Park, south past the head of the Big Horn, skirting 
the northern edge of the Platte east to the Powder River, and north all the way to the 
Musselshell, one of the Missouri’s major tributaries (see Figure 4).97 
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Figure 4: Map of Crow Lands Following Treaties 
Maps of the Apsáalooke, http://lib.lbhc.edu/index.php?q=node/159 
 
 
 As was always the case with such negotiations, however, these designations were 
conducted from an imperial center, far removed from on-the-ground realities. More 
telling than the official American reports is the inter-tribal negotiations that took place in 
concert with—and outside of—the official American-sanctioned spaces. In that same 
year, many of the Lakota winter counts list a single event: peace with the Crows.98 In 
what has been dubbed “Lone Horn’s Peace,” the Lakota and Crow conducted their own 
treaty beyond the bounds of American influence, one that attempted to overcome the 
tensions resulting from ecological change, disease, and the influx of American travelers. 
Largely spearheaded by the Miniconjou Lakota leader Lone Horn and the aforementioned 
Big Robber, this agreement seems to have created a region of joint-use—roughly the land 
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stretching between the Powder River and the Black Hills—what Dan Flores, Richard 
White, and other scholars have highlighted as one of the game-rich “buffer zones” that 
existed relatively undisturbed between warring tribes, “intermediate zone[s], variously 
described as war grounds or neutral grounds.”99 These were the Powder River’s energy 
havens, and as the Missouri withered they became increasingly attractive abutting 
peoples. 
From a historical perspective, such territories existed because they were areas 
where “only war parties dared to venture.”100 Nevertheless, this observation belies a 
deeper thermodynamic layer, one that harkens back to the Missouri-Yellowstone 
dichotomy. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Lakota were at their most powerful; at the 
same time, however, their lands were nearly devoid of bison, their traditional protein 
source and the victual foundation of expansion. The Crow, on the other hand, still had 
plenty of faunal resources, but their access to American energy sources—most notably 
food and firearms/powder—was being systematically cut-off as trading posts along the 
Yellowstone folded. Consequently, they were forced to risk traveling through land that 
was now possessed by their enemies—the Blackfeet, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and, in the 
years prior to 1851, the Lakota. Access to Fort Laramie and other trading posts to the 
south—such as the Salt Creek posts run by American traders Joseph Bissonette and John 
Richard—now became of paramount concern if the Crow were to defend their 
increasingly attractive lands.  
The result was one of the more intriguing developments for the Crow: a move 
away from the Yellowstone and toward the Platte. Estimates show that up to two-thirds 
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of the tribe annually moved down to the North Platte during this period for trade amongst 
the American forts. Once again, though, much of this seems to have been a result of 
thermodynamic concerns and the increasing pressure that was being thrust on the 
traditional riparian biomes of the Yellowstone River Basin. Just as the Crow had injected 
new energy sources into their camps during the 1820s and 1830s via trade with Rocky 
Mountain trappers, during the 1850s many bands spent summers down by the Platte, 
“begging from emigrant trains along the Overland Trail.” While perhaps not as effective 
as the raiding that had defined the Crow during the first half of the century, this can be 
seen as yet another attempt to augment tribal energy resources, particularly at a time in 
which—thanks to increasing pressures from both surrounding indigenous tribes and the 
inchoate encroachments of Americans—long-held thermodynamic caches were 
beginning to wane.101 No longer receiving horses, food, and powder, the Crow altered 
their strategies, doing everything in their power to maintain their way of life amidst a 
rapidly shifting energy landscape.  
Nevertheless, this period of relative peace also belies the tensions that would later 
overtake the Crow homelands. Even during the reprieve, certain Lakota divisions 
operated independently, preying upon Crow peoples and their herds. This was most 
evident amongst the northern Hunkpapa and Blackfeet Lakota, who continually plagued 
the Crow, attacking traders and members of the tribe while preventing annuities from 
being delivered to Crow homelands. Such feelings were summed up in 1860 by the Crow 
leader Great Bear, who, complained to W.F. Raynolds, then on his expedition up the 
Yellowstone:  
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Our hearts are bad. The White man is no longer a friend to the Crow Indian. The 
Great Father has deceived us. We have not received our annuities. My people are 
sick and dying…We made a treaty with the Great Father many moons ago, in 
which the Great Father at Washington told us that we must leave our own 
country. They have not been sent to us this year, but the Great Father had sent 
them to our enemies’ country, where we cannot get them; for our enemies are 
stronger than we are. The white man has set our enemies upon us; some of our 
warriors have been killed. We could go there and trade with the white without 
being killed by our enemies; but now we have no presents; we cannot trade our 
robes for blankets anywhere. The Sioux will not let us trade at Fort Union.102 
 
By 1856, as American troops increasingly clashed with the Lakota and their allies and the 
Crow found themselves forced far from their promised annuities, Lakota winter counts 
recorded another very different conference with the Crow. In this encounter, the Crow 
leaders Two Face, Bear’s Head, and Big Robber met with Man Afraid of His Horses and 
a number of other Lakota headmen.103 Due to the clandestine nature of this meeting, the 
details remain obscure. Nevertheless, the result is clear: the brief period of peace and 
shared land use came to an end; the Lakota and their allies began to encroach upon Crow 
lands, forcing the latter up into the safety of the Big Horns and north to the now depleted 
Missouri. As the Cheyenne would later tell American officials, “we stole the hunting 
grounds of the Crows because they were the best. The white man is along the great 
waters [the Missouri], and we wanted more room. We fight the Crows because they will 
not take half and give us peace with the other half.”104  
 Such changes in Crow geopolitical relations emerged in response to larger 
ecological transformations, most notably the gradual denuding of the Missouri over the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century. The Crow struggled to deal with a series of 
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indigenous invasions, but such adaptations were made all the more difficult in the 1860s, 
as gold and other metals were discovered in the Deer Lodge Valley of what is now 
western Montana, igniting a stream of more than thirty thousand settlers and miners. The 
problem was getting people there, of “Producing a Gold Rush.”105 On the northern plains, 
the lack of preexisting trail systems meant that settlers had to construct their own, and 
this led to the invariable question of what the best route would be. The most obvious 
option was to build upon the Platte River Road’s infrastructure by constructing a cutoff 
from the Fort Laramie area across the Powder River Basin and into the gold fields. In 
1863 American prospector John Bozeman, trader John Jacobs, and guide Rafael Gallegos 
attempted to build such a route to the mining town of Virginia City (near present-day 
Ennis). Their first effort ended in failure after a group of 150 Indians (most likely Lakota 
or Northern Cheyenne) immobilized the train and provided the emigrants with an 
unnerving choice: turn around peacefully or continue on and be killed. 106 Certainly a 
portend of things to come, the Lakota and their allies enforced their territoriality by 
excluding the American entrepreneurs, even as they claimed to be merely “passing 
through.”107 Although another attempt the following year successfully blazed the trail, it 
did so only tenuously. Speaking to Indian Agent Samuel Latta in 1862, a Lakota 
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delegation declared “that no emigration was ever contemplated either by land or water; 
and they would not submit to it, as emigrants brought disease and pestilence into their 
country, which destroyed their people, and, upon the other hand, the buffalo would not 
return to that section of country where they had been pursued by white men.”108 As 
Samuel Word, a fellow traveler on Bozeman’s initial expedition recalled, the Lakota 
“warn us not to proceed further through their country—that they were combined to 
prevent a road being opened through here—that if we went on we would be destroyed.”109 
Not surprisingly, then, as the Lakota increasingly occupied the Yellowstone River 
Valley and American emigrants crisscrossed the Crow’s traditional homelands, we also 
see a marked shift in Crow geopolitical strategy, one that can best be seen in one 
particular encounter with American invaders. In May of 1863, a group of Crows attacked 
a party of prospectors led by Granville Stuart, who was travelling along the Bighorn and 
the Yellowstone, trying his hand at prospecting. The Crow had been observed in the area 
trying to steal horses, and that night they attacked. In Stuart’s words it was “one of the 
most fearful tragedies that ever occurred in the mountains.” As was typical for the Crow, 
they stole the party’s horses, but in contradistinction to nearly all of their previous 
encounters with Americans, they did not do so stealthily; instead they fired upon the 
miners, wounding half a dozen or so and killing two. The Americans quickly abandoned 
their plans and returned back up through the Big Horns.110 More importantly, however, 
this marked a major shift in the Crow’s thermodynamic world: instead of strategically 
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purloining energy in a sustainable fashion, they now began to ape the more aggressive 
Missouri River raiding tactics of the Lakota and the Blackfeet.  
 This marked increase in violence belied the major geopolitical shifts that were 
taking place in the region. Such transformations reached a crucial fork in 1866, when, 
following the aborted treaty talk at Fort Laramie (to which the Crow had not even been 
invited), the Lakota visited the Crow not as a war party but as part of a diplomatic 
mission, one in some ways akin to the short-lived Lone Horn’s peace. According to the 
Crow leader Half-Yellow Face, the Lakota joined the Crow along the Tongue River and 
made presents of horses and arms. In return, they “earnestly urged [the Crow]…to join 
them in a war of extermination upon the whites.” Nevertheless, the Crow rejected this 
offer, and within a few weeks they attacked the Lakota and “took five Sioux scalps and 
then sent word to the Sioux…that they would hold no farther [sic] communication with 
them, that the Crows should destroy every Sioux who fell into their hands, and that they 
expected the Sioux to do the same by them.”111 Once again, this was the onset of a new 
geopolitical strategy for the Crow, one that had far-reaching effects for both the Powder 
River and the Crow’s thermodynamic worldview. 
 As Red Cloud’s War gradually came to dominate the Powder River Basin and the 
lands abutting the Bozeman Trail, the Crow then made a momentous decision: instead of 
joining with the encroaching Lakota, they would aid the Americans in an effort to retake 
their traditional homelands, the thermodynamic center of the northern plains. As one 
scholar has observed, “the Crow ultimately allied with the United States, but their 
allegiance was not unconditional. Instead, it was based on Crow desires to protect the 
                                                
111 “Bradley Manuscript—Book ‘F,’” Contributions to the Montana Historical Society, 8: 223-5. 
 82 
land and resources central to their way of life.”112 After the Fort Fetterman battle and the 
Lakota dominance of the former Bozeman Trail, Congress decided to pursue diplomatic 
negotiations instead of engaging in a drawn-out campaign on the plains. The Crow were 
among the tribes invited to the preliminary negotiations for the 1868 Treaty of Fort 
Laramie, and after being told that they would have their territory significantly reduced, 
the Crow leader Blackfoot addressed the Americans: “Do not speak to us of confining us 
in a corner of our territory! First give up the route of Powder River. Recall your young 
man…and all those who seek gold there….We are not you slaves, we are not your 
dogs!”113 The meeting adjourned, and by the time the Crow returned in the spring of 
1868, the U.S. Army had decided to abandon the Bozeman Trail in return for a Lakota 
assurance that they would live on a reservation. In consequence, the Crow were told that 
this new treaty would cut their land holdings from the thirty-eight million acres promised 
by the 1851 treaty to a mere eight million. Nevertheless, the Crow signed the agreement. 
Among the key designations was the protection of still-prime buffalo hunting lands 
(energy centers) and a guarantee that all future annuities would be distributed on Crow 
lands via an agency that was to be located on the reservation. In other words, the Crow 
were to retain certain of their traditional homelands while also regaining the now-missed 
energy injections from the Americans. Furthermore, they were promised protection from 
the Lakota, the peoples who had, for the past two decades, been systematically 
encroaching upon their territories. As Hoxie has observed, of the ten Crows who 
ultimately signed the treaty on behalf of the tribe, six had been scouts for the American 
                                                
112 Frank Rzeczkowski, “The Crow Indians and the Bozeman Trail,” Montana: The Magazine of Western 
History 49, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 30. 
113 Quoted in A. Glen Humphreys, “The Crow Indian Treaties of 1868,” Annals of Wyoming, 43 (Spring 
1971), 78. These preliminary negotiations took place in the fall of 1867, after the Medicine Lodge Treaty. 
The final negotiations and the signing of the treaty took place in spring 1868. 
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army against the Lakota. Consequently, “they had assessed the military situation first 
hand and would have reasonably concluded that this was the best treaty they could hope 
to achieve.”114 
 Two years later, the Crow were on the reservation, occupying eight million acres 
that radiated out from a central government storehouse located on Mission Creek, near 
the modern-day town of Livingston. In this environment, they attempted to live as they 
had for the past half-century, hunting and trading while supplementing their supplies with 
the treaty-guaranteed rations. Increasingly, however, they found their territory overrun by 
both white settlers and the ever-encroaching Lakota. According to one report, the latter—
no doubt thinking back to the Crow refusal to join them in their war against the 
Americans—regularly taunted the Crow, laughing at them and saying, “look at us. We 
are rich and ride fat horses and have plenty, while you are friends to the white and are 
poor and have no horses.”115 Nevertheless, the Crow remained on their reservation. 
According to one scholar, they did so not out of weakness but out of a desire to “control 
their own destiny,” for by the late 1860s, “the Crows found themselves in close contact 
with an alien culture (that of the whites) which threatened control of the Crows’ society 
and its future.”116 A glut of intruders—both indigenous and Euro-American—had forced 
the Crow to alter their long held thermodynamic relationships. For over a century, they 
had been “in exactly the right place,” but by the 1860s, everyone else wanted to be there 
too. 
 
                                                
114 Hoxie, Parading through History, 90-92. 
115 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1870 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1870), 
299. 
116 Rzeczkowski, “The Crow Indians and the Bozeman Trail,” 47. 
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Conclusion 
More than two thousand years before any of these events took place, indigenous 
peoples began to systematically harvest energy along Sarpy Creek, driving great herds of 
bison down an arroyo, along the natural drainage lines of the land and into a horseshoe-
shaped outcrop of sandstone. Once the animals reached this trough, they no longer had 
any real chance of escaping. The hunters were deft in their methods of harvest: they 
employed heavy spears with smaller detachable shafts that could be launched through the 
air with mortal force. This done, they transported the corpses to a processing site, where 
they then butchered the animals, breaking apart the meat, extracting fat, and crushing the 
bones for the nutrient-dense marrow and grease. Finally, they moved off to a nearby 
campsite, where they dried the meat, pounding it down into pemmican, “an energy-rich, 
cheap food source [consisting] of dried meat, soft fat (unsaturated fats derived from bone 
marrow) and hard fat (saturated fats taken from body fat and converted into tallow), 
bosses (fatty hump meat, and/or dépouille (strips of fat that lay along the spine of the 
animal)),” and transformed the bones and hides into tools and clothing.117 Over the course 
of nearly three hundred years, the hunters returned to this place again and again, 
ultimately harvesting more than 2,000 bison before—for unknown reasons—they 
abandoned the site.118 There it would sit undisturbed, accumulating layers of sediment and 
debris until two millennia later, when humans would once again return to harvest energy, 
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albeit in a far different but nonetheless connected manifestation—in the form of coal, the 
fossilized solar energy of long-dead floral life.119  
This is a different sort of indigenous story. In recent years there has been a trend 
in Native American history toward trumpeting indigenous force, power, and what has 
been called “indigenous imperialism,” demonstrating different groups that were empires 
and arguing that it was only “weak people [who] desired the kinds of compromises 
inherent in a middle ground.”120 One of the results is that many historical peoples—in 
particular those who relied more heavily upon trade and alliance for their survival—have 
been marginalized in the scholarship, even threaded into narratives of declension. As one 
of these recent scholars has written about the Crow, “their prosperity in horses was their 
undoing. Desperate to obtain guns and to block…incursions, Crows opened their lands to 
American fur traders and, inevitably, to the traders’ microbes…[They] faced a rapid 
decline….and tried to escape annihilation by forging a series of desperate alliances.”121 
Even Hoxie has voiced a similar, albeit more nuanced, opinion: by the 1860s, “the Crows 
had been drawn into a web of increasingly uneven military, economic, and political 
relationships. As they lost the ability to act independently and freely, bandleaders found 
themselves anchored to a narrowing geographical environment and forced together with 
unprecedented force. The fur trade had kept them close to traders and their posts, and the 
expansion of other tribes had confined them to a shrinking portion of their aboriginal 
                                                
119 Interestingly, Sarpy Creek—Crow name, “Where White Flanked Horses are Caught.” It was said that in 
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hunting grounds, but never before had their movements been so restricted.”122 Such 
statements undoubtedly contain a great deal of truth—it is hard to argue with the basic 
facts. And yet at the same time they neglect a crucial part of the story: from an energy 
perspective, it is not enough simply to talk about the ecology of the northern plains. To 
truly understand the environmental factors, it is necessary to narrow the lens, to focus on 
the unique composition of microenvironments and how the thermodynamics of the 
various biomes affected its inhabitants. While there can be little doubt that the Crow’s 
ecological position helped precipitate events in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
painting them as “desperate,” “facing inevitable decline,” and “inevitably suffering,” 
does a gross disservice to the nuances of the historical reality. As Medicine Crow writes, 
“to the Crow, war was not for conquest; it was not for imperialism…War was a game of 
wits, of chivalry, and of honor between tribes. The fact is, it could hardly be called ‘war,’ 
in the sense in which we think of war today. It was only a dangerous game!”123 Put 
another way, just because the Crow were not imperialist does not mean that they did not 
possess their own brand of northern plains power. 
In a recent work, the Richard White shrewdly observed, “we need to think about 
what did not happen in order to think historically. Considering only what happened is 
ahistorical, because the past once contained larger possibilities, and part of the historian’s 
job is to make those possibilities visible; otherwise all that is left for historians to do is to 
explain the inevitability of the present.”124 Even more than most other environments, the 
northern plains is ecologically defined by heterogeneity. Far from being a single biome, it 
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contains thousands of different microclimates, each one unique in its composition. Taken 
as a whole, it is a decidedly unforgiving environment, one of the most variable in the 
world; but in certain of these microenvironments, it is surprisingly forgiving. Unlike the 
central and southern plains, the northern plains is cut by two of the continent’s biggest 
river systems: the Missouri and its ever-turbulent kin, the Yellowstone. Thanks to the 
influx of moisture and rich mountain sediments that these systems perennially inject, they 
can be seen as the region’s own energy factories, not unlike the power plants of today 
(one of which is located in Colstrip, just over the northern boundary of the Crow 
Reservation). Over the course of the nineteenth century, as Americans entered the region 
in increasing numbers and indigenous peoples were pushed farther and farther west, the 
Missouri and its tributaries were systematically denuded, resulting in a substantial loss of 
available energy resources. But during this same period the Yellowstone endured, 
escaping the ravages of American and indigenous imperialism and providing the Crow 
with a reliable source of energy, one that fueled some of the largest horse herds that the 
northern plains had ever seen. As the first half of the nineteenth century gave way to the 
second, however, and the Missouri became increasingly stripped of its resources, the 
Yellowstone became the region’s last remaining energy haven. It became a cache for all. 
What we have, then, is a classic double bind. The Yellowstone remained such a 
potent energy nucleus because of the scarcity of trading posts and its unnavigability; at 
the same time, that dearth (i.e., the Crow’s isolation) meant that the Crow were constantly 
struggling to obtain the requisite trade goods. What all of this means it that the Crow 
lived—and continue to live—in a unique biome, an ecological anomaly in the heart of an 
unforgiving grasslands environment. It once held some of the most valuable grasslands in 
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one of the harshest environments on the continent; today it harbors some of the largest 
coal mines in the world. It was, and is, according to Arapooish, a place where 
“everything good is to be found.” The only problem was that it was no longer unknown. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Waiting for a Chinook: 
The Johnson County War as Energy Conflict 
 
By the spring of 1892, Cheyenne was beginning to look more like Boston or 
Baltimore than the frontier town it supposedly was. Instead of the clean Rocky Mountain 
air so many tubercular migrants had been promised, the streets were clogged with a sooty 
industrial fog that scumbled the sun; in place of the usual melee of stagecoaches and 
horses, people pulled into town on great mile-long locomotives, the trains so crowded 
that passengers were forced to cling to the roof rails, spilling luggage and layers as they 
barreled through the West. This were not your typical blend of itinerant, gold-seeking 
Americans and families but Eastern Europeans—Poles and Hungarians, Russians and 
Czechs—all of them looking for a new start out on the plains. In this they were largely 
disappointed: it was the late-nineteenth-century West, and in addition to dreams of 
mineral- and cattle-wealth, it was defined by its own sinister brand of frontier racism. The 
streets of Cheyenne were serried not merely with overseas immigrants but with hundreds 
of frontier locals, gunslinging cattlemen and ex-deputies who made it their business to 
physically and verbally assault any and all newcomers. And it was at this time—in the 
spring of 1892—that such tensions made the perilous shift from threat to reality: up in 
nearby Johnson County, on a small plains homestead, the Pole Michael Kovach had just 
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been shot in cold blood in front of his wife and children. And although the killers were 
never identified, what was worse was that the slaughter was said to be the first of many, a 
warning to all newly arrived settlers to leave the Powder River Basin if they wanted to 
live.1  
 Neither appealing nor historically accurate, this is the world of an alternative 
Wyoming, the nineteenth-century Natrona and Johnson Counties of Michael Cimino’s 
infamous 1980 cinematic flop, Heaven’s Gate.2 As the follow-up to his Academy-Award 
winning The Deer Hunter, Heaven’s Gate saw Cimino wield one of the archetypal events 
in the history of the American West—the Johnson County War—as fodder for his own 
revisionist epic. Depicting an onrush of Eastern European immigration—what Pauline 
Kael has rightfully described as a “bizarrely homogenous” group, noting that, “a whole 
community from some Bulgarian village seems to have moved to Johnson County, and 
another whole community from the Ukraine”—into this small, newly found county in 
northern Wyoming, the film depicts a Marxist take on the conflict between the 
downtrodden and the affluent, the landless and propertied in the epic narrative sweep of 
American expansion. The resulting film was one of the biggest disasters in Hollywood 
history: a bloated, plodding four-hour picture that came in over-budget and behind 
schedule, and which was so poorly received and critically castigated that, instead of 
allowing it to run as scheduled, the studio (United Artists) made the notorious decision to 
pull it from theaters after just one week, taking a more than forty-million-dollar loss on 
                                                
1 “You people go back where you came from,” is a common refrain in the movie, hurled most notably by 
Christopher Walken’s character to the immigrants trudging across the plains, as well as by other characters 
to the recently arrived Casper immigrants. 
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have observed, the relationship between the events of Heaven’s Gate and those of the real-life Johnson 
County War are moderate at best. Kale, in what would become a representative view, rightly described 
Cimino as taking “a garbled version of the Johnson County war as his subject.” 
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the project. The rest is the stuff of legends: Heaven’s Gate has been blamed for 
everything from the bankruptcy and ruin of one of the most esteemed studios in 
Hollywood to the end of the era of the auteur filmmaker, paving the way for the arrival of 
the feckless action-heavy blockbusters that so dominated the 1980s and 1990s.3  
 And so it is odd that from a historiographical standpoint, there is actually a good 
deal of mimetic value to Heaven’s Gate. The critic Christopher Sharett summed this point 
up nicely: in an effort to portray the film as “The most politically radical Western ever 
made in the United States,” he explained that, while “Many Westerns have depicted the 
affair [the Johnson County War]…Heaven’s Gate is truest to its broad contours.”4 
Although the radical political nature of the film is certainly up for debate, Sharett is 
certainly correct when it comes to the Johnson County War’s historiography: of the 
hundreds of books and articles that have been written on the subject—stretching all the 
way from 1894’s The Banditti of the Plains; Or, The Cattleman’s Invasion of Wyoming in 
1892 through 2010’s Wyoming Range War: The Infamous Invasion of Johnson County—
the majority portray the War as an archetypal class conflict, a clash between a group of 
wealthy, absentee ranchers and a whole county’s worth of impoverished, small-land 
owners, each group fighting for their respective vision of the West’s future.5 
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There is certainly something to be said for such an approach. Most obviously, 
there were very real wealth disparities between the two sides of the conflict. But there are 
also drawbacks: by attributing the role of central historical motivator to economic factors, 
historians have implicitly reproduced a Marxist take on temporal change. Instead of 
seeing contests over the ecological or the thermodynamic, we see landed aristocrats using 
violence in order to preserve their own established wealth from an onrush of 
impoverished immigrants. In other words, by presenting this class-based narrative as the 
sole interpretation of the Johnson County War, historians have unintentionally ablated a 
host of other critical factors, many of which point toward a more complex ecological 
narrative, one that reveals far more about larger historical changes in the region. 
 A return to the land reveals a number of these insights, shifting understandings of 
both the Johnson County War and its larger place in the region’s thermodynamic history. 
In essence, the region’s earliest open-range ranchers—the later invaders—attempted to 
replace the northern plains’ bison with (mostly southern) cattle, assuming not merely that 
the two animals were interchangeable, but that cattle were in actuality superior versions 
of bison. This supposition was fundamentally mistaken—among other things, cattle are 
notably inferior to bison in cold climates—and as the concrete losses began to accrue, the 
open rangers erected a number of rhetorical stopgaps in a last-ditch effort to save their 
system of ranching. It was during this decline that not merely homesteaders and paupers 
but a whole new system of ranching entered the Powder River Basin. Beginning in the 
                                                                                                                                            
thinkers, from Gramsci on up to Raymond Williams, and the cultural theorists of political violence. In 
essence, Belgrad’s argument is that cattle ranching pitted different ecological modes against each other, and 
the result was the outbreak of political violence. As he writes, “the cultural hegemony that stabilized cattle 
ranching as an ecological mode in northeast Wyoming in the early 1880s eroded in the second half of the 
decade.” Daniel Belgrad, “‘Power’s Larger Meaning’: The Johnson County War as Political Violence in an 
Environmental Context,” The Western Historical Quarterly 33, no. 2 (July 1, 2002): 164. 
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late-1880s, settlers flocked to the region under the Desert Land Act and other associated 
land-leasing laws. They did so trailing a system of ranching that was not based upon 
ancestral bison but on the latest scientific findings (particularly the newly found field of 
range science) of Europe and the United States. It was this system—one predicated on 
management, prediction, and the conscious creation of plains energy—that not only 
spelled the end of the open range era, but that also provided a bridge for the energy 
frontiers that would follow: the oil wells at Salt Creek and the coal fields of Gillette. In 
other words, the Johnson County War was as much about energy and understandings of 
extraction as it was about any larger class conflict. Understanding this not only recasts 
the archetypal range conflict of the West, but it reveals the long-hidden thermodynamic 
connections between early-Powder River ranching and the fossil fuel industries that 
would follow. 
 
Figure 5: Map of Johnson County 
“Land Wars: Two Cases Shape Future of Land-Use in Wyoming,” 
https://newwest.net/topic/article/land_wars_two_cases_shape_future_of_land_use_in_wyoming/C35/L35/ 
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The Rise of Cattle and the Fall of Bison 
 Like most things concerning cowboys, cattle, and the Old West, the story of the 
Powder River cattle industry is tinged with its fair share of myth: if you browse the 
various county and oral history compendia throughout the region, you will find a healthy 
portion of tall-tales and folk yarns that, from an empirical standpoint, leave something to 
be desired.6 Perhaps the most prominent of these involves a pair of innominate traders, 
men who passed through the northern plains in the mid 1860s, hauling supplies across 
present-day Nebraska and Wyoming on their way to Utah’s Camp Douglas. According to 
the story, partway through the trip—in what would become Wyoming—the pair found 
themselves ensnared by the ice and snow of an early-season storm. They had planned to 
reach Utah before the seasons changed, but now, without much of a choice, they were 
forced to cache as many of their supplies as they could, to set the oxen free to fend for 
themselves, and to return back home to the relative comforts of the Midwest. There they 
spent the winter, resting and worrying amidst the bustle of the Missouri’s trading 
entrepôt. When they returned the following spring, fully expecting to stumble upon 
cadavers and a few hidebound survivors, they found the oxen not only alive but thriving, 
bigger, fatter, and in far better shape than they had left them during that unfortunate 
storm. Convinced that they had happened upon some sylvanic western oasis, the two men 
                                                
6 See, for example, Alfred James Mokler, History of Natrona County, Wyoming, 1888-1922 (Chicago: R.R. 
Donnelley and Sons Co., 1923); Robert A. Murray, Johnson County: 175 Years of History at the Foot of 
the Big Horn Mountains (Buffalo: Buffalo Chamber of Commerce, 1981); Campbell County Historical 
Society, Campbell County: The Treasure Years (Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Co., 1991). It 
should be noted that many of these histories are excellent works that document much history that would 
otherwise be forgotten. 
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spread the news of the region’s natural bounty, in the process catalyzing scores of Texas 
ranchers, who, eager to find viable postbellum land to exploit, eagerly trekked north.7 
Founding stories like this tend to pack far more potency than their veracity 
suggests. As the eminent fire historian Stephen Pyne suggests, all places have meaning, 
“and that meaning depends less on the scene’s physical geography than on the ideas 
through which it can be viewed and imagined.” This was particularly true during the 
nineteenth century, when “American society…mustered the capacity and the will to 
match its discovered opportunity and transformed land into place and place into symbol. 
The outcome was neither obvious nor inevitable.”8 In other words, rather than geography, 
the power of these foundational stories lies in the larger associations they engender. In 
the case of this particular mythic story—a happenstance discovery of the region’s 
thermodynamic bounty—we have the seeds of the open range cattle industry on the 
northern plains, the notion that not only could cattle survive on the northern plains, 
thereby replicating and replacing the erstwhile bison, but that they would make better and 
more efficient use of those grasses, not merely surviving winter but paradoxically 
thriving in it. As such, regardless of the historical validity of the story, it has come to be 
seen as the archetypal narrative of early Powder River ranching, setting the stage for the 
livestock revolution that would define the late-century plains. For time and again open-
range ranchers would live its larger theme: the unwavering belief that the northern 
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plains—and the Powder River Basin in particular—was a modern-day Eden, a 
thermodynamic oasis in the heart of one of the harshest environments on the continent. 
This did not happen overnight. The first step was to eliminate the ruminants that 
already inhabited the area: bison. Spurred on by the country’s industrialization and the 
concurrent need for durable machine belts, during the 1870s western hunters became 
interested in bison qua leather-provider, not, as had previously been the case, as the 
source of the bulky and heavy full-robes of Missouri River lore. This subtle economic 
shift had important consequences for the species’ population. Under the earlier system, 
hunting had been rigidly delineated along seasonal lines. During the summers, bison 
coats became too piebald and patchy to be worth the labor, and so the hunters vacated the 
plains and participated in myriad other tasks—e.g., farming or mining for gold—waiting 
to return until late fall, winter, and spring, when the coats were at their thickest and 
therefore the most valuable. But by the 1870s all of this had changed. With the bulk of 
the robes now destined for distant tanning factories, where they would be spalled and 
stripped into machine belts for the rapidly industrializing east, hunting dilated to a year-
round affair.9 Embryonic outfits fanned out across the plains during all months, at first 
limiting themselves to the more accessible regions of the southern plains before moving 
north by the end of the decade.10 Not surprisingly, the industry boomed; the best shooters 
took two to three thousand animals a month, and with robes fetching up to four dollars a 
                                                
9 William A. Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo, 1821-1881,” The Western Historical Quarterly 27, no. 
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10 Most environmental histories on the bison’s demise concerns the central and southern plains. Among the 
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hide, for a brief period outlaws and former pariahs managed to amass the sort of profits 
normally reserved for only the most elite and respected of fields.11  
This vatic shift—and in particular the explicit focus on bison as laissez-faire 
prey—had important corollaries for the cattle industry that would follow. While hunters 
were out eradicating the species from the plains, politicians and public figures were 
praising that slaughter in an odd, pseudo-Darwinian cant, propounding the deep-seated 
view “that domestic livestock were destined to replace the bison.” In the historiography, 
this sort of talk has often been relegated to an auxiliary role, a footnote alongside the 
more patent violence of the slaughter, but such claims—like the mythic stories that 
preceded them—served an important rhetorical function. According to this view, cattle 
emerged as the teleological successors to the species that had previously defined the 
plains. Bison, like the indigenous inhabitants they were so closely associated with, “fled 
before the conquering cattle.”12 Time and again federal officials deprecated the mythic 
animals for making less efficient use of the land and its chief energy resource: the plains’ 
abundant grasses.13 They couched their claims in the familiar cant of Manifest Destiny, 
arguing that bison “trample upon the plains upon which our settlers desire to herd their 
cattle and their sheep…[t]hey are as uncivilized as the Indian,” and that the animals were, 
“at most, but game. Men have not been able to domesticate them so as to make them 
useful in any respect as a domestic animal. They take up as much room and consume as 
                                                
11 For hide prices by year, see M. Scott Taylor, “Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual 
Extinction of the North American Bison,” American Economic Review December 2011): 3179. 
12 Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920 (Cambridge; 
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Euro-American settlers imposed, among other places, in early New England. See Cronon, Changes in the 
Land, 78-79, 95. 
 98 
much provender as cattle and horses or any other character of useful domestic animals.”14 
But just as important as these claims was their geographic ubiquity. Not only did such 
rhetoric litter the halls of Congress, but it similarly occupied the minds of Powder River 
settlers. Even in Johnson County we see articles on the importance of “substitute[ing] 
cattle for buffaloes, and ranch men with their assisting cowboys for the aborigines.”15 The 
focus here on substitution—on purported efficiency—reveals a more sinister, implicit, 
and economically enlightened logic, one that would prove central to Johnson County’s 
earliest ranchers: bison and cattle are similar species; bison have thrived on the northern 
plains—and particularly (as the Crow, Lakota, etc. showed) in the Powder River Basin—
for millennia; cattle are more efficient and civilized animals; therefore, cattle will not 
merely replicate the ecology of the bison but ultimately surpass it. It was a 
thermodynamic thesis that would come to define the early years of the Powder River’s 
cattle industry, and one that would play a critical role in the lead up to the Johnson 
County War. Unfortunately, like the Darwinian thread that it was in many ways a part of, 
it was also badly mistaken. 
The timing of these cognitive and physical shifts is important. Most stories place 
the first substantial settler cattle herds entering the Powder River Basin in either 1878 or 
1879, dates that coincide precisely with the initial stages of the bison’s demographic 
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bull. The pastures which now support 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 head of buffalo will support an equal number 
of cattle, which, as better friends of man, have a better right to them than the ugly wild beast that has little 
to give us worth having besides its skin...Let the buffalo go—the faster the better—and let the grassy hills 
and plains of Montana and Wyoming be covered with herds of good, honest, civilized cattle.” “The Buffalo 
Must Go,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, June 9, 1882. 
15 “The Cattle Crop,” Big Horn Sentinel, May 28, 1887, 
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collapse.16 By that time Texas was more or less overrun with pseudo-feral, postbellum 
cattle. But the problem was not simply the number of the animals that had colonized the 
region. As a result of overgrazing and a lack of care during the war years, most of the 
cattle were nowhere near healthy enough to be sold profitably for meat. And even if they 
had been, Texas did not possess the transportation networks needed to ship them north 
and east to more valuable markets—distant Midwestern hubs like Chicago and Kansas 
City, where they were processed and packaged for America’s burgeoning population.17 
Consequently, ranchers began to look north to the central and northern plains, which 
were then being settled in the wake of the war and the various mineral rushes that had 
colonized the region.18 During the late 1860s it was the central plains that first filled this 
newfound void, with Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri benefitting most from the 
northward-drifting herds. But by the 1870s these ranges too had become overcrowded, 
and ranchers continued to look for new thermodynamic frontiers, this time to the northern 
plains, lands that were just then being seized from Indian peoples like the Crow. And so 
ranchers “turned their eyes toward northeastern Wyoming,” in particular to the Powder 
                                                
16 Helena Huntington Smith, The War on Powder River: The History of an Insurrection (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 8-9. E.S. Osgood writes that, “Wyoming stockmen were down on the 
trail in 1879 buying up herds as they came in from the south, for their new ranges along the Powder, 
Tongue, and Upper Cheyenne.” E.S. Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, a Study of the Northern Range, 
1845-1890 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1929), 86. Many of the earliest ranches were in 
the vicinity of military forts, to whom they sold beef. For instance, in 1878 and 1879, H.G. Williams had a 
ranch on Crazy Woman Creek, a few miles from Fort McKinney, to whom he sold steers. Sheridan Post, 
October 18, 1910. 
17 W.E. Guthrie, “The Open Range Cattle Business in Wyoming,” WPA Collections 377, 1. Of course the 
lack of railroads in the South was also one of the decisive factors in the Civil War. 
18 Although some scholars have criticized what they see as the mythic version of cattle coming to the 
northern plains from Texas, claiming instead that the bulk came from Oregon, it does seem that most of 
Johnson County’s cattle came from the south (the critique seems more appropriate for Montana). As Harold 
Briggs has observed, “Although some eastern and western cattle were brought into Wyoming during the 
boom period by far the larger portion of the range stock came from Colorado and Texas. Wyoming stock- 
men went down the trail in 1879-1880 buying up herds as they came up from the south, for their new 
ranges along the Powder, Tongue, and Upper Cheyenne rivers.” Harold E. Briggs, “The Development and 
Decline of Open Range Ranching in the Northwest,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 20, no. 4 
(1934): 527–28. 
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River Basin, where they “commenced prospecting for new ranges on Crazy Woman, 
Goose Creek, and other streams.”19 In 1878, just as pressure on the bison was increasing, 
territorial Governor John Wesley Hoyt remarked upon this northward movement of 
ranchers, describing the foothills of the Big Horns as “an Arcadia” that was “waiting for 
and only needing the herdsman and his flocks to make it complete.” He noted that “little 
parties of adventurous pioneers” were already up there “exploring for good location with 
the intention of taking in herds of cattle next spring.”20 And while his remarks certainly 
echoed the booster rhetoric that would later plague Salt Creek (chapter three), in this case 
Hoyt was right. Within two years those same foothills would support just under a million 
cattle, leading to Johnson County’s designation as “the mecca of the Texas cattle treks.”21  
The distinctive provenance of these first cattle would go on to play a major role in 
the development of the Powder River Basin’s open range, eventually paving the way for 
the final confrontation in Johnson County. The animals were reared and cared for 
according to what historian Terry Jordan has dubbed “The Texas System,” a place-based 
cognomen that has since stuck in the regional literature. This method, an amalgam of 
Spanish and English livestock practices (and, in the Americas, transplanted from Central 
America and the Carolinas), attempted to take advantage of both the natural bounty of the 
“free range”—i.e., land that was in the public domain—and the cattle’s innate drive for 
survival to permit the animals to fend for themselves. As a rule, ranchers only actively 
intervened and herded during the spring—when they branded new calves—and the fall—
                                                
19 Cheyenne Sun, March 6, 1880. 
20 “Report of the Governor of Wyoming Territory Made to the Secretary of the Interior,” (Washington: 
G.P.O., 1878), 40. 
21 A.P. Dow, “The Cattlemen’s Invasion of Wyoming 1892,” WPA Collections 370, 2. 
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when those fattened and matured for market were shipped to the slaughterhouses.22 The 
result was that irresistible speculative combination: minimal labor and maximum profit. 
James Brisbin’s infamous The Beef Bonanza: or, How to Get Rich on the Plains, an 1881 
bestseller, sums up this thermodynamic worldview best: “the profits are enormous. There 
is no business like it in the world, and the whole secret of it is, it costs nothing to feed the 
cattle. They grow without eating your money. They literally raise themselves.” Brisbane 
claimed that an individual could start out with a $25,000 investment and, within six 
years, not only have made all of that money back, but come out with a profit of more than 
$50,000.23 Such dogma was recapitulated by Johnson County’s early residents. “In the 
old days ranching was nothing more than a desperate, if intensely interesting, gamble,” 
one cattleman recalled. “The only investment was in the cattle themselves, and the only 
real labor took place in the spring, for the annual roundup in which new calves were 
branded.”24 Under this iteration of the open range system, the animals excavated their 
own energy surpluses. In effect, cattle became better bison. 
The problem, however, is that there is something misleading about the Texas 
cognomen when it is applied to the Powder River Basin. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, much of the scholarship on the Great Plains has treated the region as a 
monologic whole, erasing the vast ecological differences that occur not just latitudinally 
but across the thousands of different microclimates that affect and fundamentally shape 
                                                
22 Terry G. Jordan, North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion and Differentiation 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 210-211; George Stewart, “History of Range Use,” 
The Western Range (Senate Doc., 74th Cong., 2d sees., no. 199), Washington, 1936, 122-123. 
23 James S. Brisbin, The Beef Bonanza; Or, How to Get Rich on the Plains. Being a Description of Cattle-
Growing, Sheep-Farming, Horse-Raising, and Dairying in the West (Philadelphia : J.B. Lippincott & 
Co.,1881), 200. Italics mine. 
24 Ida McPherren, “History of Grazing,” WPA Collections 395, 3. 
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the thermodynamics of its space.25 From a ranching perspective, this means that although 
similar in its broad strokes, the “Texas System” as practiced in Texas, Oklahoma, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and even Colorado differed significantly from that which was carried 
out in eastern Wyoming and Montana. For the region’s indigenous peoples, the brutal 
conditions of the northern plains made horse care a wholly different entity than it was on 
the central and southern plains, where tribes like the Comanche and Kiowa kept herds far 
greater than anything that was conceivable on the northern plains. The same was true for 
cattle—the seasonal rounds and winter isolation on the northern plains versus, say, 
southern Colorado, made the northern plains system disparate enough to merit its own 
place-specific nomenclature.26 Just as Crow equestrianism was different than Comanche 
equestrianism, so too was Powder River ranching different from that of the central plains. 
As such, I refer to the initial open-range system of cattle ranching in the Powder 
River Basin not as the “Texas System of Ranching”—as it has heretofore been called—
but as the Cattle-Bison System (C.B.S.) of ranching. This classificatory shift is more than 
mere semantics, for on the northern plains the temporal movements of most ranchers 
closely mirrored the seasonal rounds of the Crow and other equestrian bison hunters of 
the plains. This cycle of annual movement is well known among the indigenous studies 
literature, but it bears summary here. During a typical year, the Crow people would 
gather together in spring—typically May—as bison moved out from their winter shelters 
                                                
25 The macroscale approach can be seen in Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse 
Cultures,” The Journal of American History 90, no. 3 (2003): 833–862. Hämäläinen claims that “the most 
revealing dynamics” of Plains ecology are latitudinal—the traditional delineation into northern, central, and 
southern plains. As argued in the rest of this chapter, however, the more telling delineations are along 
microclimates. 
26 Note that this is also a problem with much of the scholarship on the cattle industry. See, for instance, 
Ernest Staples Osgood, The Day of the Cattleman, Minnesota Archive Editions edition (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1929); Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov and Terry G. Jordan, North American Cattle-Ranching 
Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion and Differentiation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); 
Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1931). 
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and windbreaks and onto the plains for the early season grasses. Here they operated in 
bands, gathering roots and killing bison when possible, attempting to regain the nutrition 
they had lost over the harsh winter months. As spring gave way to summer—roughly 
June through September—the tribes broke into smaller groups to pursue these animals 
out on the plains, though they also occasionally came together in large groups for certain 
ceremonies. With the exception of such ritual gatherings, however, encampments 
remained small—family- or band-sized—and tended to be located along rivers and 
creeks. In the fall, they gathered into what were typically their largest groups of the year 
for communal winter-preparation hunts. If they did not possess enough horses for such a 
hunt, this would include pounds, where the methods—herding large groups of bison into 
natural or constructed enclosures—were oddly similar to those later practiced by 
cattlemen. Finally, as October came and fall gave way to winter, the tribes dispersed into 
smaller groups once again, sheltering themselves in the relative safety of the region’s 
river valleys, staying warm and moving little if at all until the following spring, when the 
process started over.27  
In most of the literature, these movements disappeared in the late-nineteenth 
century as the Crow and other northern plains tribes were forced onto reservations. But 
what is remarkable is just how closely this cycle mirrors the seasonal rounds of the 
Cattle-Bison System ranchers. In the spring—anywhere from mid-April to early-June, 
depending upon the severity of the preceding winter—as soon as the snow melted and the 
                                                
27 Scott Hamilton and B.A. Nicholson, “Aboriginal Seasonal Subsistence and Land Use on the Northeastern 
Plains: Insight From Ethnohistoric Sources,” Plains Anthropologist 51, no. 199 (2006): 262–65; J. Rod 
Vickers, “Seasonal Round Problems on the Alberta Plains,” Canadian Journal of Archaeology / Journal 
Canadien d’Archéologie 15 (1991): 61–65;  John C Ewers, The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture: With 
Comparative Material from Other Western Tribes (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980), 123–
24. 
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grasses became accessible, cattlemen would venture out from their winter haunts to check 
on the herds. Once on the plains, they would gather all of the cattle in a given range so 
that the new calves could be branded. Such roundups were generally conducted by 
district, coordinated around certain rivers or sections of rivers, and were announced in the 
local newspapers. After this, the ranchers’ and cowboys’ only responsibilities for the next 
four or five months were odd and arythmic bits of maintenance: ensuring that cattle had 
access to water, grass, and salt; pulling the animals free from mudholes and other 
terrestrial sinks; prohibiting them from straying too far from camp. As summer then gave 
way to fall, the ranchers gathered for another roundup—in effect participating in a tamer, 
domesticized “hunting” of the animals—this time culling the herd’s three-, four-, and 
five-year-olds to be shipped to market, typically via train.28 This completed, the men 
prepared to return to their winters camps, where they holed up with supplies and waited 
out the bitter cold for the next five months.29 This continued on until the snow melted and 
the following spring roundup came around, at which point they would brand the next 
crop of calves, thereby starting the cycle anew.30 
 One must assume that all of this was done unconsciously, for there is no evidence 
of ranchers knowingly replicating the movements and sustenance patterns of either bison 
or the region’s mid-century indigenous inhabitants. And yet time and again they made 
explicit comparisons between the two ruminant species. This was done not merely among 
boosters and politicians but in the regional papers as well. At the height of the open range 
                                                
28 The Burlington and Missouri Railroad reached Gillette, the subject of chapter four, in 1891. 
29 According to one hand, “for the most part, we just laid around, ate and slept, and looked after our saddle 
horses… Life got pretty monotonous.” Of course this is similar to accounts of winter camps for the 
region’s indigenous peoples. B.W. Hope, “Joe Elliott’s Story,” Annals of Wyoming 45, no. 2 (1973): 147.  
30 Macy, “Some Factors,” 7-8; Marcel Kornfeld, “Stockraising Settlement Strategies,” Master’s Thesis, 
University of Wyoming, Laramie, 1982, 60. For an example of roundup announcements, see “Roundups for 
1887,” Buffalo Echo, April 22, 1887, 2. 
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era, the local Big Horn Sentinel went so far as to print a report from a Manitoba man, S.L. 
Bedson, who outlined a systematic program for cross-breeding bison and cattle (what we 
would now call beefalo) into a sort of uber-animal for the northern plains ecology. 
According to Bedson, the offspring of such a match were “very hard, as they take the 
instinct of the buffalo during the blizzards and storms and do not drift like native cattle; 
they remain upon the open prairie during our severest winters, while the thermometer 
ranges from 30 to 40 degrees below zero, with little or no food except what they rustle on 
the prairie and no shelter at all.” Here it seems was the perfect mutant for the cattle-baron 
era: the tractability of domestic cattle and the primal hardiness of plains bison. In ways 
that nobody could have predicted, this animal can now be seen as the ultimate symbol of 
the C.B.S.  
 For a number of reasons, by the late-1870s Johnson County had become the 
logical destination for cattlemen looking to ply the Cattle-Bison System, a place to 
transform abstract theory into concrete reality. Its first ranchers supplied the U.S. Army’s 
Fort McKinney, a military outpost that had been erected in the wake of Custer’s defeat on 
the Clear Fork of the Powder River, just a few miles west of present-day Buffalo. But by 
the late 1870s, the ranchers who were entering the region did so with the goal of shipping 
beef east, out to Chicago and other distant markets, where they hoped to turn a greater 
profit. Many of these early cattlemen were formerly in the employ of Fort McKinney. 
(The county’s first officially recorded settler was the post’s trader, an Ohioan by the 
name of Elias Snider.) 31 But as the 1870s gave way to the 1880s, settlers from across the 
country began to descend upon Johnson County, establishing a pattern of land use that 
                                                
31 Mrs. Charles S. Baker, “Early History of Johnson County,” WPA Files 788, 6; Minnie Rietz, “Johnson 
County,” WPA Files 996, 1. 
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would shape both the Johnson County War and its historiography: in the southern half of 
the country, closest to Cheyenne, large, wealthy outfits such as the Powder River Cattle 
Company, the Hardin Campbell Cattle Company, the Frontier Land Cattle Company, and 
the Converse Cattle Company reigned, while in the northern half—centered around tiny 
Buffalo—smaller outfits and farmers tended to hold sway.32 It is in this geographic 
dichotomy that we find the first germ of the class-based approach taken by so many later 
scholars. But for now, it is important to realize that all these initial settlers readily 
embraced the Cattle-Bison System, setting their herds loose to graze on the natural 
bluestem, blue grama, and switchgrass that covered the region, in the process attempting 
to transform grass and latent energy into profits. As A.P. Dow, a cattleman from the 
Sheridan area, put it, “men planned on making this territory the greatest cattle haven in 
the world. There were to be no fences, the cattle were to be known by their brand,” 
roaming the country to “its unfenced limits.”33 The subsequent ranges were based upon 
usufruct rights to land and fee simple title to cattle, a practice similar to the first-come 
first-serve notion that would be practiced at Salt Creek (chapter three), whereby use was 
ceded to the first person to use the land and develop it.34 But the key difference in 
Johnson County was that none of this was official—it was all based upon unspoken 
observance and respect. In the words of one employee of the Six-Half Circle ranch, after 
claiming a particular range, ranchers simply “turned their cattle loose that spring and did 
                                                
32 John W. Davis, Wyoming Range War: The Infamous Invasion of Johnson County, Reprint edition 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 14. 
33 A.P. Dow, “The Cattlemen’s Invasion of Wyoming, 1892,” WPA Collections, File 1469. 
34 Randy McFerrin and Douglas Wills, “High Noon on the Western Range: A Property Rights Analysis of 
the Johnson County War,” The Journal of Economic History 67, no. 1 (2007): 70. Interestingly, the notion 
of usufruct right to land is one of the key tenets that Cronon describes indigenous land use in New England 
by, contrasting it with European colonists’ notion of private property. See Cronon, Changes in the Land, 
62-74. 
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not see them again all winter.” They were on their own until the spring melt, when the 
new calves were branded.35  
 It was this concept of land as usufruct and cattle as superior bison that would 
drive the C.B.S. through its various successes and failures, ultimately leading to the 
violence of the Johnson County War. The early 1880s were without question a time of 
hope and prosperity, when it seemed as though all of the boasts and grandiloquence of the 
politicians and boosters were true: every sign indicated that the migrant cattle did make 
better use of the land than bison, that they fattened and matured in ways previously 
unthinkable. But underlying this initial success was a far more troubling thermodynamic 
reality. Unfortunately for the C.B.S. ranchers, it was hidden by a number of place-based 
rhetorical strategies. The first of these was something called “book count,” a regional 
method of accounting that was not merely a queer foible of the system—as it has 
heretofore been treated—but a thermodynamic strategy that played a crucial role in 
establishing the overblown optimism of the C.B.S. Without its quantitative fortification, 
the C.B.S. may very well have crumbled early on, and the Johnson County War may 
never have happened after all. 
 
The Problem with Book Count 
In simple terms, the book count was the number of cattle that ranch owners 
recorded in their official records. It was the quantity that they claimed to own. But 
beneath—or rather beyond—its simplicity existed a separate reality: the number of living, 
breathing animals that were out there on the range. One of the crucial and well-known 
                                                
35 Nora Neely, “The T7 and Other Ranches,” WPA Collections, File 1194. 
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characteristics of the open range era was that these two quantities were often wildly 
disparate, varying by as little as 1/3 or as much as eighty percent, depending on whose 
accounts you look at.36 For a long time they existed in separate phenomenological realms, 
never intersecting due to the simple fact that few ranchers ever went out and physically 
counted the animals in their herds. The only time the two quantities did overlap was 
during sales, when the range-bound animals were finally tallied and codified, and the 
bankruptcy of the book count was laid bare. One can see this in the case of W.E. Guthrie, 
one of Johnson County’s earliest ranchers and a later participant in the Johnson County 
War, who liked to recall the story of a neighboring rancher who entered the Powder River 
cattle business by purchasing 1,200 head from another local. Within a couple of years, 
however, the new owner began to fear that he had nowhere near as many cattle as he paid 
for. As such, he sent Guthrie onto the range to count the animals. After working his way 
across the region, Guthrie was able to round up fewer than 200 of the supposed 1,200 
animals, an experience that seems to have been more the rule than the exception. As 
Guthrie puts it, “in most cases where large herds were bought ‘book count’ the 
purchasers were given a good start towards [sic] bankruptcy, or at best the loss of a large 
part of their investments.”37 In cases where a sale was never made, the owners remained 
perennially ignorant of just how wildly their own numbers fluctuated from the empirical 
count. 
In some ways, the whole concept of book count is representative of the C.B.S. and 
its thermodynamic worldview. Such an entity could only exist when owners were 
detached not only from their animals but from the landscape as a whole. Under the 
                                                
36 The 1/3 number comes from Macy, “Some Factors in the Development and Destruction of the ‘Open 
Range,” 6-7.  
37 Guthrie, “The Open Range Cattle Business in Wyoming,” 5-6. 
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C.B.S., absenteeism was a well-known and rampant malady; many of the ranches’ 
headquarters were located overseas, with the palatial Frewen Brothers ranch (England) in 
modern-day Kaycee and the nearby T.Y. ranch being the most well-known. (The latter 
held its annual meeting of directors not in the Powder River Basin but in London.)38 
According to one rancher, the companies “were owned by Eastern or English 
companies…[and] their managers, sent out from the East, hardly knew a cow from a 
buffalo. The foremen would put them to wrangling horses or at some such work where 
they would be out of the way. A great many of them were remittance men,” scions of 
wealthy European nobles who sent their sons to America in order to get them out of the 
way.39 These men were “Englishmen in knee breeches, accompanied by their general 
managers, buggy bosses and valets [who] rode around with an air of lordliness which was 
ridiculous.”40 This not only led to the statistical inaccuracies of book count, but it also 
created an ideological fissure between locals, who for the most part lived on the land, and 
absentee owners, who “hardly knew a cow from a buffalo.” Once again, the language 
here is telling: the C.B.S. ranchers had seen—or rather, heard—of the millions of buffalo 
that had previously packed the plains; now they thought they could simply substitute 
cattle, animals that—as in the founding myth of the unnamed traders—would “take care 
of themselves.” Unfortunately, many of these owners were horribly ignorant of the 
intricacies of the local landscape; they had little inkling not merely of the difference 
                                                
38 Oscar H. “Jack” Flagg, A Review of the Cattle Business in Johnson County, Wyoming, Since 1882, and 
the Causes That Led to the Recent Invasion (The Vic Press, 1967), 9. According to one local newspaper, 
the Powder River Cattle Company failed not because of the damage from the Hard Winter but because it 
was run “by a board of directors that were enjoying pleasant offices in London.” Big Horn Sentinel, 
November 19, 1887. 
39 Neely, “The T7 and Other Ranches,” 2. Of course this was similar to the absenteeism that would come to 
plague Salt Creek (see chapter three).  
40 Oscar Flagg, “A Review of the Cattle Business in Johnson County, Wyoming since 1882 and the Causes 
that Led to the Recent Invasion,” 6, Buffalo Bulletin, May 5, 1892. 
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between the species but of the various microclimates of the plains.41 To them it was more 
or less one great, grassy sea, and they intended to do everything they could to profit from 
it. 
In much of this historical scholarship on the Johnson County War, this concept of 
book count is portrayed pseudo-comically, as one of a handful of the inane tenets that 
defined the open range era, ultimately leading to overstocking and exaggerated death 
counts. But from the viewpoint of the Cattle-Bison System, it was crucial. The C.B.S. 
was premised upon the notion of virtually unlimited abundance and gain; any sort of 
quantitative loss—whether natural or human-induced—disclosed the limitations of the 
system, in particular its long-term unsustainability and detachment from on-the-ground 
realities. As such, the concept of book count—and its corollary, an ownership class that 
was, for the most part, absent from the physical landscape—enabled the C.B.S. to 
continue to function as a viable worldview, regardless of how much it meshed with the 
empirical reality. Paradoxically, under this view the less contact owners and ranchers had 
with the animals, the better.42  
Part of this detachment came out of necessity. Although the numbers tell us that 
the C.B.S. was a success—by the mid-1880s, the Powder River Basin was teeming with 
cattle; although specific numbers for the region are difficult to determine, a good estimate 
for the territory as a whole is between 1.5 and two million cattle, a good portion of which 
                                                
41 Even Nate Champion, the martyr of the Johnson County War, began his career in the Powder River Basin 
working for the C.A. brand, whose “money…come from overseas.” Jack R. Gage, The Johnson County 
War Ain’t a Pack of Lies (Cheyenne: Flintlock Publishing Company, 1967), 4. 
42 There are some similarities between this approach and that practiced by so many of the tycoons of the 
Gilded Age. For one such examination, see Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the 
Making of Modern America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011). 
 111 
were in the P.R.B.—we need to remember that the numbers were often faulty.43 Despite 
all of the overbearing rhetoric of boosters and politicians, cattle and bison were far from 
the same species. As the former moved into Powder River Basin by the hundreds of 
thousands during the late-1870s and early-1880s, they established a new ecology, 
replacing but—crucially—not replicating that of the bison. For despite what the C.B.S. 
ranchers believed, we now know that even out on the open range, without the fences that 
would later delineate the plains’ cattle, “bison wander more, are less apt to regraze a site 
during a single growing season, will use steeper terrain, select and consume drier, 
rougher forage, and spend less time in riparian areas and wetlands.”44 Part of this has to 
do with the animals’ similar but divergent evolution. Although a genetic history points to 
a common ancestor, the two species split more than thirteen million years ago, with the 
bison’s subsequent movement taking it to the world’s grasslands while cattle inhabited 
wetter woodland biomes. The results are telling: cattle are decidedly less mobile, more 
obese, and have a skeletal structure that favors short bursts of speed at the expense of 
more methodical long-distance travel. Further, they have notably negative effects on 
riparian ecosystems, those thermodynamic keystones that were outlined in the previous 
chapter.45 As a consequence, not only are cattle more likely than bison to overgraze any 
given location, thereby inhibiting future use of that locale’s thermodynamic resources, 
but during particularly trying times—whether it be drought or snow or some other type of 
energy-sapping factor—they have less ability to move and search out supplementary 
                                                
43 T. A. Larson, History of Wyoming, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 167. 
44 “Are Cows Just Domestic Bison? Behavioral and Habitat Use Differences Between Cattle and Bison,” 
Western Watersheds Project, https://www.westernwatersheds.org/gw-cattle-v-bison/. 
45 J. Boone Kauffman and W. C. Krueger, “Livestock Impacts on Riparian Ecosystems and Streamside 
Management Implications... A Review,” Journal of Range Management 37, no. 5 (1984): 430–38. 
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forage than their evolutionary cousins, the bison.46 Perhaps most importantly for our next 
section, bison are more acclimated for the hardships of northern winters: they have a 
greater hair density in their coats and therefore a better capacity to survive in cold 
climates, they are noticeably better at foraging for food in snow, and they have the ability 
to digest food of notably lower quality than cattle.47 In other words, for bison there was in 
a very real sense more energy available in a given environment than there was for the 
region’s newfound cattle. Although the C.B.S. ranchers could praise the superiority of 
their animals as much as they wanted, the empirical reality told a far different story. 
Consequently, although the Cattle-Bison System was ostensibly thriving, by the 
1880s the stage was set for its first substantial challenge. Because of their detachment 
from the landscape and their reliance upon book count as a reflection of ecology, many 
C.B.S. ranchers came to the conclusion that the Powder River Basin was a modern-day 
Eden, a place where energy was, for all intents and purposes, limitless. What they did not 
realize was that by forcing the animals to fend for themselves, to forage locally for food 
in an unforgiving landscape, they were effectively killing them. For nearly a decade the 
inherent flexibility of book count hid this reality from those in power, forestalling any 
possible change. But as the owners of these vast cattle herds were about to find out, when 
                                                
46 See, for instance, Norland, who notes that bison will rarely stay in the same spot for more than forty-
eight hours, regardless of resources. As a result, certain areas were “potentially grazed only once, if at all, 
in a 3-4 week period.” J.E. Norlan, C.B. Marlow, L.R. Irby, "Determination of Optimum Bison Stocking 
Rate in Theodore Roosevelt National Park, North Dakota," Journal of Environmental Management 1985), 
21: 225-239.  
47 H.F. Peters, S.B. Slen, “Hair Coat Characteristics of Bison, Domestic x Bison Hybrids, Cattalo, and 
Certain Domestic Breeds of Beef Cattle," Canadian Journal of Animal Science 44, no.1 (1964), 48.  
Margaret Meagher, for instance, noted that snow rarely affected bison’s ability to feed. She cites one study 
that records bison feeding in four feet of snow without any difficulty. Margaret Mary Meagher, The Bison 
of Yellowstone National Park (Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, National Park Service, 1973), 73.  
According to Peden, bison “have a greater digestive power than cattle when consuming low protein…[and] 
poor quality forage.” D. G. Peden et al., “The Trophic Ecology of Bison Bison L. on Shortgrass Plains,” 
Journal of Applied Ecology 11, no. 2 (1974): 493. 
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conditions deteriorated and the Powder River Basin was at its worst, the strength of book 
count would quickly become its weakness. Instead of legitimizing the C.B.S., it would 
help lead to its undoing. 
 
The Hard Winter: 1886-1887 
 One of the most celebrated paintings of the Old West pictures a single slat-ribbed 
bull standing knee-deep in snow, its body so thin and ligamental that his fur looks 
pocked. A pack of five wolves circle it, waiting for an opening or moment of weakness to 
make their kill. The resultant juxtaposition is acute. The cow looks terminally haggard, 
the only sign of life a faint wedge of mist emerging from its mouth. The wolves, on the 
other hand, seem oddly relaxed, almost serene. Three of them sit patiently watching the 
cow, while the other two trace a loose circle in the snow, moving with the confident 
nonchalance of apex predators. Entitled “Waiting for a Chinook,” the work is a simple 
watercolor painted in the summer of 1886, after the worst winter in memory. More 
importantly, it is the first known work of Charlie Russell, one of the West’s most august 
nineteenth-century artists. But what ultimately makes the work so powerful is the story 
that it represents, one diametrically opposed to that propagated by the C.B.S.48 It is a 
painting of visceral pain and loss, of the limitations and austerity imposed by the winter 
of 1886-1887, what has since become better known as “The Hard Winter.” More 
importantly, it is the first representation of a new thermodynamic worldview. 
                                                
48 Wallis Huidekoper, “The Story behind Charlie Russell’s Masterpiece: ‘Waiting for a Chinook,’” The 
Montana Magazine of History 4, no. 3 (1954): 37–39. 
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Figure 6: Charlie Russell’s “Waiting for a Chinook” 
https://collections.centerofthewest.org/view/waiting_for_a_chinook?offset=99&maxOffset=23622 
  
From a historiographic standpoint, there remains a great deal of controversy over 
just how bad the Hard Winter really was.49 It has become rather commonplace for 
scholars to claim that that winter’s severity—and its corollary place in the historical 
                                                
49 The main argument against the “hard winter” thesis is quantitative. Geoff Cunfer, for instance, in one of 
the most well-known examples, calculates that in 1885 there were 7.5 million cattle on the plains, a number 
that would, five years later, drop to 6.3 million. But he argues that, if properly organized, the plains could, 
and has, supported herds of thirteen million, nearly twice what it held during the hard winter. He terms this 
balance “ecological equilibrium,” and claims that it would be reached in the first part of the twentieth 
century, as the new method of ranching outlined by Webb took hold. This is an argument that, on the 
surface, seems to make sense. If we calculate the total available forage on the plains then we can calculate 
the total number of fauna it could support. But the problem with this is similar to that outlined in chapter 
one, when examining the historical Crow and the rise of the Yellowstone River as an energy factor. (I.e., 
that the northern plains as a whole is an incredibly harsh environment, particular for raising horses, but 
much of the Yellowstone river and its tributaries are some of the best.) In other words, calculating a 
carrying capacity for the plains as a whole tells us very little about the hard winter or the carrying capacity 
of any particular range. See Geoff Cunfer, On the Great Plains: Agriculture and Environment (College 
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2005), 50–51. The methodology Cunfer uses is similar to that used 
to calculate bison population and carrying capacity in Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy.” 
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imaginary—has been exaggerated, that popular media, in particular the Russell painting, 
has promulgated a myth that has little to do with the empirical reality. By examining the 
period through a thermodynamic lens, however, this subsection pushes back against such 
claims, arguing that for many in the Powder River Basin—and, more specifically, 
Johnson County—the Hard Winter was very hard indeed. It marked the initial breakdown 
of the Cattle-Bison System, causing numerous ranchers to go bankrupt and flee the 
region. But it did not lead to the wholesale collapse of the C.B.S. Instead, it can be seen 
as marking the beginning of a transition period, a move away from the Cattle-Bison 
System and toward a new energy imaginary, that of the Range-Science Ranchers, a group 
of emigrants who will be examined in the next section. While the Hard Winter may not 
have had a major impact on the class-based divides preferred by many previous scholars, 
then, it did serve to highlight and exacerbate the thermodynamic bankruptcy of the 
C.B.S., helping to lead to its ultimate collapse. 
According to most reports, the spring of 1886 was atypically dry, with the usually 
verdant spring grasses emerging sere and sparse, providing little of the nutrition 
necessary to revive cattle coming off of winter deprivation. Unfortunately the subsequent 
summer provided little relief, witnessing a scarce two and a half inches of precipitation, 
roughly half the seasonal average.50 All the way up by the Canadian border, Fort 
Assiniboine—one of the few primitive weather stations in either Montana or Wyoming at 
the time—reported a maximum temperature of 108 degrees, the highest ever recorded. 
Such a seasonal diversion would have important consequences on the ensuing winter. 
From a scientific standpoint, in years when rainfall dropped below ten inches, the total 
                                                
50 Frederic S. Hultz, “Wyoming Livestock Production,” typed manuscript, 5, WPA Collections, File 377; 
Alfred Larson, “The Winter of 1886-87 in Wyoming,” Annals of Wyoming (January 1942), 6. 
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quantity (by weight) of grass per acre could fall to less than 1/6 of its normal capacity.51 
Consequently, as summer turned to fall and then winter, the range was all but devoid of 
available energy, lacking that critical cache of cured grasses that was so necessary to 
survive the northern plains’ most trying season.52 But not only did that summer’s heat 
scorch whatever scant vegetation remained, leaving little in the way of nutrition, but it 
also catalyzed a spat of prairie fires that destroyed acres of range and, as a corollary, 
many of those clusters of energy.53 As a result, cattle entered the fall roundup—when they 
would normally be at their fattest—in a severely weakened state. Not only were the 
animals that were shipped east of noticeably inferior quality to previous years, but those 
that remained were enervated and vulnerable to external pressures.54 Even with a mild 
winter, cattle losses were sure to be significant. 
But of course it would not be a mild winter. In November, Denver’s Field and 
Farm observed that the northern part of Wyoming was “in bad shape for winter 
feeding…Grass is short and there is not much of it.”55 Ranchers in Buffalo echoed these 
sentiments, publicly hoping for a mild winter to help their livestock make it through. As 
one owner observed, “grass is very short in the greater portions of the country, and the 
cattlemen need an open winter to carry their stock through safely.”56 That month brought 
snow and a cold-spell that “revived the coal trade and brought out the sleighs with their 
                                                
51 James E. Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic: High Plains Indians and Their Horses in the Region of 
the Arkansas River Valley, 1800-1870,” Environmental History Review 16, no. 2 (1992): 69. 
52 Stewart, “History of Range Use,” 123. 
53 Carolyn Cunningham and Mark Thompson, eds., Montana Weather: From 70 Degree Below to 117 
Degree Above (Helena.: Montana Magazine Inc., 1982), 71. Fire is, at root, a process of rapid 
decomposition, reducing latent energy into heat. See Stephen Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of 
Wildland and Rural Fire (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1997): 20-44. 
54 Harry Sinclair Drago, The Great Range Wars : Violence on the Grasslands (Lincoln : University of 
Nebraska Press, 1985), 251. 
55 Field and Farm, November 13, 1886. It is worth noting that most reports point to the northeastern 
quadrant of Wyoming as suffering worse than any other (the other notable victim was eastern Montana). 
56 Laramie Daily Boomerang, January 2, 1887. 
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merry bells.”57 It also marked the start of “The most prolonged windstorm ever known.” 
From late-November on through February, a steady wind, “a good fair average of forty 
miles an hour” blew “from sunrise to sunset.” In northern Colorado, it blew so hard that 
trains were swept clear off of the tracks.58 In the midst of this zephyr, the plains were hit 
with a mix of snow and heavy rain. Although not typical for the late-fall/early-winter, this 
was not out of the ordinary: because of the Rocky Mountain belt and, more closely, the 
Bighorns, incoming weather patterns tend to drop their moisture on the windward or 
eastern slopes. The now moisture-light air continues down the leeward side of the 
mountain(s), warming as it does so, resulting in massive temperature swings over the 
course of a few hours (the famous Chinooks). Although typically dry, these winds do 
occasionally bring rain. Under normal circumstances, they are welcomed as a winter 
reprieve—the increased temperature has been known to cut-down on snow accumulation, 
often melting as much as a foot a day. But in the fall of 1886, the rain did not signify a 
full-on Chinook but rather an all-too-brief warming spell. As a result, instead of making 
forage easier to access, it created ice, layers and strata of the stuff that were, according to 
one ranch hand, “packed [as] in an ice house.”59 It effectively locked away the few 
nutrients that remained, leaving the bulk of them inaccessible to the region’s cattle. 
The new year only saw the situation further deteriorate.60 The first major storm hit 
on January 9. The temperature dropped to negative twenty and snow lashed the landscape 
for sixteen straight hours. Two days later, the precipitation commenced once more, this 
time persisting for three days, during which time the temperature never topped the 
                                                
57 Davis, Wyoming Range War, 33. 
58 Larson, History of Wyoming, 7–8. 
59 William Peter Ricketts, “The Winter of 1886—A Tough One,” WPA Collections, File 367, 2. 
60 In one of the great ironies of early Wyoming history, there were no official snowfall totals during the 
winter because the U.S. Signal Office recorder in Cheyenne was “sick.” Larson, History of Wyoming, 6. 
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aforementioned twenty below. Snowdrifts of twelve and fifteen feet were reported, and 
when the precipitation finally stopped on January 15, the temperature dropped even 
further, hitting a punishing forty-six below zero. The stage to Buffalo was stopped by 
snow “four feet on the level,” causing the Sentinel to worry that “unless a gentle Chinook 
pays us a visit, there is room to anticipate a heavy loss when the time comes to tally up at 
the spring round-up.”61 For much of February the temperature held steady in the -10 to -
20 range, with temperatures in Miles City dipping to as low as -52. As a result, “all 
gulches and creek channels were leveled with snow, all grass covered and only the sage 
brush in sight.” Ranchers described the sounds of the “bawling, drifting and starving 
cattle.” From the safety of their cabins, “both day and night the cries for food were heard, 
but we were powerless to help them.” 62 Because of the rigidity of their seasonal rounds 
and the larger thermodynamic worldview that they actuated, the ranchers were out of 
touch with their own animals; all they could do was hunker down and wait for the spring 
thaw. 
 Much of the prenominate suffering had to do with cattle’s cold-weather inferiority 
when compared to bison. As noted earlier, from an empirical standpoint bison had far 
more energy available for use during the winter months than cattle. This was especially 
true in times of harsh weather, when the temperature dropped, the snow level increased, 
and ranch-hands took shelter in often-distant cabins to wait out the worst of the winter. In 
basic terms, the lower the temperature and the greater the wind, the more heat an animal 
loses and therefore the more energy that it needs to take in order to maintain its 
metabolism. Cattle will respond to these challenges by increasing their heart rate, 
                                                
61 Drago, The Great Range Wars, 253–54; Davis, Wyoming Range War, 34; Larson, History of Wyoming, 7. 
62 Ricketts, “The Winter of 1886—A Tough One,” WPA Collections, File 367, 2-4; Miles City temperature 
from “Local and Personal,” Big Horn Sentinel, February 12, 1887. 
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respiration, and blood flow, all of which requires consuming increased quantities food. 
(A modern “rule of thumb” is “to increase total digestible nutrients 1 pound for every 5 
degrees below zero F”).63 The problem is that on the northern plains this period of 
greatest energy loss coincides with the season of least available energy. Accordingly, “the 
interplay between the heat loss of the animal and its feed energy intake as affected by the 
thermal environment is the essence of predicting the productivity of the animal.”64 And it 
is not simply the low air temperature but the strong winds of the plains that makes winter 
such a dangerous time. In short, the higher the wind speed, the higher the critical 
temperature of the animal and the minimum temperature at which an animal is able to 
survive.65 In dry, calm conditions, cattle are able to survive at negative six degrees. But 
even at ten degrees above zero, a fifteen to twenty mile per hour wind will put the 
animals into danger.66 During the Hard Winter there were regularly reports of forty-mile-
per-hour winds in the midst of whiteout-grade snowstorms.67 All of this was compounded 
by the fact that over the course of a normal winter short grasses lose more than half of 
their protein content, meaning that even if this flora is uncovered and consumed, cattle 
                                                
63 Verna Anderson, Breanne Ilse, John Dhuyvetter, Charles Stoltenow, Dale Burr, Tim Schroeder, Tyler 
Ingebretson, “Winter Management of the Beef Cow Herd,” North Dakota State University, 
https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/publications/livestock/winter-management-of-the-beef-cow-herd. 
64 James DeShazer, G. Hahn, and Hongwei Xin, “Chapter 1: Basic Principles of the Thermal Environment 
and Livestock Energetics,” Livestock Energetics and Thermal Environment Management, January 1, 2009, 
8. 
65 Ibid., 14. 
66 This is made worse by the fact that winter is the windiest time of the year on the northern plains, with the 
average wind speed registering at just under twelve miles per hour in mid-January, eleven miles per hour 
for the winter as a whole “Average Weather in Miles City,” https://weatherspark.com/y/3582/Average-
Weather-in-Miles-City-Montana-United-States-Year-Round, Weather Spark. 
67 W. Turrentine Jackson, “The Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association: Its Years of Temporary Decline, 
1886-1890,” Agricultural History 22, no. 4 (1948): 260. 
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can very easily starve on a full stomach. 68 After summers of intense drought and heat—
like that of 1886—this was a very real possibility.69 
All of these factors came into stark relief during the Hard Winter. One of the best 
accounts comes to us from William Peter Ricketts, later a Wyoming state legislator and 
the commissioner for Campbell County (home of Gillette, the focus of chapter four). At 
the time, however, he was a young ranch-hand working at the Half-Circle L Ranch just a 
few miles outside of Miles City, along the northern rim of the Powder River Basin. There 
he spent the winter bunking with four other workers, the group nominally in charge of the 
livestock but unable to venture out except for the briefest of trips, eventually spending so 
much time ensconced that they claimed to have memorized the newspapers which lined 
the walls as ad hoc wallpaper. This wearisome lifestyle continued on until the last week 
of February, when a warm spell swept in and turned the accumulated snow to slush. 
Within a week the men were able to wander out and begin the arduous attempt to account 
for their cattle. Men in southern Wyoming and Colorado were still cautiously optimistic 
that their cattle had survived the winter, but newspapermen noted that the exception 
would probably be northern Wyoming and eastern Montana, where the weather had been 
particularly severe.70 Unfortunately, Ricketts’s experience confirms such fears. As he 
described the scene: “water poured from every gulch into Horse Creek until its water 
lapped the foothills on both sides of the valley. Dead cows were moving east in 
bunches…we felt we were living in a new world.” The men went out riding only to find 
                                                
68 Anderson et. al. “Winter Management of the Beef Cow Herd,” 1-5. Sherow, “Workings of the 
Geodialectic,” 71. 
69 At a chemical level, the membranes of the photosystems become brittle and inelastic as temperatures 
drop. This causes the electron transfer chain to struggle and operate more slowly, its efficiency directly 
correlated to temperature. And as if this is not bad enough, during winter carbon dioxide is at its lowest 
point of the year, thereby further slowing the chemical process of photosynthesis. Oliver Morton, Eating 
the Sun: How Plants Power the Planet (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 299. 
70 Larson, History of Wyoming, 10. 
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“a yearling or two or big steer dead behind most any kind of a windbreak—say a cutbank, 
a fallen tree, brush or rock piles,” no doubt looking for relief from the brutal cold. Worse, 
the few surviving animals “were mere shadows. Their bodies were thin and out of 
proportion to their monstrous horns and the big heavy bush on their tails.” Ricketts 
estimated his own losses to be a staggering seventy-five percent.71  
 The numbers from that spring’s roundup were hardly better. Statewide, the most 
accurate estimates place Wyoming’s deficits at fifty percent, Montana’s at seventy-five.72 
But it is important to remember that the Powder River Basin suffered worse than 
surrounding regions—this is the key rebuttal to those scholars who argue that the winter 
of 1886-1887 was not as deleterious as it has been made out to be. 73 Francis Emroy 
Warren, the Wyoming manager for the American Cattle Trust and later Wyoming’s first 
governor, claimed that over half of the cattle in the Powder River region were lost. The 
Buffalo Echo reported one outfit rounding up fewer than 1,000 from a herd of 12,000.74 
In the wake of such destruction, many of the larger outfits—including the Frewen 
Brothers, the Bar C, the Dolores Land and Cattle Company, and the Swan Land and 
Cattle Company, the latter two among the largest operations in the territory—either left 
                                                
71 Ricketts, “The Winter of 1886,” 2-6. 
72 “The Northwestern Range,” Big Horn Sentinel, July 28, 1888. Although Terry Jordan estimated losses 
from 60-100%. Jordan, North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers, 238. 
73 Governor Thomas Moonlight, writing in 1887, was already confident enough to claim that “This was the 
turning point in this history of Wyoming…the largest cattle companies are now closing up the business and 
giving place to the smaller holdings.” Nevertheless, some historians claim that that winter’s severity—and 
its corollary place in the historical imaginary—has been exaggerated, that popular media, in particular the 
prenominate Russell painting, has propagated a myth that had little in common with the empirical reality. 
Among the most vehement critics has been historian T.A. Larson, who claimed that in Wyoming, “the 
losses were probably not far above 15 percent,” or less than half of the number lost on Montana. 
Moonlight, “Report of the Governor of Wyoming,” 1887,” 1:1027-1028; Larson, History of Wyoming, 191. 
74 Larson, History of Wyoming, 12–13. 
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the region or declared bankruptcy.75 In other words, although the state as a whole may not 
have suffered disastrously, certain microenvironments did—and unfortunately for those 
in Johnson County, many of those environs were located right in the heart of the Powder 
River Basin.  
The key point here is that whatever the quantitative specifics of the Hard Winter, 
it unequivocally marked a turning point in the energy history of the region, serving in 
many ways as a hinge that tipped the balance away from the Cattle-Bison System and 
toward the Range-Science Ranchers (described in the next section of this chapter). Prior 
to the winter of 1886-1887, the C.B.S. had dominated the Powder River Basin. Based, as 
it was, on large, unclaimed ranges, massive herds, and little immediate oversight, it 
favored large corporation-type ranches and absentee owners, many of whom were either 
European or of Eastern-seaboard nobility. This approach was propped up by concepts 
such as book count and mavericks (which will be detailed later in this chapter). In the 
wake of that winter, however, as many outfits suffered catastrophic losses, scores of 
investors decided to leave the plains, selling off their remaining herds in favor of 
alternative business opportunities. In doing so, they were unconsciously acknowledging 
the failures of the Cattle-Bison System, in the process helping to pave the way for the 
Range-Science Ranchers and the catastrophic events of the Johnson County War.   
 
Range-Science Ranchers 
 Whatever historiographic disagreements there are concerning the Hard Winter, 
one thing seems clear: it did not destroy cattle ranching on the northern plains. Rather, 
                                                
75 Thelma Gatchell Condit, “The Hole-in-the-Wall, Part IV,” Annals of Wyoming, 29 (April 1957), 65; 
“Alexander Swan” in David J. Wishart, ed., Encyclopedia of the Great Plains (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), 54. 
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the devastation of the Hard Winter laid bare the defects inherent to the Cattle-Bison 
System. Both because of the cattle losses and the number of companies that went 
bankrupt or abandoned the region, the continued viability of the C.B.S. was put into 
doubt. Partly as a result of such changes, the C.B.S. now found itself vulnerable to a 
steady stream of Range-Science Ranchers. During the late-1880s and early-1890s this 
latter group took the form of small ranchers, families, and homesteaders, individuals and 
groups who not only ran cattle but who also raised a number of crops as well. Much has 
been made of the small size of these operations when compared to that of the C.B.S. (e.g., 
the class argument as outlined in the introduction to this chapter); far more important, 
however, was the way that these newcomers approached cattle and the ever-important 
question of thermodynamics. Rather than looking backward and trying to replicate the 
seasonal movements and land-use patterns of bison, they looked overseas for guidance, to 
universities, institutes of science, and the newfound field of range management. Much 
more than the devastation of the Hard Winter, it was this cognitive shift that augured the 
demise of the C.B.S. and that ultimately led to the violence of the Johnson County War. 
The key issue was not, as has so often been believed, class; the key issue was how to 
understand energy production and extraction on the northern plains grasslands. 
 There is unfortunately a dearth of archival sources concerning these small 
ranchers who flocked to the region in the late-1880s and early-1890s. Part of this no 
doubt has to do with the C.B.S. ranchers’ near-monopolistic control of the press.76 Part of 
it emerges from the simple mechanics of historical archives—the C.B.S. ranchers were 
for the most part wealthy and well-educated, containing Ivy Leaguers and overseas 
                                                
76 See the chapter’s next section. Also see Ross. F. Collins, “Cattle Barons and Ink Stingers: How Cow 
Country Journalists Created a Great American Myth,” American Journalism 24, no. 3, 7-29.  
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aristocrats; the small ranchers were none of those. But regardless of the particular reasons 
for this lack, there does exist data on the larger trends that shaped Johnson County and 
the Powder River Basin during this time. Between 1880 and 1890 the population of the 
county quadrupled, swelling from a mere 637 to 2,357. During that same period 213 new 
land patents were filed, 205 of which came between 1888-1890, with 189 (just under 
ninety percent) filed in the years 1889 and 1890 alone. The bulk of these claims—
seventy-two percent—were filed under the Desert Land Act, a bill whose conditions and 
thermodynamic underpinnings profoundly shaped Johnson County’s later development.77 
Originally passed in 1877, this piece of legislation, An Act to Provide for the Sale of 
Desert Land in Certain States and Territories, allowed individuals to initially acquire up 
to 640 acres (a section) of land for twenty-five cents an acre (with a dollar per acre paid 
upon receiving patent to said land). Under the bill’s requirements, the claimants were 
obligated to irrigate and cultivate the land—which was, by definition, ground otherwise 
unsuitable for agriculture—within three years. In Johnson County, this meant that most 
claims were along the handful of creeks and tributaries of the Powder River—the three 
branches of Clear Creek (north, middle, and south), French Creek, Rock Creek, Piney 
Creek, Crazy Women Creek, and the three forks of the Powder River (north, middle, and 
south)—that dotted the region. It also meant cultivating crops, which would go on to play 
such an important role in the new thermodynamic system that supplanted the C.B.S. 78 
                                                
77 Francis Henry Tanner. “The Disposal of the Public Domain in Johnson County, Wyoming, 1869-1890,” 
(doctoral dissertation, University of Wyoming, 1967), 19-20, 91, 119. 
78 During the late-1870s and early-1880s, the Desert Land Act was the subject of much land fraud as 
wealthy ranchers used it to acquire great swaths of rangeland for little cost. However this does not seem to 
“have been the case in Johnson County, where Ijams, Hesse, and other C.B.S. ranchers used intimidation 
and sparse settlement to use federal range for free (Note that there were negligible land filings prior to the 
late-1880s). See Tanner, “The Disposal of the Public Domain in Johnson County.”  
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 In part, these small ranchers came to Johnson County and filed their claims thanks 
to the openings created by the Hard Winter. But their efforts were also aided by a 
presidency that favored the small yeomanry of Jefferson and de Crèvecœur over the 
wealthy, multi-county open-range commons of the C.B.S. Hearkening back to this small-
farmer worldview, President Grover Cleveland had made it a mission upon taking office 
to uphold the integrity of the country’s land laws. In order to prevent big-business fraud, 
he issued an August 1885 proclamation demanding that all fences on the public domain 
be removed. That same year, his State of the Union address outlined a number of 
amendments to the Desert Land Act and other land-based bills that were designed to 
make them less liable to abuse by large, powerful ranchers and more amenable to small 
settlers looking to work the land.79 According to the U.S. Land Office, “millions of acres 
are…inclosed and are now being so inclosed to the exclusion of the stock of all others 
than the fence owners, and to the prevention of settlements and the obstruction of public 
travel and intercourse.”80 In the Powder River Basin, this conflict became particularly 
heated. After John Tisdale, Fred Hesse, and a number of the large cattle outfits—the 
Peters and Alston outfit, the 76 ranch, the Bar C, the Bar X, FU, and WP, among 
others—refused to take down their own public range fences, Cleveland approved the 
deployment of a cavalry troop in Cheyenne in order “to aid the civil authorities in 
enforcing the proclamation of the president forbidding the fencing of the public domain 
                                                
79 Public Lands. Unlawful Inclosures or Occupancy; Obstructing Settlement or Transit, U.S.C. 1061, Title 
43 (1885). 17; “Proclamation No. 271—Ordering the Immediate Removal of Any and Every Unlawful 
Enclosure of Public Land,” August 7, 1885, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency. 
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80 Cited in Lyn Ellen Bennett and Scott Abbott, The Perfect Fence: Untangling the Meanings of Barbed 
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and directing the removal of such unlawful fencing.”81 Not willing to be bullied by the 
federal government, the C.B.S. ranchers responded with equanimity, claiming it was their 
right to erect such barriers and that they “do not care a brass farthing whether one troop 
or one hundred troops are sent to Wyoming for that purpose.”82 Put another way, they 
were willing to do whatever it took to protect the continued viability of the C.B.S., even 
if that meant defying the whims of distant Washington.   
 Beyond such destructive efforts, however, Cleveland’s executive mandates also 
proved critical for the new crop of small ranchers. For the bulk of the 1880s, the nearest 
land office for Johnson County settlers was nearly three hundred miles to the south, in 
Cheyenne, the capital of Wyoming and a town at the time essentially controlled by the 
C.B.S. ranchers. (It was here that their headquarters, the Cheyenne Club, was located. It 
was also the site from which they launched the Johnson County invasion.) On May 1, 
1888, however, one year after the terror of the Hard Winter, a new land office opened its 
doors in Wyoming, this time in Buffalo, the informal home of the small ranchers and the 
later target of the Johnson County Invasion. It was here that the bulk of the small 
ranchers’ claims would be filed with increasing frequency. And although there is no 
evidence that the C.B.S. ranchers physically obstructed small ranchers from filing their 
claims in Cheyenne or anywhere else, the subsequent evidence is unmistakable: with a 
land office that was both more inviting and geographically convenient, the number of 
claims skyrocketed.  
The location of many of these patents—for the most part located in the northern 
part of the county, along Piney, Rock, French, and Clear Creeks—reveals a unique 
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feature of the Range-Science Ranchers’ approach to energy and the landscape, one 
distinct from that of the C.B.S. ranchers.83 Unlike the latter, who focused on the Powder 
River Basin as a macroscale biome, the small ranchers identified and homed in on 
thermodynamically superior microclimates, seeking out those niches that were most 
energetically advantageous. For in a region as fragile as Johnson County—receiving 
fewer than ten inches of precipitation per year—these microclimates were critical, 
particularly for animals as seasonally vulnerable as cattle, who as we now know, were 
less adept than bison for the cold weather of the northern plains. A 1975 survey of the 
county gives an idea of just how diverse this visually monochromatic region was and 
remains: the report’s authors listed 109 different types of soil—not counting subtypes—
ranging widely in terms of fertility, moisture, and erosion.84 Given this variety and the 
region’s well-known aridity, even late-nineteenth century scientists claimed that “the 
climate [of Johnson County] is peculiar, differing greatly within a few miles.”85 It was 
this attention to ecological detail—both a knowledge of and familiarity with the 
landscape—that set the Range-Science Ranchers apart from the C.B.S. Just as the Crow 
had leveraged certain ecological niches to support their own horse herds, so too did the 
Range-Science Ranchers ferret out those same sites for cattle. 
But of course the size of the herds and the mixed nature of their land tenure was 
not the only thing that was changing during this period. As increasing numbers of settlers 
filed land claims along the creeks and rivers of Johnson County during the late-1880s, 
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perceptions of ranching also underwent a fundamental transformation. Coinciding 
precisely with this uptick was the passage of one of the more important but often 
overlooked pieces of legislation in the settlement of the American West: the Hatch Act. 
Ratified in 1887, this bill created a nationwide program of agricultural experiment 
stations to “aid in acquiring and diffusing among the people of the United States useful 
and practical information...under the direction of the college or colleges of agricultural 
department of colleges…[in order to] conduct original researches or verify experiments.” 
In order to facilitate such a program, the act authorized $15,000 annually to each state to 
carry out research.86 The goal was to increase the scientific understanding of crop and 
range management, thereby improving both efficiency and predictive knowledge, both of 
which had been patently lacking in the past (and whose absence defined the C.B.S.). The 
result was a university-educated cohort of centrally organized agricultural scientists 
whose job it was to improve the proficiency and gross output of the country’s farming 
and ranching operations. On the national level, this group would usher in a new way of 
approaching and imagining the land; more locally, it would push out the Powder River’s 
C.B.S., ultimately leading to the violence of the Johnson County War. 
As a nation-wide program of agricultural study, the Hatch Act affected 
everywhere from California to Connecticut, but the local conditions in Wyoming were 
particularly telling.87 Based out of the University in Laramie (the Powder River Basin was 
also serviced by a smaller, local experiment station in Sheridan), the Wyoming 
Agricultural Experiment Station published forty-five bulletins during its first decade of 
existence, covering everything from insecticides to potatoes to the vagaries of plant lice. 
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Most tellingly, however, the station expanded beyond the typical fare of parochial 
agricultural tracts to encompass the inchoate field of range science. Emerging in the late-
1880s and 1890s, range science was, in the words of one historian, “an American 
Creation, and it was the product of the dominant movement in turn of the century 
America. That society placed a high value on the ability to predict, and it extended that 
value into all realms of life, including ranching.”88 As perhaps the premier cattle-
producing state in the nation, Wyoming was at the forefront of the range science 
embrace: the Agricultural Experiment Station published bulletins on irrigation, stock 
feeding, grasses and forage plants, stock breeds, the use of alfalfa as a hay crop, hay 
digestion experiments, and more. And while all of these were no doubt important to the 
thermodynamic shifts that were beginning to affect the range, the most critical was also 
one of the longest, a seventy-page report released just one year after the events of the 
Johnson County War. Entitled “The Feeding and Management of Cattle,” the Wyoming 
Agricultural Experiment Station’s thirteenth bulletin represented a fundamental shift in 
how cattle were conceptualized. No longer were they seen as modern, pliable versions of 
bison; instead they became genetically unique compounds of cells and meat, living 
entities with their own biological strengths and weaknesses. In lieu of allowing the 
animals to forage for themselves out on the open range, there was an explicit focus on 
science as a tool that could “convert…coarse feed into beef and dairy product.” In doing 
so, the report became a sort of manifesto for the Range-Science Ranchers: “there was a 
time when farmers thought that science, and even agricultural science, could bring little 
that would be helpful to them, but happily that day is past, and I approach the scientific 
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side of the subject of feeding with no fear whatever that it will prove uninteresting to my 
readers, but rather that a large majority will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity 
which may offer for a better understanding of the great problem of stock feeding.” The 
remainder of the text goes into great detail on the best breeds, nutrition, and seasonal 
protection for the region’s cattle. It reprints detailed feeding tables from German 
agricultural scientists listing grasses by percentage composition of water, protein, fiber, 
carbohydrates, and ether extract (see Figure 7).89 It expounds upon the best methods of 
irrigation, how to plant forage-crops and when to cut them.90 In short, it lays out a 
scientific method for transforming the Powder River Basin from a region built upon hope 
and myth to one constructed upon the calculated production of high-quality energy. 
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Figure 7: Nutritional Table for Livestock 
University of Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station (1893). "Bulletin No. 13 - The Feeding and 
Management of Cattle." University of Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin, 55. 
 
 Out on the hills and riparian sections of the plains, the small ranchers did their 
best to translate all of this scientific information into concrete Johnson County results. 
Most notably, they took to harvesting hay and sheltering animals during the winter, 
thereby eliminating one of the main deficits of the C.B.S. By 1892—the year of the 
Johnson County War—the Powder River basin sported ample crops of celery, cabbage, 
corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, flax, potatoes, sugar beets, turnips, rutabagas, lettuce, peas, 
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carrots, alfalfa, millet, buckwheat, and onions.91 But in terms of the larger thermodynamic 
landscape, the most important crop was undoubtedly hay, a catchall term that in Johnson 
County typically meant alfalfa, one of the oldest forage crops still used. Archaeological 
records show its use dating back 6,000 years in what is now Iran. Pliny wrote about it, 
and his Roman contemporaries noted that “all emaciated cattle whatsoever grow fat with 
it.” But as a forage crop it faded during the Middle Ages, and by the time of the 
Reformation there was little mention of the once ubiquitous fodder. It would later 
reemerge in Spanish America and the United States South, but it “was in the dry, 
calcareous soils of the West that alfalfa first showed its true promise in the U.S.” This 
was due not merely to the region’s aridity but to the high pH of the soil—which was 
typically alkaline—and the weather.92 As one writer observed, “the long hours of daylight 
[in Wyoming and Montana] during the short summer are conducive to rapid growth and 
maturation.” As a result, “on some irrigated lands as many as four alfalfa cuttings are 
possible from the same field.”93 Thermodynamically, this meant the potential for a great 
deal of energy relocation across seasons; it meant the ability to rationally produce energy 
instead of merely hoping for bounty. 
From a historical standpoint, the precise date of alfalfa’s introduction to the 
northern plains is unclear. Like so many other people and products, it seemed to follow 
the gold rush around the West, transported in the packs and carts of overland migrants, 
and for that reason it is not surprising that it was introduced to Montana’s western 
landscape around 1880, following cattle drives and the strikes at Helena, Virginia City, 
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and Butte. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have made its way east to the Powder River 
Basin until the end of the decade, in the wake of the Hard Winter, when there were a 
handful of inchoate moves toward winter feed and hedging against the unpredictable 
seasonality of the state. In December 1885, for instance, one year before the devastation 
of the Hard Winter, an article on plains cattle ranching in Harper’s openly questioned the 
long-term sustainability of the Cattle-Bison System. Writing about Wyoming in 
particular, the author opined “that the industry of feeding steers hay during the winters 
will rapidly increase is inevitable, and many men of small means, or who are 
conscientiously opposed to freezing and starving cattle to death, will engage in it, 
providing that the cattle-growing associations do not seize all the water rights and all the 
meadows.”94 Two years later, Governor Thomas Moonlight, an old Civil War colonel and 
an active member in the Indian Wars of the 1860s and 1870s, noted a slight shift in ranch 
behavior when he observed that “until lately but little effort was made even to put up hay 
on a large scale for winter feed.”95 Even in the midst of the Hard Winter, before all the 
damage was known, papers were commenting on the wastefulness of winter losses. The 
Denver Tribune-Republican opined that “the remedy for this is so plain and so easily 
made use of that the cattle men of western Colorado deserve very little sympathy. The 
soil…is exceedingly well adapted to the growth of alfalfa. Experience has taught that 
alfalfa is most excellent feed for cattle and yet there has been nothing like enough of it 
grown in the valley named to supply all the cattle off western Colorado with feed during 
the approaching winter…His percentage of loss would then be very small, and in spring 
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his cattle would be in prime condition.” With lucid premonition, the writer added, “this 
winter will probably impress this truth upon the cattlemen so forcibly that they will never 
forget it.”96  
Certainly those who endured in the wake of the Hard Winter began to make many 
of the necessary transformations. And yet, while the rate of change certainly accelerated 
in the wake of the Hard Winter, there is ample evidence that such transformations were 
already under way before that devastation. Just one month after the Denver article, 
Buffalo’s own paper published a piece entitled, “Our Hay Industry,” in which they laid 
out the county’s developing practice of growing and curing grasses, putting a particular 
focus on alfalfa. In their estimation, it would only take three years to develop an adequate 
stand of the crop, and once established each acre could yield six tons per cutting, an 
observation more or less confirmed a few years later, when the Big Horn Sentinel 
estimated the per-acre yield at four-to-six tons. The article concluded by observing that 
“Hay is without doubt the most profitable crop that is raised in Johnson County.”97 
Similarly, a spring 1887 issue of the Northwestern Live Stock Journal detailed a new 
cattle company for the region, noting that they passed through town with twelve-thousand 
pounds of grass seed, much of which was alfalfa.98 Although brief and for the most part 
arrhythmic, such reports reveal that in the lead-up to and wake of the Hard Winter, there 
was already ample talk and action when it came to shifting away from the Cattle-Bison 
System. What was missing, however, was a scientific program for disseminating the sort 
of detailed, place-based information that could lead to large-scale change. 
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In the wake of the Hard Winter’s devastations, such information began to arrive. 
The local Big Horn Sentinel published a series of articles on irrigation and alfalfa, 
claiming that “the results obtained under irrigation are almost beyond belief.”99 They 
described the best habits for cutting and preserving alfalfa and reported that the State 
Agricultural College of Colorado (keep in mind that the connections between Wyoming 
and Colorado at this time were substantial: the state would figure importantly in the 
Johnson County War) had just published a pamphlet on the growth and nutrition of 
alfalfa.100 But instead of simply summarizing the information the Sentinel reproduced the 
pamphlet in its entirety, making that information available to the settlers of Johnson 
County and enabling them to enact the proposed changes. Among the most telling points 
was the contention that “no other clover, grass, or forage plant compares with it, or 
contains a greater per cent of protein substances.”101 In other words, alfalfa not only made 
energy available during the winter months, it made higher quality energy available. 
Because cattle were unable to make as efficient use of the region’s grasses as bison, such 
a thermodynamic shift was critical for exploiting the region as a cattle empire. It would 
lead to the downfall of the C.B.S. 
Of course ranchers could have simply harvested the plains’ extant grasses—
during most years there was certainly no shortage of them. But as the Hatch Act revealed, 
there were scientific reasons for harvesting their own crops, in particular alfalfa. As the 
Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station explained, the native grasses “run out if cut 
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year after year without allowing it to reseed.”102 Furthermore, as alfalfa’s long and storied 
history indicates, there were distinctive advantages to the crop. In addition to providing 
simple forage, haying alfalfa and other forage crops presents animals with more energy 
than the “naturally cured” grasses that are dormant on the plains. This is because, as 
described in an earlier section, grasses contain their greatest nutrients during the spring, 
just prior to reaching full bloom. By haying at this point, ranchers were able to preserve 
the maximum energy from the land, thereby providing their cattle with that energy in 
winter.103 Once again, here we can see an increase in scientific and place-based 
knowledge leading to a deeper understanding of the region’s thermodynamic landscape 
and how to best exploit it. We can see the stage being set for the ultimate conflict with 
the C.B.S. 
In doing so, the Range-Science Ranchers became more in tune with their animals 
and their needs, obviating many of the setbacks of the C.B.S. As one rancher described 
this more scientific method of winter care, “about once a day, hay [was] hauled from the 
stack a little distance, and scattered so the cattle [could] feed.” If he found that the cattle 
were too thin or sick, he would give them extra feed, in particular looking out for the 
vulnerable, pregnant two-year old heifers.104 During the summer that focus shifted to 
bulls, who were given extra food to increase virility in the lead-up to breeding season. As 
this was being done, ranchers would work their way through the breeding herd, “culling 
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out” those cows that had not produced desirable calves in the past. In July the bulls were 
released into the herd according to scientific theory: the established number was four 
percent for the bull’s demographic (with the remaining animals often castrated). The goal 
was to use the latest range science knowledge to produce both the greatest calf yield—
thereby increasing monetized energy—and the specimens most suited to the northern 
plains environment. By being physically present with the animals on a daily basis year-
round—by breaking the bison-based seasonal round that defined the C.B.S.—and by 
noting the peculiarities of place and nutrition, these ranchers could alter feed according to 
need. Whereas under the open range system breeding had been a haphazard and natural 
affair, for many of the small ranchers it became systematized, closely aligned with the 
latest scientific findings.105 Gone were the days of the cattle-cum-bison on the open range, 
fending for themselves, open to the environment, the weather, and simple chance; in its 
place was the well-ordered world of science-based rational management. Instead of 
harvesting cattle, the new settlers carefully produced them. 
 
The Mavericks 
 In the spring of 1889, the Big Horn Sentinel detailed a number of competing 
energy events in the Powder River Basin: there were the oil strikes to the south in Salt 
Creek (early explorations that will be detailed in chapter three), voluminous lists of recent 
Desert Land Act filings (most of them in hometown Buffalo), and a series of reward 
announcements aimed at capturing cattle butchers and thieves who were said to be 
terrorizing the region. 106 From the viewpoint of energy history, all three of these are 
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portentous; but from the perspective of the Johnson County War, it is the latter that is the 
most interesting. For three straight months—extending from the spring on into the early 
summer—the paper ran a prominent advertisement, sponsored and signed by eleven of 
the region’s biggest cattle outfits. In its entirety, it read: 
$1,500 reward: We the undersigned agree to pay the sum of $1,500 for the 
conviction of each and every person caught stealing, unlawfully killing, defacing 
or altering the brands of cattle or horses, belonging to any or all of us anywhere. 
Also for the unlawful branding of mavericks on our respective ranges.107 
 
It was a terse but powerful statement, one that could not have helped but make an 
impression on the region’s inhabitants. But by the late-1880s, such a notice was far from 
atypical. In the wake of the Hard Winter, and with the notion of book count now 
thoroughly debunked, proponents of the C.B.S. looked for a new tool to prop up their 
worldview. They found it in mavericks. 
Like book count, the maverick system is one of those odd quirks of western 
history. In basic terms, it meant any animal whose brand could either not be identified or 
who lacked one entirely. The bulk of these unmarked animals entered the roundup 
alongside their mothers, to whom they were still, in a bio-parental sense, attached. In 
such cases—which, it should be emphasized, encompassed the vast majority of the set—
the calf was branded with the same mark as the mother. But every so often a calf would 
wander into a roundup without a linking cow. This might happen if the cow (mother) had 
died or if somehow, due to heavy snow or some unknown tragedy, the calf had been 
separated during the winter. In these cases the animal was deemed a maverick, a cow 
whose owner was unknown.108 
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These circumstances tended to come about innocently, without the perpetrator 
realizing that he was committing any wrongdoing. But it could also be carried out with a 
more sinister motive. This was the heavily publicized issue of rustling, the ostensibly 
omnipresent but rarely witnessed crime that would come to figure so centrally in the 
Johnson County War. In short, to rustle was to knowingly purloin and brand unmarked 
calves—to steal them from their rightful owners. This is the (supposed) crime that 
Michael Kovach, in the opening vignette of this chapter from Heaven’s Gate, was 
lynched for, and it was perhaps the defining crime of the Powder River Basin during the 
late-nineteenth century.109 But it was also a crime that was notoriously difficult to 
prosecute. In terms of deniability, accused rustlers could—and often did—deny that they 
knowingly perpetrated any wrongdoing.110 After all, the range was by definition open, 
without any concrete boundaries save for the odd extralegal fence, and it was therefore 
nigh impossible to prove that any such animal had been taken with the express intent of 
theft. Cattle often naturally drifted into other ranges and herds, and over time even the 
most limpid brands tended to blur, temporally smothered by hair and the animal’s natural 
growth.111 In the context of the ailing C.B.S., such ambiguity, especially when it came to 
mavericks and the free energy that they represented, was bound to cause problems.  
But what was odd was that every year the number of captured mavericks 
remained inordinately low.112 In 1886, for instance, in the spring before the destruction of 
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the Hard Winter, there were just 3,446 recorded mavericks out of 171,150 cattle—
roughly two percent.113 To understand why such a minority of animals became so 
important we need to look at the issue through the lens of thermodynamics and the ailing 
C.B.S. Mavericks were by definition amorphous and slippery entities. They belonged to 
no one and everyone. But from a thermodynamic standpoint it was different: they 
represented pockets of free energy.114 They were unaccounted for, not logged among the 
ledgers and receipts that tabulated beef and shipped animals. And so as the C.B.S. began 
to collapse in the wake of the Hard Winter and the small ranchers poured in, mavericks 
emerged as convenient caches of unaccounted-for energy, more or less usurping the role 
that book count had earlier filled. Consequently, when the spring roundup came and 
ranchers regularly recorded smaller numbers than they had expected, the ever-nebulous 
maverick became an easy elucidator, a theoretical construct that preserved the viability of 
the C.B.S. by shifting blame onto small ranchers, claiming that they were stealing the 
large ranchers’ cattle (energy).  
For the purpose of the C.B.S., it did not matter that the number of mavericks 
annually sold was far below the annual losses. Inherent to their view was the belief that 
for every captured and known maverick thousands of others went unaccounted for, stolen 
by any of the number of presumed rustlers who populated the region. And the evidence 
suggests that the members of the Wyoming Stock Growers Association—the powerful 
political organization made up of the C.B.S. ranchers (hereafter referred to as the 
W.S.G.A.)—legitimately believed this; it was not some sort of ruse or public relations 
ploy. Such attitudes can best be seen in the passage of the Maverick Law of 1884 and its 
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subsequent modifications, pieces of legislation that attempted to close off this 
thermodynamic theft, (re)capturing the mavericks’ free energy and funneling it back into 
the proper owners’ respective herds.  
None of this was new. For as long as anyone could remember, mavericks had 
been a natural part of the cattle-driving process in Wyoming. In 1884, however, the 
W.S.G.A. was able to push one of its more potent pieces of legislation through the 
territorial government: the Maverick Bill. The law was passed thanks to the effort of 
Joseph Carey, the president of the W.S.G.A., owner of the vaunted C.Y. Ranch, and later 
one of the state’s first senators, who leveraged the association’s burgeoning strength to 
officially take control of the range. The resultant bill granted all responsibility for 
organizing and conducting the annual spring roundups to the W.S.G.A. During these 
gatherings, each maverick would, by law, become the official property of the association, 
who then branded the animals as such, marking them with the W.S.G.A.’s ubiquitous 
“M.” Every ten days or so, they would hold an auction in which the mavericks were 
individually sold to the highest bidder. Once again, the total number was never large—
the W.S.G.A. listed 1,971 mavericks for 1884, 3,446 for 1886—but the represented 
calories and funds were not insubstantial.115 The accrued cash—some $30,000 in 1886, 
the spring before the Hard Winter—would go into the W.S.G.A.’s coffers, funding the 
range detectives and stock inspectors who served to protect the integrity of the C.B.S.116 
In the wake of the Hard Winter, a number of changes were made to increase the 
Maverick Bill’s impact. The most important alteration came in January 1888, when 
Wyoming officially became a state, and the body’s tenth legislative assembly passed an 
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amendment that vested control of the cattle industry in the state government by creating a 
territorial board of livestock commissioners. This was a sly maneuver by the C.B.S. 
ranchers: publicly, it came across as the W.S.G.A. relinquishing much of its erstwhile 
might. But as historian W. Turrentine Jackson has observed, far from divesting the 
W.S.G.A. of power, the creation of such a board was “the greatest achievement of the 
association in this legislative session and revealed that the stock growers continued to 
exert some political influence.”117 In essence, the bill put forth the notion of presumptive 
ownership, which stated that in any given range, the owner of the largest herd became the 
effective owner of all of the mavericks in that range.118 Worse, the commission was 
virtually unchecked in its power to enforce its laws. As Governor Moonlight, over whose 
veto the bill was passed, complained, “the commissioners are beyond the power of 
removal for none is provided; are absolutely free to do as they please. They draw no 
salary, give no bonds, acknowledge no responsibility and are subject to no authority. 
They may ride roughshod over the rights of others and there is no remedy save in the 
courts. They can appoint an unlimited number of subordinates and pay them out of the 
maverick fund.”119As such, instead of abdicating power, the creation of the livestock 
commission can be seen as the latest effort to bolster the ailing C.B.S.  
 The reaction of the small-herd owners supports this view. As Jack Flagg 
described it, the large-outfit owners, “many of them not owning [that is, legally] a foot of 
land,” claimed the public domain and all the animals that were found upon it for 
themselves. They would tell homesteaders and small-outfit owners that “we have defined 
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our boundary lines, every maverick within the limits of those lines is ours, if you have 
cattle, keep them in your private field, the public domain is ours, if your animal by 
chance gets out of your field unbranded, we will neither allow you to buy it; when, 
according to our law, it is put up for sale.” As such, there were public auctions in which 
the winner was denied the cattle that he had won, ostensibly because he was opting to pay 
with check instead of cash; in reality, however, the cattle were then resold to men like 
Fred Hesse and other prominent members of both the W.S.G.A. and, as we shall see, the 
Johnson County War. As Flagg contended, “it was a preconcerted plan” to sell the cattle 
to Hesse. In other words, after the Hard Winter, even in spite of changes to the Maverick 
Law, the biggest thermodynamic changes were extralegal: the “free energy” represented 
by ownerless cattle was pre-claimed by the W.S.G.A.’s members, thereby (temporarily) 
upholding the integrity of the C.B.S.120 
 At best, this was a stopgap measure. By the spring of 1890, as the W.S.G.A. was 
declining in power and many of its C.B.S. members came to believe that the local courts 
were too biased to convict rustlers, they began to take a more radical route. Bypassing the 
legal path, the W.S.G.A. began printing advertisements such as the one that opened this 
chapter’s section.121 It was a desperate maneuver, one that, in the long term, led to the 
eventual downfall of the C.B.S. But the more immediate effect was an uptick in violence. 
As 1890 heaved into view, the C.B.S. and its proponents were under increasing threat. 
They had tried to prop up their worldview via clever creations of energy, first through the 
concept of book count, then through mavericks. But when this latter too proved faulty—
i.e., when the number of communally gathered mavericks turned out to be far below the 
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quantity of lost energy (cattle)—the C.B.S. ranchers were faced with two options: they 
could abandon their longheld worldview, accepting something more limiting and 
democratic, or they could continue to fight it, ramping up their efforts to bolster the ailing 
C.B.S. It was the decision to pursue the latter that would lead directly to the violence of 
1892. 
 
The Johnson County War 
For over a hundred years historians, journalists, novelists, and filmmakers have 
been telling and retelling the story of the Johnson County War, presenting it as the 
archetypal conflict of the open range.122 The events are well known and little disputed, 
having long since entered into the cannon of western lore. As such, there is little to be 
gained by recounting them here. Far more valuable is elucidating a handful of key events 
from those fateful days, ones that—even amidst the bloodshed and political strife—shed 
light on the Powder River Basin’s shifting thermodynamic landscape. For it is only 
through such events that we can understand how the Johnson County War was not merely 
a class-based conflict, but both epitomized and served as a crisis that brought to a head 
the thermodynamic conflicts that had been brewing for the previous decade.  
One of the most notable anomalies was the concerted effort that the invaders 
made to recruit out-of-state mercenaries. Not content to use their own substantial 
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manpower, the C.B.S. launched a number of mustering trips during the winter of 1891-
1892. The first was undertaken by one of Wyoming’s earliest ranchers, Van Rensselaer 
Schuyler (“R.S.”) Van Tassel, for whom the tiny town of Van Tassell was later named. 
That winter, he traveled south to Colorado, where he not only purchased horses, wagons, 
and other supplies for the expedition, but also attempted to recruit gunmen. At this he 
was notably unsuccessful, failing to bring in a single recruit.123 The same was true for 
Harold Ijams, who went to Idaho with similar goals.124 But there was one trip that was an 
unequivocal success: longtime W.S.G.A. detective Tom Smith (who had a salary that was 
paid for by the sale of mavericks) was sent all the way down to his home state of Texas, 
where he managed to convince twenty-one men from little Lamar County, just south of 
the Oklahoma border, to come north, promising them five dollars per day and all 
expenses paid (they were to be provided with a horse, saddle, bridle, gun, ammunition, 
bedding, train fare, and food), plus an extra fifty dollars for each man killed. Many of the 
recruits were former Texas Rangers and U.S. Marshals, men like George Tucker, who 
justified his vigilantism by saying that it “was just to our liking. Nobody liked a cattle or 
horse thief.” 125 Tucker and the other Texans were all assured that the invasion was 
perfectly legal: the men would be provided with blank warrants upon which, after their 
killings were completed, they would fill-in the deceased’s name, claiming he was shot 
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while resisting arrest.126 More practically, however, what this meant was that by the time 
the invaders left Cheyenne for Buffalo, nearly half of the party had neither connections 
nor any explicit experience in the state of Wyoming, never mind Johnson County itself. 
In the bulk of the histories of the J.C.W. these recruiting efforts have been treated 
as an attempt by the C.B.S. to both bolster its manpower and to deny personal 
responsibility (the original plan was to have only the hired men go).127 But from a 
thermodynamic standpoint, they fit in rather neatly with the C.B.S.’s overall approach to 
the Powder River Basin as an ecological entity. As mentioned earlier, ever since its 
beginnings the C.B.S. had been defined by absenteeism. From a thermodynamic 
standpoint, such a spatial removal meant unfamiliarity with the particularities of the 
landscape, a problem that manifested as heavy winter losses that were covered up by the 
ambiguities of book count. But it also actuated in the midst of the Johnson County War. 
Once the C.B.S. ranchers reached Casper in April 1892, they struggled to adjust to and 
deal with an unexpected spring snowstorm. 128 In the resulting confusion, they were 
delayed for nearly half a day, and by the time they finally commenced their trip on 
horseback, they made yet another place-based error, one that would ultimately lead to the 
invasion’s ignominious finale, and one that could have easily been avoided given more 
familiarity with the intricacies of the landscape. On their way to Buffalo to eliminate the 
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presumed rustlers, the invaders received word that Nate Champion, one of seventy on 
their execution list, was holed up nearby at the K.C. Ranch. After taking a vote, the 
invaders decided to alter their path and dispatch Champion (and any others who might be 
with him) before proceeding on. This seemed logical enough. But what was meant to be a 
brief excursion took the invaders nearly five hours—roughly equivalent to what it would 
have taken them to reach their original destination, Buffalo—the journey slowed by 
increasingly heavy snow and a bitter Big Horns wind. It was an error that revealed both 
inexperience and a lack of spatial knowledge when it came to the region’s multifarious 
microclimates. This latter would end up being one of the key differences between them 
and the Range-Science Ranchers.  
Unfortunately for the invaders, however, this was not the only outcome of the 
C.B.S.’s detached view of space. In addition to their soggy blunderings across the 
Johnson County plains, there was also their peculiar reliance on federal-level officials. 
The state’s first two senators—in office at the time of the invasion—were former 
W.S.G.A. members: Francis Warren and the aforementioned Joseph Carey. Further, 
Amos Barber, the governor of Wyoming, was a close friend of the invaders’ doctor, 
Charles Penrose.129 And so when the C.B.S. ranchers later found themselves surrounded 
by the Buffalo citizenry at the T.A. Ranch, they sent off a series of desperate telegrams to 
Barber looking for help. Barber in turn contacted none other than the president himself, 
Benjamin Harrison, sending a message whose nebulous language yet again reveals the 
C.B.S.’s disconnect from on-the-ground realities: “An insurrection exists in Johnson 
county, in the State of Wyoming, in the immediate vicinity of Fort McKinney, against the 
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government of said state.” Barber asked for troops from Fort McKinney to be sent in 
order “to suppress the insurrection, restore order and protect both life and property.” 
When he did not get a response, he sent Carey and Warren personally to the White House 
doors, where they reportedly woke the president from his bed. Sure enough, the next day 
troops from Fort McKinney were at the T.A. Ranch, ready to save the invaders.130 
Of course the problem was that no such insurrection existed. Or rather, there was 
indeed an insurrection, but it was being carried out by the same individuals who were 
asking to be saved by the army. Once again, this was simply the latest iteration of the 
C.B.S. favoring the macro over the micro, and of the problems therein. Harrison was so 
far removed from the on-the-ground reality that he thought there was an uprising being 
perpetrated by the “rustlers” against the state of Wyoming. In reality of course, the 
state—in the guise of Buffalo Sheriff Red Angus, the man who was, in an instance of too-
good-to-be-true irony, at the top of the invaders’ blacklist—had already sniffed out and 
effectively quelled the uprising by deputizing local citizens and surrounding the invaders 
at the T.A. Ranch. Just as the C.B.S. ranchers had misunderstood both the Powder River 
landscapes and their own criminals, so too did Harrison misunderstand the signs of his 
midnight telegraph. In both instances, the cause was the same: a literal and figurative 
disconnect from the complexities of the local landscape. They did not know the Powder 
River Basin from the rest of the West. 
Beyond these reflections of the C.B.S.’s spatial disconnect, the Johnson County 
War was also notable for the degree to which the invaders attempted to take control of 
their own narrative. In the months leading up to the attack, the C.B.S. ranchers began a 
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concerted media campaign in news outlets across the country, “telling the world how 
poor old Wyoming had fallen into the clutches of a gang of outlaw cattle rustlers who 
killed and slaughtered from dawn ‘til dark.”131 When the time for the invasion came, the 
C.B.S. ranchers made the odd yet fateful decision to bring two journalists along with 
them. The first was Ed Towse, a longtime reporter for the local Cheyenne Sun who had 
ingratiated himself to the W.S.G.A. over the years thanks to his sympathetic (to the large 
cattlemen) reporting on the Cattle Kate incident, an 1889 lynching of Carbon County 
ranchers Ellen Watson and James Averell, which he described as “a question of life and 
death between honest men [the W.S.G.A.] and cut-throat thieves [Watson and 
Averell].”132 Unfortunately for the invaders, Towse would drop out of the expedition after 
day one, citing his health and an inability to continue on with the hard riding (most likely 
hemorrhoids). That left Samuel T. Clover as the only writer on the trip. Unlike Towse, 
Clover was not a local. He was a correspondent for the Chicago Herald, a writer best 
known for his work on the Ghost Dance. (He claimed to have been the last white man to 
see Sitting Bull alive.)133 Exactly how he managed to join the invaders is uncertain: by his 
own telling, he met up with an old friend, Montana cattleman Jim Pickford, in the 
Chicago stockyards. Pickford informed him of the conflict with the rustlers and the 
invasion that would soon take place.134 Never one to miss a story, Clover boarded the 
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earliest westbound train he could find, ingratiating himself to the W.S.G.A. top brass 
once he arrived in Cheyenne. Within a few days he had managed to convince them just 
how valuable it would be to have a reporter along for the trip.135 Eager as always to 
control the narrative, the C.B.S. ranchers acquiesced.  
At first it seemed that Clover would turn out to be a rather useful asset: as noted 
earlier, the C.B.S. ranchers believed they were legitimately being robbed, and there is 
ample evidence that Clover was more than willing to trumpet such convictions.136 But 
after the invaders murdered Nate Champion—the traditional climax of the Johnson 
County War—something happened that would forever shift the conflict’s narrative. The 
invaders pinned a note to Champion’s body stating “CATTLE THIEVES BEWARE!” a 
gesture that was clearly in line with the larger goals of the W.S.G.A. and its supporters. 
As this was happening, however, Clover claimed he saw an object protruding from 
Champion’s breast pocket. Before anyone else noticed, he took the item and slipped it 
into own pocket, saving it to read for later. According to Clover, he then “saw to his 
dismay that a bullet had ploughed a hole right through the center, which had admitted the 
heart’s blood of the victim. It was a ghastly prize!”137 It turned out that the booklet was a 
small diary filled with terse descriptions of Champion’s last few hours, while he was in 
the cabin exchanging fire with the surrounding invaders. It was neither detailed nor 
especially eloquent, but it provided a firsthand account of the last few hours of one of the 
accused rustlers and a man who would eventually emerge as the epitome of bravery, both 
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to the invaders and westerners more broadly. One week later, Clover would reprint the 
text in full in the April 16 edition of the Chicago Herald.138 
Both the chronology and the veracity of Clover’s version of events has long been 
in doubt. Some renditions say that Frank Wolcott, the expedition’s leader, read the diary 
aloud to the group, then gave it to Clover, deeming the document worthless.139 Others say 
that Clover used the original diary as a rough model, simply making up the bulk of the 
printed edition.140 What is certain is that nobody after or since has seen the diary. The 
only extant rendition is what Clover transcribed, purportedly verbatim, in the Chicago 
Herald, and which was then widely syndicated, appearing in most of the country’s major 
metropolitan centers—New York, Atlanta, Chicago, etc. within the week.141 The local 
northern plains rendition arrived in The Cheyenne Daily Sun under the headline “Invaders 
Bombarded: March of the Cattlemen into the Stronghold of the Rustlers.” For the bulk of 
the article, Clover remained faithful to the invaders’ point of view and interests. But 
when it came to Champion, Clover knew a good story when he found (or, perhaps, 
fabricated) one. He described the fallen rancher as “the bravest man in Johnson County,” 
a man who died “with…a look of mingled defiance and determination on his face to the 
last.” He then went on to reprint the Champion diary in its entirety, without any sort of 
extraneous commentary. The journal records the last few hours of Champion’s life, as he 
waited inside his small cabin, at first abandoned by the two traders, then forced to care 
for his friend, Nick Ray, as he slowly died from a gunshot wound that he received from 
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the invaders. The prose consists of the sort of terse, periodic sentences later made so 
famous by Hemingway, Carver, and the Brat Pack minimalists of the 1980s. The syntax 
resounds with the detached toughness that would eventually turn Champion into a folk 
hero on the plains. He comes across not as an immoral thief but as a preternaturally brave 
soul who suffered his fate with stoic resignation.142 By presenting the material in such a 
manner, Clover effectively gave a voice to Champion and the other proponents of the 
Range-Science Ranchers. The fallen hero came across as uncomplaining, heroic, and 
above all, decidedly innocent. He was presented to hundreds of thousands of readers as 
someone who suffered stoically a death he did not deserve. And as a corollary, the C.B.S. 
was coded as not only wrong, but as violently so; its proponents were bloodthirsty brutes 
who were disconnected from the on-the-ground realities of place.143 Unfortunately for the 
C.B.S. ranchers, it was this narrative mold that would stick. Instead of a story of justice 
served and the C.B.S. being proved right, by taking Clover along the C.B.S. inadvertently 
gave narrative publicity to their opponents, the Range-Science Ranchers. Clover’s 
reportage became a national sensation, the biggest news story to come out of the West 
since Little Bighorn.144 Like their other mistakes, the decision to take Clover along 
proved to be disastrous. It helped lead to the Johnson County War as the C.B.S.’s death 
knell.  
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The Aftermath: The Rise of Alfalfa 
 The events of the Johnson County War are traditionally presented as the climax to 
a much longer story. The shocking violence of the event and the aborted threat of so 
much more serves as an apposite climax to the romanticization of the open range era. But 
it is important to remember that the story did not end there. The cattle industry continued 
on in its wake, weathering the transition from the C.B.S. to the Range-Science Ranchers, 
and it continues on to this day, with the industry now generating $1.23 billion dollars 
worth of annual business in Wyoming alone.145 If we want to understand the 
thermodynamic landscape, then, we need to incorporate the changes that took place in its 
path. 
The omnipresent Jack Flagg provides as good a starting point as any. As he 
observed just a few months after the events of the Johnson County War, “the whole 
country is completely metamorphosed; where formerly the traveler could ride in any 
direction for days almost, without seeing a fence or a farm, he now finds them every few 
miles. Fine hay meadows and fields of waving grain have taken the place of sage brush 
flats and barren hill sides. The mournful howl of the coyote and wolf have been 
succeeded by the far sweeter sounds of the ranchman's song and the prattle of children. 
Small herds of horses, cattle and sheep have taken the place of the large herds of the 
barons, that have been forced to leave the county on account of the curtailing of the 
ranges by the fences and farms of the farmers.”146 From a thermodynamic standpoint, the 
most intriguing part of this observation is the mention of the “fine hay meadows and 
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fields of waving grain,” for this floral shift reflects the central difference between the 
C.B.S. and the Range-Science Ranchers, one that began in the wake of the Hard Winter 
and reached a crescendo following the Johnson County War. 
As with all things Range-Science Ranchers, these efforts were helped by the 
scientific push that had emerged in the wake of the Hard Winter and crested in the years 
after 1892. As the Wyoming Agricultural Experiment Station’s scientists, writing in 
1900, observed: “the palmy days of the open range are gone and the inevitable may as 
well be accepted, that as land becomes scarce that which can be irrigated will be 
cultivated. It has become necessary to support each head of stock on a small fraction of 
the land which was formerly available. Irrigating native meadows has greatly increased 
the production of wild hay. Substituting such cultivated forage crops as alfalfa will 
double or treble the production of hay and the prosperity of the ranchman and farmer who 
makes proper use of his products will correspondingly increase.”147 In the wake of the 
Johnson County War, land patents increased as more and more partners stepped in to fill 
the vacuum left by departing C.B.S. ranchers, until “nearly every farmer in this county is 
putting in more or less Alfalfa. Soon we will have plenty of hay and not enough stock.”148 
Within a decade, Wyoming governor Bryant Butler Brooks was penning a piece for a 
Cornell periodical, The Ranchman’s Reminder: Devoted to the Theory and Practice of 
Arid Agriculture, entitled “The Cattle Industry in Wyoming,” in which he outlined the 
scientific shift that had taken place in the state’s ranching outlook. Instead of relying 
upon the natural providence of the open range, he said, Wyoming’s cattlemen now 
looked at the issue more scientifically, employing what he termed “hay, grain, and 
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brains.”149 In terse form, this was the trinity for the Range-Science Ranchers, what the 
Johnson County invaders had sought without success to eliminate. In place of hope and 
energy excavation came the patient work of thermodynamic production. 
 All of these changes revolved around those well-known events of 1892. While 
Wyoming had a mere 24,328 acres devoted to hay cultivation in 1880, by 1890 that 
number had expanded to 173,010 acres. And by 1900, a full eight years after the events in 
Johnson County, it had further grown to 377,138. Montana tells a similar story, 
witnessing a rise from 56,801 acres in 1880 to 300,033 acres in 1890 and 712,048 acres 
in 1900.150 The numbers were astounding, but they were mirrored by a similar shift in the 
region’s narrative imaginary. Local advertising pamphlets now pictured hay stacks the 
size of houses, noting that “it is alfalfa land…the king of all forage plants.”151 As the 
Agricultural Experiment Station and the inchoate field of range science emphasized, it 
was all about efficiency, about growing and “converting coarse feed into beef and dairy 
products.”152 Such a shift in thermodynamic worldview is best summed up by a challenge 
issued by the Buffalo Bulletin just a year and a half after the Johnson County War. In a 
front-page column, the writer noted that a local, “Dutch Pete,” had “thrashed out 29 ½ 
bushels of alfalfa seed from one and one half acres of land.” The writer then showed just 
how different the Range-Science Ranchers’ worldview was: “can anyone beat it?”153After 
the failure of the Johnson County War and the collapse of the C.B.S., this was a telling 
challenge indeed: how much energy could be taken from one space or time and relocated 
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to another? How much energy could be created period? These were the questions that 
would define the worldview of not just Range-Science Ranchers but of the twentieth-
century energy industry in the American West, and it all started with the Johnson County 
War. 
 
The Rise of Range Science 
 It is not clear what happened to Samuel T. Clover in the years immediately 
following the Johnson County War. We know that he returned to his work with the 
Chicago Herald, and that two years later he took a new job as managing editor of the 
competing Chicago Evening Post.154 Unfortunately, few of the papers of the day carried 
bylines, and so it is impossible to know exactly what he reported on. Nevertheless, it is 
almost certain that, like nearly thirty million others, he attended the festivities of the 1893 
World’s Fair. We have no idea what, if any, events he visited, or, if he was indeed there, 
what he made of the famous address given by Frederick Jackson Turner. Perhaps the 
most well-known paper in the historiography of the American West, “The Significance of 
the Frontier in American History” was Turner’s attempt to codify the narrative of a 
steadily advancing frontier, one that, in his opinion, had defined American history and 
that now, post-1890, had ceased to exist. In his own words, “up to our own day American 
history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The 
existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American 
settlement westward, explains American development.” Whereas previously, American 
settlers had pushed against this line—“the meeting point between savagery and 
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civilization”—and labored to “transform the wilderness,” now this had been 
accomplished. What came next was anyone’s guess.155  
 It seems likely that Clover would have agreed with this take. His story—and, 
more broadly, the traditional narrative of the Johnson County War—fits rather neatly into 
Turner’s historiography. We are told that the big ranchers profited for more than a decade 
on “free grass,” empty, unclaimed lands that they could exploit without having to pay 
anything for it. All of this came to an end with the late-1880s invasion of homesteaders 
and small ranchers, individuals and groups who fenced the landscape, thereby imposing a 
regime of private property onto the grasslands and eradicating the large ranchers’ open-
range system in the process. This culminated in a fitting crisis: the full-blown vigilante 
conflict that would become known as the Johnson County War, an event that epitomized 
popular understandings of the West. Like the concrete closing of the frontier in 1890, this 
brief flare of brutality marked a hard end-date to the open range, safely relegating it to a 
bygone era. 
There is a reason that this historiography has come to dominate our understanding 
of the Johnson County War. In both our archives and our histories, the focus is 
overwhelmingly on the invaders.156 We get stories about their frustration at mounting 
winter and maverick losses, about the lead-up to and the blundering actions of the attack 
itself, and then we continue to follow the invaders as the subsequent trial drags on, 
editorials emerge, and the C.B.S. ranchers and their mercenaries are eventually released 
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without charge. It all makes a nice, neat story, the sort of romanticized tale we would 
expect to mark the closing to the frontier. It is, in short, the stuff of movies. 
But what is lost in this story is the rise of a new approach to energy use, 
development, and extraction in the Powder River Basin. Unfortunately, we do not have a 
great deal of archival material from which to understand the lives and stories of the small 
ranchers who would come to dominate this landscape and the cattle industry; what we do 
have is the cache of scientific, journalistic, and land office sources that both guided and 
reflected their thermodynamic approach. A careful examination of this material reveals 
that these small ranchers were not desperate homesteaders trying to siphon off bits of the 
CB.S. ranchers’ range; rather, they were mixed farmers who brought a whole new 
understanding of ranching and thermodynamics to the land, one that leveraged the latest 
scientific findings in order to control, predict, and make more efficient that ever-valuable 
transmutation of grass and water into beef. And their arrival and eventual victory would 
augur changes that would soon spread throughout the region, first manifesting to the 
south, in the oil fields of Salt Creek, then later to the east, in the coal fields of Gillette. In 
other words, the Johnson County War was not really about class divisions and the end of 
the open range; it was about the onset of a whole new energy regime and its relation to 
the larger northern plains environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Salt Creek and Teapot Dome: 
The Rise of Oil and the Fall of Place, 1880-1930 
 
Amongst the thousands of prospectors and thrill seekers who gathered in 
Spindletop, Texas in the spring of 1901, William Fitzhugh was different. Like the others, 
he had left his home in the wake of what would later become known as the country’s first 
major oil gusher, joining the thousands who made the trek to East Texas in the hope of 
striking it big.1 But unlike the mythic progressions of Turner and Greeley, of the forty-
niners and the sodbusters before him, Fitzhugh ventured east, traveling by train from 
California’s Bay Area down to the nascent Gulf fields. Furthermore, he had money—and 
lots of it. He was married to Mary E. Henshaw, a scion of one of the Bay Area’s most 
influential families. Her grandfather, Edward Carrigan Henshaw, had been a Civil War 
hero, a confidant and purported favorite of Ambrose Burnsides, while two of her cousins 
still carried substantial political clout in the Bay Area—one was the youngest justice ever 
to be elected to the California Supreme Court, while the other was one of Oakland’s most 
affluent bankers.2 In short, Fitzhugh had the financial and familial advantages that so 
                                                
1 The literature on Spindletop is extensive. For one of the best accounts, see Jo Stiles, Judith Walker 
Linsley, and Ellen Walker Rienstra, Giant Under the Hill: A History of the Spindletop Oil Discovery at 
Beaumont, Texas, in 1901, (Texas State Historical Association, 2008). 
2 Mike Mackey, Black Gold: Patterns in the Development of Wyoming’s Oil Industry (Powell, Wyo: 
Western History Publications, 1997), 17–19. Sarah Edwards Henshaw, Our Family: A Little Account of it 
for My Descendants (Oakland, Cal., 1894), 41. Many secondary sources on Salt Creek misidentify Fred and 
William as Mary’s brothers, when, in fact, they were her cousins. See Sarah Edwards Henshaw for a 
detailed genealogy of the Henshaw family. 
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many of his fellow pilgrims lacked, and he planned on using them to flourish. 
 But there was another more thermodynamically apposite factor that set him apart 
from all of those other itinerant drillers and speculators: he was an academically trained 
mining engineer, a rarity for the time, particularly in the United States, where the field 
was just then being codified in the halls of academia.1 Like many of the men who 
ventured west in the wake of the Hatch Act (see chapter two), Fitzhugh had studied the 
inchoate science intensively during the latter part of the nineteenth century, graduating 
with a degree from Berkeley, and his journey to Texas was in many regards an 
opportunity to put that knowledge to the test in the newly erumpent industry. After 
arriving in Spindletop that spring, he spent the next few months surveying the land, 
adjusting to the climate, and sorting through the maze of competing claims that already 
flecked the landscape. Eventually he managed to purchase a few unproven leases in the 
vicinity of the original gusher, and for months he worked these claims, trying to coax up 
a portion of the oil that so many others had already realized. But to his disappointment he 
found that the region—and especially the lesser claims that fell to latecomers such as 
himself—was all but played out, overcrowded and underproducing, and when he heard 
rumors of untapped oil wealth farther north, in the recently formed state of Wyoming, he 
abandoned his Texas claims for the promise of colder climes.2 
 Fitzhugh’s first stop on the northern plains was the twin towns of Lander and 
Byron, two hundred miles west of Casper. Lander had been the earliest major oil seep in 
what would eventually become the state of Wyoming: discovered by Captain Benjamin 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Robert Rakes Shrock, Geology at MIT 1865-1965: A History of the First Hundred Years 
of Geology at Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Department Operations and Projects (MIT Press, 
1982). 
2 Mackey, Black Gold, 17–19. 
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Bonneville in 1832, it would serve as an unofficial supply for trappers and traders in the 
region until the 1880s, when commercial wells were drilled in order to supply the Union 
Pacific. By the time Fitzhugh arrived, oil had been a known quantity in the region for 
close to seventy years, and it had been drilled commercially for the past twenty.3 For a 
young state, then, Wyoming—and particularly Lander—had a remarkably deep mineral 
history. Unfortunately for Fitzhugh, however, this meant that it housed the corollary 
tangle of competing land claims that had plagued him down in Texas. In what was 
beginning to become something of a theme in his life, he found that he had arrived too 
late to acquire the best lands, that the boom had already taken place.4  
All of this changed in the spring of 1909. Still without anything to show for his 
years of exploration, Fitzhugh got word of what was by all indications a major strike to 
the northeast. According to the reports that trickled down to Byron, the previous October 
a Dutch company had drilled and struck a gusher at the Salt Creek field, an at-the-time 
well-known but low-yielding stretch of alkaline flats forty miles north of Casper. 
According to the rumor, after drilling down to just over a thousand feet, a plume of oil 
had shot more than a hundred feet in the air, bathing the prairie in its black-brown mist 
before workers were finally able to cap it.5  
 Through his years of frustration and failure in the fields, Fitzhugh had learned an 
important lesson about thermodynamic punctuality; that fall, not wanting to miss out on 
yet another major strike, he traveled to Salt Creek himself, working the land and local 
government offices to ascertain how many legitimate claims had been filed and where 
                                                
3 E.G. Woodruff, “The Lander Oil Field, Fremont County,” U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 452 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911). 
4 Mackey, Black Gold, 18. 
5 Ed Bille, Early Days at Salt Creek and Teapot Dome (Casper, WY: Mountain States Lithograph 
Company, 1978), 12. 
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they were located. In the weeks that followed, he met only one other man in the field, 
Hugh “Daddy” Stock, a veteran oilman of the Pennsylvania and Colorado fields who was 
then an employee of the aforementioned Dutch company. His only other companions 
were thin flocks of sheep and cattle and the odd itinerant shepherd or rancher. Seeing the 
opportunity that had for so long eluded him now right there in front of him, Fitzhugh 
moved quickly. Although the field had been heavily patented over the years, the bulk of 
the claims had not been improved and were thus legally suspect. And so instead of 
tracking down all of the various claimants and trying to purchase their lands individually, 
Fitzhugh hired a surveying crew and spent the next month nailing survey posts and 
delineating sections, in essence “jumping” the prenominate holdings. He then erected a 
camp and brought in some forty men—the most notable being William “Missou” Hines, 
even at the time well-known for his role in Owen Wister’s The Virginian—as muscle to 
keep out any potential trespassers, and he contracted with the only other company then in 
the field—the aforementioned Dutch company—purchasing all of their drilling 
equipment for $13,000. Because the field was so isolated and therefore plagued by only 
the most primitive forms of transportation, obtaining such specialized and ponderous 
drilling supplies was a Sisyphean task, one that took not merely a great deal of effort but 
also years of planning and experience with the vicissitudes of global shipping—as such, 
this move not only gave Fitzhugh the capacity to commence drilling, but it also halted 
any competing exploration. 6 In short, he was on the precipice of finally realizing his 
dream, of obtaining the unmatched oil wealth that had evaded him for so many years. 
                                                
6 Harold D. Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming: The Story of a Great Oil Field, (Midwest Oil Corporation, 
1956), 41. 
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Figure 8: Map of Salt Creek, Wyoming 
From W.T. Thom, Jr., and Edmund M. Spieker, The Significance of Geologic Conditions in Naval 
Petroleum Reserve No. 3, Wyoming (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 1. 
 
This was a pivotal time in the history of Salt Creek. By all indications, Fitzhugh 
had arrived at precisely the right moment—there had indeed been a major recent strike, 
but the field was still relatively empty, unworked and therefore ripe for a well-financed 
takeover. But such appearances belie a much deeper, much more complicated history 
than Fitzhugh could have ever imagined. Despite all indications to the contrary, Fitzhugh 
had arrived in Salt Creek in the wake of hundreds, if not thousands of others. For more 
than two decades, this remote alkaline flat had held out the promise of unimaginable 
wealth and bounty for the surrounding region, a capacity to transform it from a humble 
nineteenth-century cattle emporium to a modern twentieth-century energy factory. Time 
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and again local boosters had promulgated the flat’s mineralogical merit, its status as one 
of the world’s richest and most copious oil fields. And yet by the time Fitzhugh arrived—
some twenty years into the field’s commercial development—it had delivered next to 
nothing in the way of profit. As Fitzhugh found out in his early explorations, even in the 
wake of the unexpected gusher at Big Dutch there was very little further development—
the field and greater region simply did not possess the requisite infrastructure or funds 
needed for such change.7 As had been the case throughout so much of Salt Creek’s 
history, it was yet another instance of narrative hope engulfing the limits of place. 
As Fitzhugh recognized, however, despite the surface indicators, this field was on 
the precipice of a metamorphosis: a mere ten years after he entered Salt Creek, the sheep- 
and cattle-stippled flat would be home to the biggest oil field in the country, one that 
would pump its crude product down to Casper, where the largest oil refinery in the world 
would process it and ship it south to the Gulf of Mexico. From there it would go on to 
supply much of continental Europe, powering countries and peoples worlds away from 
the humble Powder River residents who produced it. It is the story of a remarkable 
transformation, one whose roots reach back decades to the countless boosters and 
wildcatters who worked to transform the field from one of mere promise and rhetoric to 
an empirical reality. Far more than a mere wasteland, it is a story of the stuttering rise and 
eventual fall of the early American energy industry. 
From a historiographic standpoint, it is curious that such a location, so laden with 
the accouterments of cultural and environmental history, has played such a minor role in 
                                                
7 Ibid., 28–40. 
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the field.8 Despite the central place that Salt Creek held in early-twentieth-century oil 
production, it has been almost entirely absent from these studies, which have tended to 
focus on the more well-known regions: Pennsylvania, Texas, and California. As such, 
this chapter examines the rise of the field up through its ultimate collapse alongside the 
Teapot Dome Scandal. In doing so, it traces the next step in the Powder River Basin’s 
thermodynamic history. As an educated scientist, William Fitzhugh’s efforts at Salt 
Creek were explicitly connected to the rise of the Range Science Ranchers in Johnson 
County. Like that former cattle conflict, the ascension of Salt Creek pitted a handful of 
wealthy absentee owners who had little knowledge of the local landscape against a cadre 
of European-educated scientists who used the latest in geological knowledge to bring the 
field to its early-twentieth-century apogee. Unlike Johnson County, however, Salt Creek 
soon found itself as part of a new development in the region’s energy production and use. 
The Teapot Dome Scandal—long held to be an aberrant political scandal—marked the 
inception of this corollary stage, one that was far more concerned with narrative than it 
was with science and place. In other words, while the world’s best geologists were using 
the latest scientific theories to produce detailed maps of the Powder River’s subterranean 
landscape, a corresponding increase in nationwide energy use was leading to an antipodal 
                                                
8 The historiography of the petroleum industry has by and large centered around the economic and social 
aspects of the trade See, for instance, Christopher F. Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014); Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest 
for Oil, Money and Power, 1st edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Brian Black, Petrolia: The 
Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom, First Edition, First Printing edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000); Brian Frehner, Finding Oil: The Nature of Petroleum Geology, 1859-1920 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Laton McCartney, The Teapot Dome Scandal: How Big Oil 
Bought the Harding White House and Tried to Steal the Country (Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2009); 
Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920’s (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965); 
Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900-1940 (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2005); Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American 
Politics in the 1970s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2016); Diana Davids Hinton and Roger M. Olien, Oil in 
Texas: The Gusher Age, 1895-1945, (University of Texas Press, 2010). 
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movement, one that resulted in a near total abstraction from place.9 Although such a 
tension was new for the West’s energy producers, it would soon come to define the 
modern thermodynamic landscape. Its story begins in the heart of the Powder River 
Basin. 
 
The Rise of Salt Creek 
Nearly two decades before William Fitzhugh arrived in Wyoming, Johnson 
County’s open-range ranchers headed north out of Casper, traveling to Buffalo, Kaycee, 
and a handful of other isolated towns, their path bringing them through a Wyoming 
landscape in the midst of drastic change.10 With regional transportation virtually 
nonexistent, they were forced to ride from the train’s Casper terminus, traveling 
northwest through the upper half of the state. As they did so, they passed through the 
sparse badlands of Natrona County, burnt brown sandstone and alkaline flats stippled 
with the odd shepherd and, if they looked really closely, one or two wooden, early-model 
oil rigs.11 Of course they kept on moving: this land was not considered valuable for 
anything—least of all cattle grazing—and therefore was of no concern to them. It was an 
interstitial space, one to be moved through, not stopped in. They were on their way to the 
lush grasslands of Johnson County, where they would clash with the group of smaller 
ranchers who were using the latest range science to alter the region’s thermodynamic 
                                                
9 Of course there is also an intriguing connection here with the current (since the 1970s or so) rise of the 
Powder River Basin coal industry. Despite housing the biggest coal mines in the world, the existence of the 
Powder River coal industry is virtually unknown in the United States. Similarly, in the 1920s, the Teapot 
Dome effectively yanked the Powder River oil industry from its concrete location. 
10 Chapter two of this dissertation will be focused on this conflict and its relation to the larger story of the 
Powder River Basin. 
11 By this point, the Pennsylvania Company had drilled four wells. C. A. Fisher, “History of Well Drilling 
in Salt Creek Field in Chronological Order from 1889 to the Present Time,” 1918, Box 3, Folder 2, 
Collection 00664, Midwest Oil Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. 
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landscape.12 Little did they know that within a few decades this barren landscape would 
become the most valuable piece of ground in Wyoming, home to the most profitable oil 
field in the world. 
We tend not to think of the great cattle wars as intersecting with the rise of fossil 
fuels and the oil industry, but the more closely we look, the more we find that these 
ostensibly compartmentalized historical epochs did, in fact, collide, merging and 
intersecting in all sorts of baroque, unforeseen combinations.13 Located a mere forty miles 
north of Casper, a ranching town (and later to become a major Wyoming city) founded in 
the 1880s, the Salt Creek Field was a ten-by-five-mile ellipse of timberless sandstone, 
some twenty-thousand acres in total. But like the Johnson County War invaders, the 
earliest cattle- and sheepmen saw the expanse as a passing-through place, “an intermittent 
source of bitter, alkali water…a bed of sand with occasional vile water holes.”14 As one 
writer later described it, “the Salt Creek area is a particularly barren range and the water 
of that Creek uninviting, so it escaped the homesteading of water holes that wove a sparse 
pattern over miles of the short-grass buffalo range that lies on all sides of Salt Creek.”15 
Early geologists portrayed it as “barren and desolate,” claiming that, “though it is 
traversed by numerous deep valleys the effect of relief is lost in the distance, the somber 
colors of the treeless hills causing one to fade into the next, forming a vast, rolling 
expanse, whose prevailing tones are brown and gray.”16 Even through the first few 
                                                
12 For more on the connections between the Johnson County War and Salt Creek/Teapot Dome, see Oakley 
Hall, “Powder River Country,” American Heritage, Volume 40, Issue 3, April 1989. 
13 The other one is that in moving from Casper northwest, their path roughly coincided with that of the 
erstwhile Bozeman Trail (which passed from Fort Fetterman, between Douglas and Casper, and Fort Phil 
Kearny, just north of Buffalo). 
14 Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 1. 
15 Ibid., 10–11. 
16 Carroll H. Wegemann, “The Salt Creek Oil Field, Wyoming,” United States Geological Bulletin 452 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911), 40.      
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decades of the twentieth century, after the oil boom was well underway and realizing its 
first substantial profits, it would remain without any sort of permanent settlement, a place 
to be traveled to and extracted from, not remained in.17 
Long before either mineral speculators or cattlemen entered the region, oil had 
existed as a known quantity in the West. There had been stories about the region’s 
indigenous populations using it for medicinal purposes, and early explorers—from 
Captain Bonneville to the mid-century’s overland travelers—noted it in muddy seeps 
along the foothills of the Wind River Valley.18 The very first well in what would later 
become the state of Wyoming was drilled near the very spot where Fitzhugh would later 
stop, in Lander, in 1883, the same year that Laramie lawyer (and later president of 
University of Wyoming’s Board of Trustees) Stephen Downey filed the first claim at Salt 
Creek.19 It was patented according to the stipulations of the Placer Mining Law of 1872, a 
law originally intended to apply to the hard metal rushes of mid-century and that would, 
in the years to come, cause numerous litigious headaches for just about everyone 
involved (including Fitzhugh). In effect, this law enabled individuals to file on up to 
twenty acres of land. More commonly, though, it permitted an “association” of eight 
individuals to claim up to 160 acres of land (twenty acres multiplied by eight 
                                                
17 In this respect, there are some curious overlaps with twentieth-century notion of wilderness, where, 
according to the 1964 Wilderness Act, is a place “where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” 
Quoted in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (Yale University Press, 1965), 5. 
18 See, for instance, Washington Irving and Benjamin L. E. Bonneville, The Adventures of Captain 
Bonneville (New York, G.P. Putnam and son, 1868), 236. 
19 Even in the early days of Salt Creek, there was a great deal of confusion and boasting when it came to the 
field’s “discovery.” After the Denver Post published a history of the field claiming that Daddy Stock was 
the first to drill, Harry Iba, the son of one the field’s early drillers, wrote a letter to the editor of, curiously, 
the Wyoming Tribune. Iba claimed that the story had been “a falsehood,” and that he had “been working in 
the Salt Creek fields for twenty years and many discoveries of oil were made…by my father, Cy 
Iba…before that time.” He then goes onto say, “The writer of the article seems to follow the well-known 
Denver Post rule of writing about what he dreams after a round of hop.” “Casper Man Corrects Denver Post 
Story,” Wyoming Tribune, June 12, 1912, 4. 
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individuals). The individual or association was then required to drill a well or dig a shaft 
to at least twenty feet, and the resultant work had to amount to a minimum of $100 of 
improvement to that claim. If they either continued this process for five years or 
completed more than $500 of improvements and discovered “commercial quantities” of 
oil, they could then file for a patent. This required them to put up $2.50 per acre in 
exchange for the title to that land. Of course, terms such as “commercial quantity” were 
vague and subject to great manipulation, and as far as most of the historical records show, 
it often equated to as little as a jar of cloudy, water-logged oil.20 
Even with this low bar, however, Downey’s claim never amounted to anything, 
and he does not seem to have made any of the requisite improvements or conducted even 
minimal drilling—it was speculation in the most literal sense of the word. But in the 
ensuing years a number of new scientific theories began to filter into the region, leading 
to a deeper understanding of the field and its subterranean geography. The most 
important of these was the anticline theory. Developed in 1882 by Israel White, a former 
U.S.G.S. member and private prospector in West Virginia, it described the accumulation 
of oil beneath an anticline or dome, a geological formation that, through diachronic uplift, 
had been warped or folded into land which, when viewed via a cross-section, took on the 
                                                
20 Mary Colleen Gnagy, “Midwest, Wyoming: Living in a Company Town” (Master's Thesis, University of 
Wyoming, 1991), 23; Mackey, Black Gold, 2–5. University of Wyoming Geologist describes the law and 
its application to Salt Creek as follows: “The oil lands of this district belong to the general government and 
are located under the ‘Placer Mining Act,’ each person being entitled to a claim of twenty acres. Usually a 
company is formed and claims of one hundred and sixty acres are located by eight persons. According to 
law each claimant must sink a ten-foot hole on his claim the first year and do one hundred dollars worth of 
work each year thereafter. The work is not confined to sinking wells or prospect holes and may be put upon 
road construction or other improvements. When a company has completed five hundred dollars worth of 
work upon its claim it can, by submitting proof to the U. S. Land Office and paying two dollars and one-
half per acre, obtain a patent.” W.C. Knight, “The Petroleum of Salt Creek, Wyoming,” Petroleum Series—
Bulletin No. 1 (Laramie, Wyoming, 1896), 10. 
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distinctive shape of an arch (see Figure 9).21 When this occurred, oil was slowly forced up 
toward the surface, sandwiched between an upper layer of gas and a lower stratum of 
water. As a result, White claimed, if geologists and prospectors could identify an 
anticline and its apex, there was a good chance of striking oil beneath. And while 
anticlines are certainly not the only geological formation within which oil is found, to 
date approximately eighty percent of the world’s oil and gas has resulted from such 
configurations.22 As we will see, Salt Creek was one such field: although aesthetically 
unappealing, from a geological standpoint it is simply stunning, containing a near-perfect 
example of the anticline. Consequently, White’s theory came at a propitious moment in 
the field’s development: whereas men like Downey relied upon the same sorts of obvious 
surface clues that explorers had noted half a century earlier (e.g., oil seeps) and randomly 
sunk crude test wells, geologists working under White’s model could effectively map 
subterranean landscapes. Like the range scientists whose work propelled the 
thermodynamic shift in Johnson County, White helped to pave the way for a similar 
metamorphosis on the fields of Salt Creek.23 
                                                
21 According the Kenneth Deffeyes, even today “Active petroleum geologists spend 95 percent of their time 
looking for petroleum traps.” Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage  
(Princeton University Press, 2008), 44. 
22 Robert O. Anderson, Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1984), 89. 
23 Curiously, though, the theory did not have an immediate impact upon the oil industry. Pennsylvania, at 
the time the center of the oil industry, was something of a geological anomaly. Unlike the majority of the 
world’s other oil producers, almost all of its oil came in non-anticline formations. Brian Frehner, Finding 
Oil: The Nature of Petroleum Geology, 1859-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 71–73; 
Israel White, "The Geology of Natural Gas." Science 6 (June 26, 1885), 521-522. 
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Figure 9: The Salt Creek Anticline 
W.C. Knight, “The Petroleum of Salt Creek, Wyoming,” Petroleum Series—Bulletin No. 1 
(Laramie, Wyoming, 1896), 17. 
 
In order to reach the Powder River Basin, however, the anticline theory first 
needed publicity. Although little known as a genre today, the state-sponsored geological 
report—like the Agricultural Bulletins in Johnson County—was a critical part of the 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth century oil industry. By the time of White’s anticline 
theory, geological surveys had existed in the United States for well over half a century. 
Geology was a nascent intellectual field at the time, straddling the divide between a 
burgeoning academia and a more practical, utilitarian interest.24 This dialectic is most 
evident if viewed from a financial angle: the surveys themselves were funded by state and 
territorial governments, and they therefore came with certain fiscal expectations attached. 
Emerging out of the Northeast and then the South in the 1820s, the state-sponsored 
survey had originally been created for the purpose of locating and describing “mineral 
and soil resources so that they might be exploited as a source of wealth to the individual 
                                                
24 For a historical overview of the field of geology, see Julie Renee Newell, “American Geologists and their 
Geology: The Formation of the American Geological Community, 1780-1865,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, 1993). 
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and to the state.”25 As was the case with the Hatch Act, from the very beginning there was 
a delicate balance between obtaining and transmitting scientific information for the 
academic sake of acquiring knowledge, and a more populist, applied function of said 
information, a payoff to the people, one that was more often than not economic. In 
lobbying for employment, it was not at all unusual for scientists to portray their surveys 
as “investments that would improve their [the state’s] financial standing.” Publishers 
would occasionally alter geologists’ reports, expurgating material that wasn’t deemed 
economically viable. 26 The resultant tension is evident in the work of James Hall, 
arguably the most eminent geologist of the nineteenth century, who put the economic 
demands of the vocation bluntly: “it is the duty of the State Geologist…to advise other 
persons where they may expend their energies in search of minerals with some prospect 
of success, and on the other hand to advise them against expending money in geological 
formations barren of metalliferous ores or other economic products.”27 As such, when 
surveyors were able to obtain government patronage, they were not only tasked with 
adding epistemologically to the field, but they were forced to convey this often abstruse 
and esoteric information to the average citizen, to make it both accessible and valuable.  
Like the Agricultural Bulletins of the period, this meant that the reports had to be 
made available to the public. Typically this meant that they were published in local 
papers, particularly those located in the vicinity of major geological activity. One 
example comes to us in March 1918, when Carroll Wegemann released the latest report 
                                                
25 Walter B. Hendrickson, “Nineteenth-Century State Geological Surveys: Early Government Support of 
Science,” Isis 52, no. 3 (1961): 358. 
26 Newell, 236-237. Newell also provides an example of the dialectic relationship between the scientist and 
the state regarding economic motives, relaying a story about how the South Carolina legislature removed 
plates of fossils “the had been deemed nonessential” from the geologist’s manuscript before printing. 
27 Quoted in E. DeGolyer, “State Geological Surveys and Economic Geology,” Economic Geology 20, no. 
4 (June 1925), 377. 
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on Salt Creek, United States Geological Survey Bulletin 670, “The Salt Creek Oil Field 
Wyoming.” By far the most comprehensive of the surveys that had been produced over 
the previous three decades, the release of this document was publicized in newspapers 
throughout northern Wyoming. In one representative instance, Wyoming Oil World 
stated, “the report contains a full description of the field, including field and surface 
indications, extent, accommodations and virtually everything that is necessary to acquaint 
either the technically trained or the layman with the possibilities of the field.” Further, it 
instructed readers on how they could obtain this information: “A copy of the bulletin can 
be obtained by writing to any of the members of the Wyoming delegation at 
Washington."28 Like the Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletins before it, such 
geological reports were meant to be consumed by the people. 
 
Figure 10: 1886 Depiction of the Salt Creek Anticline 
Samuel Aughey, “Annual Report of the Territorial Geologist to the Governor of Wyoming,” (Boomerang 
Printing House: Laramie, 1886), 40. 
 
                                                
28 “Bulletin of Salt Creek Now Out,” Wyoming Oil World, August 3, 1918, 3.  
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In Salt Creek, a long string of such documents began to appear in 1886, a few 
years after the field’s first half-hearted claims. The initial account amounted to just a few 
pages in geologist Samuel Aughey’s larger “Annual Report of the Territorial Geologist to 
the Governor of Wyoming,” but it nevertheless provided a template for how the field’s 
countless other geological surveys would attempt to communicate their findings to the 
public. For the first time Aughey produced clear and simple diagrams of the distinctive 
anticlinal fold that Salt Creek would later become so well-known for, describing it as one 
that was “so gentle that no break has occurred, and the shales are not eroded down to the 
underlying group” (see Figure 10). According to Aughey, the smoothness of the rise and 
the lack of any accompanying fractures meant that much of the underlying petroleum trap 
was well-preserved and promised to be among the best oils in the world.29 At the time oil 
was harvested either as a lubricant or illuminating fuel, and Aughey made no qualms 
about his recommendation of the Salt Creek product: “of all the fine oils of Wyoming 
Territory I regard this, if not the finest, at least as fine as there is anyway, not even 
excepting the famous Beaver Oil. It will prove itself to be one of the ideally perfect 
lubricating oils of the globe.”30 In much the same way that later boosters would trumpet 
the unique excellence of Salt Creek, Aughey promulgated the unmatched geology of the 
field and its mineral products. The only difference was that he did so while leveraging the 
latest in geological knowledge. 
                                                
29 Aughey, “Annual Report of the Territorial Geologist to the Governor of Wyoming,” 40-41. Writing in 
1918, Carroll Wegemann, in a U.S.G.S. report, would write that “The Salt Creek anticline, in spite of its 
asymmetric cross section, is extremely regular in outline as compared with anticlines in other oil regions.” 
Carroll Wegemann, “The Salt Creek Oil Field, Wyoming,” United States Geological Survey Bulletin 670 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 26. 
30 Aughey, “Annual Report, 40-41. Later authors would write that Salt Creek’s “main features are so 
apparent that to any trained eye it looks almost like a diagram of an ideal dome taken from a text book on 
oil geology.”  Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 5. 
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In response to this report, a handful of individuals filed claims during the late-
1880s and 1890s. The most notable was Cy Iba, a former California and Black Hills gold 
miner who would factor into the development of Salt Creek for years to come, obstinately 
defending his claims in the face of men like William Fitzhugh, who periodically came in 
and tried to overpower existing landholders.31 But the real change came in 1890, when the 
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Company brought in the first commercially drilled well in 
what is now known as the Shannon Field. In spite of Aughey’s early geological report 
and the nascent work on the anticline theory, this initial well was located a full two-and-
a-half miles north of the field’s apex. The reason for this is not clear. On the one hand, 
the company arrived in Salt Creek from the East Coast, and therefore their familiarity 
with the specifics of the field was necessarily limited. On the other hand, Aughey’s report 
was notoriously vague; it provided a cross-section of the famous anticline (see Figure 
10), but it failed to pinpoint precisely where the apex was located. In other words, like the 
Cattle-Bison System ranchers before, the Pennsylvania Company displayed a stunning 
ignorance of the local landscape, something that would come to cost them dearly over the 
ensuing years. Instead of looking to geology for thermodynamic guidance, they based 
their excavation on more conspicuous surface signs: in this case, the same sort of oil seep 
that had led Stephen Downey to file his initial claim seven years earlier.  
Nevertheless, Mark Shannon, the head of the Pennsylvania Company, and his 
men still managed to strike oil far from the anticline, at approximately 1,000 feet.32 After 
                                                
31 Harold D. Roberts, “History of the Salt Creek Oil Fields,” 1919, Box 3, Folder 2, Collection 00664, 
Midwest Oil Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. 
32 Theories vary on why this is. The most convincing is that Shannon was coming from the Pennsylvania 
fields, which were something of a geological anomaly: the bulk of them fit within the twenty or so percent 
of world oil sumps that are not anticlines. Therefore, it is conceivable that Shannon was less likely to buy 
into the nascent anticline theory. 
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bringing a sample of the product back to Pittsburgh, he publicized the claims of eastern-
trained chemists, who alleged that “nature had done more for this oil in the ground than 
the best and latest refining and compounding processes had done for other oils.” Further 
promotion took place in 1893, when Shannon brought his oil to the Chicago World’s 
Fair, taking home an award for the best natural lubricating oil. With such encomium at 
his command, the crude was sold unrefined to the Denver and Gulf Railway Company 
and used as a lubricant.33 Nevertheless, Shannon took the long view on the region’s 
profitability and eventually constructed a small refinery in Casper, one that was capable 
of processing up to one hundred barrels per day, though even then it was limited almost 
exclusively to lubricating oils.34  
 In the midst of these early efforts, Salt Creek’s next geological report came out. 
Building upon Aughey’s paper from a decade earlier, in 1896 University of Wyoming 
professor of geology Wilbur Knight published the first geological report that was 
dedicated solely to Salt Creek. In this publication, Knight noted the recent work by 
Shannon and the Pennsylvania Company; in doing so, however, he observed that “no 
pioneer company ever experienced greater difficulty than they as they attempted to 
convert the oil into money: It was impossible to secure freight rates to Omaha or 
Chicago, so that the crude oil could be sold in competition with eastern oils of the same 
grade. Besides the new conditions that had to be considered, this company had to haul 
their oil fifty miles by wagon, which in itself was a serious matter, and, had the oil not 
been of a very superior grade, would have defeated the enterprise had they secured 
reasonable freight rates.” In many ways, Knight’s work seems to take a step back from 
                                                
33 Nearly all oil-based products—gasoline, petroleum, kerosene, diesel, heating oil, etc.—require 
refinement. For Shannon to sell Salt Creek oil unrefined was both rare and not particularly profitable. 
34 Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 20–22. 
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Aughey’s cursory 1886 report. Instead of working to further map the intricacies of the 
subterranean shale, Knight seemed more concerned with drumming up local business. To 
begin with, despite little scientific evidence, Knight modified previous geological maps, 
noting a “slight anticlinal fold” where the Pennsylvania company was drilling, from 
which he concluded that “there are two oil horizons” instead of the previously assumed 
one. Further, his report was peppered with obvious unscientific features throughout. The 
most conspicuous is the inclusion of photographs that would seem more at home in a 
popular history book or travel brochure. Among these are images of pumps, refineries, 
and, most curiously, a lengthy sixteen-mule freight train, set and ready to haul a load of 
oil from the fields to Casper (see Figure 11). All of the photographs contain captions, and 
in this particular image Knight noted that the train contained a wagon devoted to “the 
freighter’s home”—a “house on wheels…provided with a spring bed, a stove and all of 
the necessary equipage for keeping house.”35 Such details point to a larger energetic 
imaginary. At forty-seven pages, his report was by far the most detailed to yet be 
published on Salt Creek, and yet by opting to promote the local camps and domestic 
amenities over the latest in geological data, Knight helped to perpetuate the plodding 
progression of Salt Creek’s thermodynamic landscape. While the anticline theory was 
taking hold in many of the country’s competing oil fields, it had yet to break through in 
the Powder River Basin. Just as the C.B.S. ranchers had refused to adapt to a place-based 
approach to energy excavation, so too did Salt Creek’s earliest drillers limit the anticline 
theory to paper.36 
                                                
35 Wilbur C. Knight and E.E. Slosson, “The Petroleum of Salt Creek, Wyoming,” Petroleum Series—
Bulletin No. 1 (Laramie: University of Wyoming, 1896), 6-12. 
36 For newspaper mentions of Knight’s report, see Honorable H.W. Davis, “Our Oils,” Buffalo Voice, 
December 24, 1898, 1. 
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Figure 11: Image of Cattle from Knight’s 1896 Geological Report 
Wilbur C. Knight and E.E. Slosson, “The Petroleum of Salt Creek, Wyoming,” Petroleum Series—Bulletin 
No. 1 (Laramie: University of Wyoming, 1896), 13. 
 
 In approaching geology and excavation in this manner, Knight, Aughey, and the 
Pennsylvania Company displayed a number of similarities with the open range ranchers 
who preceded them. This was most notable in the defining feature of Salt Creek’s early 
years: the disconnect between public praise for the oil fields and the lack of extraction, 
which so closely corresponded with the C.B.S. habit of book count. Even when 
commercial drilling had hardly begun, the Wyoming Derrick was already situating Salt 
Creek in relation to the rest of the world. “The eyes of the entire world are upon us,” they 
wrote in 1891. “The effects of a flowing oil well at this point are so manifold that it is 
hard to estimate them. It will have its effect not only in the United States but even in 
Europe.”37 Time and again, editors referred to Salt Creek and the greater Casper region as 
“The Pennsylvania of the West,” taking steps to push the famous Pennsylvania fields into 
                                                
37 “Preparing to Drill,” Wyoming Derrick, December 18, 1891, 1. Emphasis added. 
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the past tense, thereby opening narrative space for the future of Salt Creek. 38 “The 
Pennsylvania and Ohio fields have been pressed to their utmost so that new territory is 
anxiously looked for,” one paper wrote. “This new territory is right here in Casper’s 
backyard.”39 Even geologists such as Knight boasted that “the finest oil in the world is 
found in inexhaustible quantities in Natrona County.”40 In other words, much as the 
C.B.S. ranchers had used book count to create a specious portrait of the thermodynamic 
landscape, so too did Salt Creek’s early drillers and boosters use selective science to 
portray the field as something that it was not. Like the Range-Science ranchers who 
replaced them, it would take a concrete application of another recently developed 
scientific discipline—in this case, geology—to the specificities of place in order to turn 
such fantasies into reality. It would require someone with far better training and a more 
worldly experience with oil than Aughey and Knight to bring that science to Salt Creek. 
A decade after Knight’s report, that person would arrive. 
 
The Second Boom 
 Although by 1906, a full twenty years into production, the Salt Creek field had yet 
to produce anything worthwhile, change was in the air. That spring one of the Powder 
River’s more eccentric visitors, the Italian geologist Dr. Cesare Porro, traveled out onto 
the badlands north of Casper, doing his best to ferret out what lay beneath the surface. At 
just forty years old, the Milan-born scientist was already among Europe’s most well-
                                                
38 “French Oil Syndicate,” Natrona Tribune, October 24, 1895, 5. See also “Wyoming Oil Field,” Natrona 
County Tribune, April 21, 1898, 8, where George McCalmont of the Pennsylvania Oil Company is quoted 
as saying that “the Salt Creek belt is to the Wyoming field as the Franklin belt was to the Pennsylvania 
field.” Notice the shift in tense here, from the past to the present. 
39 “Preparing to Drill,” Wyoming Derrick, December 18, 1891, 1. 
40 “Salt Creek Oil,” Natrona Tribune, March 3, 1894, 3. 
 180 
respected minds in the oil business. Fluent in nine languages, he had traveled the world 
for nearly two decades in the service of the Royal Dutch Company, pinpointing 
prospective fields in regions and lands that most Europeans had never even heard of. He 
had written a doctoral dissertation on the geology of the Bergamo Alpine region, and 
since then had surveyed and mapped geological resources in France, Germany, Italy, 
Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq and Iran), and Sumatra, the latter of which translated into 
one of the world’s great strikes.41 In short, that spring Porro brought to Salt Creek the sort 
of geological acumen and attention to place it had been so lacking.  
 By 1906 the itinerant Porro was under the employ of a different company, 
Petroleum Maatschappij, a newly formed group of Dutch investors who were looking to 
expand their operations into the United States. Porro was known to be an ardent early 
proponent of the anticline theory, and he placed a great deal of emphasis on it as a means 
of “a rational program of research based on the knowledge of the geology of the 
subsurface,” as opposed to the hunch-based drilling and prospecting that so often plagued 
the less scientific men (like Shannon) in the industry.42 In what would become the field’s 
most influential report, Porro outlined his belief that significant oil accumulations could 
be found in the vicinity of the anticline’s peak. Unlike Knight and Aughey, however, he 
pinpointed specific locations: at a depth of just over one thousand feet, nearly three miles 
south of Shannon’s previously drilled lands. Even then, however, he was careful to couch 
his projections, to foreground the cognitive impenetrability of the subterranean layers: 
                                                
41 Thomas S. Harrison, “Memorial: Cesare Porro (1865-1940),” Bulletin of the American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists, (August 1952), Volume 36, Number 8, 1681-1686. Porro’s visit drew a brief 
mention in one of the local papers, which reported that “Dr. Cesar Porro, a geologist from Milan, Italy,” 
and a few men from Chicago were prospecting for oil. “Much activity in oil production in Wyoming is 
expected within the next few months as foreign capitalists are becoming interested extensively.” Natrona 
County Tribune, June 5, 1905, 5. 
42 Harrison, “Memorial: Cesare Porro (1865-1940),” 1686. 
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“We cannot speak of prouved [sic] horizons in the depth, but we have sufficient reasons 
to admitt [sic] that such horizons in fact exists [sic]. The structure of the strata is so 
favorable that if these horizons are reached, they could give good, not only, but eruptive 
oilwells [sic].”43 The difference from the field’s previous geological reports is patent. 
Instead of simply noting the existence of the anticline, Porro mapped the underlying 
topography with precision: he marked both the location of the apex and the depth of the 
submerged oil. Instead of relying upon a mix of science and outdated trial-and-error, 
Porro brought the best education and experience Europe could offer to unlock the Salt 
Creek field; like the Range-Science Ranchers, he mapped the particularities of space in 
order to excavate the region’s cache of energy. 
Not surprisingly, Petroleum Maatschappij moved quickly to purchase Shannon’s 
failed holdings. They sent their manager, Coenraad Kerbert, an engineer with experience 
in Siberia and the Dutch East Indies, to Casper. There he spent a year wading through the 
vicissitudes of competing claims and legal obstructions, until August 1908, when he was 
finally able to begin drilling at Porro’s recommended site. By October, the crew had 
reached the top of the First Wall Creek sand, and on October 23, at almost the precise 
spot where Porro had estimated much of the oil to be located, the crude came streaming 
up in Salt Creek’s first gusher, the same one that would bring William Fitzhugh up from 
Lander.44 It erupted with such pressure that workers found themselves unable to stop the 
flow, and although they eventually managed to cap the hole, twenty-five to fifty barrels 
                                                
43 “Dr. Cesare Porro Report on Salt Creek,” 1906, Box 3, Folder 2, Collection 00664, Midwest Oil 
Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. 
44 Years later, Porro’s recommended site would be proven to be almost exactly atop the apex of Salt 
Creek’s anticline. “Memorandum of Facts Connected with Early History of Salt Creek Field, Wyoming,” 
1924, Box 3, Folder 2, Collection 00664, Midwest Oil Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, 
University of Wyoming Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 35–39. 
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nevertheless managed to seep through each day, much of which had to be burned off in 
order to prevent it from seeping into Salt Creek’s nearby waters.45 As Porro later recalled 
of the experience, “I was able to advise a deep drilling on Salt Creek dome, just at a point 
near the apex, to the north; I preferred to keep myself on that side because the oil signs I 
spoke of were north of the apex. The well was drilled, and in 1908 the Wall Creek sand 
was struck at a depth of 1,175 feet, and was penetrated to a depth of 25 feet. According to 
my forecast, it should have been reached at something more than 1,000 feet.”46 It was Salt 
Creek’s first gusher, what would later become known simply as “The Dutch Well,” or, 
more popularly, “Big Dutch,” the first strike to definitively prove the existence of the 
voluminous oil that local boosters had been so long professing. And it was brought about 
thanks to the deep geological knowledge of one of Europe’s primary petroleum 
geologists. 
Unfortunately, there is more to oil production than place-based knowledge. Just as 
Salt Creek was starting to boom, as individuals were beginning to flock to the field in 
response to the first veritable gusher, a series of litigational changes that would 
permanently alter the field were taking place at the federal level. These alterations 
emerged out of two separate, but interrelated concerns: on the one hand, the increasing 
need for a modern, portable fuel for the navy; on the other, the voluble pleas for 
conservation of natural resources. The first had to do with American expansion and 
modernization. As the initial decade of the twentieth century came to a close, the federal 
government—and more specifically the navy—began to consider a switch over to oil as 
its primary fuel. Much of this had to do with the extension of the military into the far 
                                                
45 Harold D. Roberts, “History of the Salt Creek Oil Fields,” 1919, Box 3, Folder 2, Collection 00664, 
Midwest Oil Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. 
46 Harrison, “Memorial: Cesare Porro (1865-1940),” 1683. 
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reaches of the Pacific, where available coal—the traditional naval fuel—was scarce. As 
one journalist bluntly described the dilemma: “with fuel oil regarded as the pivot upon 
which victory or defeat would swing in case of hostilities on the Pacific, inaction on the 
part of the navy department in equipping a Pacific squadron with oil-burning apparatus, 
can be characterized as nothing short of criminal negligence.”47 The first step was to 
obtain a more reliable domestic supply. Under the placer mining law, neither state nor 
federal government procured any portion of the mineral rights or profits. Extraction 
existed entirely within the private realm, leading to a rush to claim and extract crude oil 
as quickly as possible. According to the director of the U.S.G.S., at “the present rate at 
which the oil lands in California are being patented by private parties will make it 
impossible for the people of the United States to continue ownership of oil lands there 
more than a few months. After that, the Government will be obliged to repurchase the 
very oil that it has practically given away.”48 In response, on September 27, 1909 
President Taft signed an executive order withdrawing over three million acres of public 
domain land in California and Wyoming, including all of the lands not currently under 
development in Salt Creek. Like Petroleum Maatschappij before them, the federal 
government relied upon teams of well-educated scientists for this move: the specific 
selection came under the recommendation of the U.S.G.S., who had reviewed all of the 
various state-sponsored geological reports and surveyed much of the implicated country, 
recommending certain undeveloped lands that were thought to contain large quantities of 
oil.49  
                                                
47 Oil Investors’ Journal, March 5, 1907, 14. 
48 California State Council of Defense Committee on Petroleum, Report of the Committee on Petroleum: 
California State Council of Defense (California State Printing Office, 1917), 38. 
49 Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 47–54. 
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 But there was also another factor driving the withdrawal order, one tied to the 
early conservation movement.50 By 1908 and 1912, when Big Dutch came in at Salt 
Creek, both political parties were offering conservation-related statements as parts of 
their respective platforms, with the Democrats pronouncing, “we insist upon the 
preservation, protection and replacement of needed forests,” and the Republicans 
similarly stating, “we endorse the movement inaugurated by the administration for the 
conservation of natural resources, and we approve of all measures to prevent the waste of 
timber.”51 Although tied to natural resources in general, part of the impetus for such 
proclamations was a realization that the early oil industry was—even for a time of 
marked inefficiency—wildly profligate. Writing in Collier’s, the geologist (and president 
of University of Wisconsin) Charles Richard Van Hise bemoaned the “wanton waste” of 
the petroleum industry, concluding that “it is perfectly clear that the interests of the 
nation demand that all of our mineral lands…should be perpetually withdrawn from 
private entry, and be operated under the Government upon a lease system.”52 Even more 
desperately, the U.S.G.S.’s David Talbot Day lamented the “certainty of exhaustion,” 
stating that all authorities in the industry “agree that the known fields are being exhausted 
at a rate so rapid as to mean cessation of the industry within a few decades unless the 
expected new fields are found.”53 Like so many conservationists and public officials of 
the time, Van Hise and Day blamed the Placer Mining Law under which oil land and that 
of most other resources was patented, which “encouraged, almost forced, overproduction 
                                                
50 Samuel Hays, in the definitive account of the movement, places its formation between 1890 and 1920, in 
the midst of both Salt Creek’s and the wider petroleum industry’s early development. Samuel P. Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Harvard 
University Press, 1959). 
51 Quoted in John Ise, The United States Forest Policy, (New Haven, 1920), 149. 
52 Charles Richard Van Hise, “Patriotism and Waste,” Collier’s: The National Weekly, September 18, 1901, 
23, 41. 
53 David T. Day, “The Petroleum of the United States,” American Review of Reviews, January 1909, 50. 
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with its attending waste.” Although well-meaning in the limits that it imposed upon the 
amount of land any one individual could patent, when added to the fact that one had to 
drill and prove the existence of oil on any claimed land, the necessarily meager maximum 
created a competition for extraction: the amorphous geology of oil meant that one claim 
could drain the oil from all of the lands around it. Consequently, “it became a race to 
produce the oil from the tract before it was drained…He had to produce even when it 
resulted in overproduction that drove the price of oil so low that it was impossible to 
make a profit.”54 In essence, there was no motivation for an individual to employ wise 
use, and by withdrawing all unclaimed lands, Taft was attempting to hit the metaphorical 
pause button, thereby prohibiting any further expansion and waste. 
From the beginning, Salt Creek’s prospectors were convinced that the withdrawal 
was unconstitutional. Even Taft himself was not certain of his action’s legality, and so the 
following year Congress passed the Pickett Act, explicitly granting the president the 
power to withdraw further lands in the public’s interest.55 But the act still failed to settle 
the web of ambiguous land claims that had been filed prior to its passage—June 25, 
1910—and so a test case was filed. The United States Government brought suit against 
the Midwest Company, an at-the-time four-year-old corporation that had systematically 
purchased private land holdings in Salt Creek in the years prior to the withdrawal. As 
such, the U.S. claimed that these lands were in fact government property—that is, that the 
claims had been filed after Taft’s proclamation and were therefore void. In June 1913, the 
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United States District Court for Wyoming ruled against Taft, claiming that a president’s 
executive order could not overrule extant placer mining laws (only Congress had the 
authority to withdraw public lands). Midwest filed an appeal, and the case was passed on 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1915, under the purview of Chief Justice Edward Douglas 
White, the country’s highest court heard the case of United States v. Midwest Oil 
Company. In a five-to-three ruling, the justices upheld the executive’s action—thereby 
reversing the state court’s ruling—claiming that the president was acting within his 
power as an executive to uphold the public’s interests.56  
 In time, the Midwest case would grow to become a landmark in conservation 
history, preserving, as it did, the president’s power to unilaterally withdraw lands for 
conservation purposes; but in 1915 it had little direct impact on the Salt Creek field. In 
the years between the initial executive action (1909) and the ensuing Supreme Court case 
ruling (1915), William Fitzhugh had been able to claim that his visit to the Salt Creek 
field had clearly predated the executive withdrawal; as he surveyed and staked out land 
with the help of Daddy Stock, he argued, he was establishing his explicit intent to 
purchase the subsequent lands. Regardless of the legality of Taft’s withdrawal, then, his 
claim remained valid.57  
Consequently, as the case wended its way through the judicial bureaucracy, 
Fitzhugh continued to operate as planned, expanding his claims until, by 1910, just a year 
after he initially entered the field, he owned more than 18,000 acres, by far the greatest 
                                                
56 For general facts on the Midwest Decision, in particular its pivotal role in relation to conservation, see J. 
Leonard Bates, “The Midwest Decision, 1915: A Landmark in Conservation History,” The Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly 51, no. 1 (1960): 26–34. For local portrayals, see Natrona County Tribune, 
“Government Wants Oil Lands,” February 20, 1913, 1. 
57 William Fitzhugh, “The Depositions of William M. Fitzhugh and Bearing Upon the Salt Creek Titles,” 2, 
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total in the history of the field. It was a major coup for a man who had been struggling to 
break into the industry for years. Nevertheless, holdings did not necessarily equate with 
success: as was the case with so many before him, Fitzhugh’s empire existed largely on 
paper. Partly thanks to the dearth of equipment and available labor, and partly thanks to 
his own proclivity for the business end of things, Fitzhugh had completed very little 
drilling on his claims. Not surprisingly, his California backers began to grow wary of 
such habits, and in the summer of 1910 they decided that they had had enough. They 
reached out to the Casper banks and cut off all of Fitzhugh’s credit, making it clear that 
they were no longer responsible for any subsequent debts. Without his investors, 
Fitzhugh was forced to mortgage his home just to stay in business, bemoaning to locals 
that his relatives-in-law were “unscrupulous associates who wished to freeze me out after 
I had proven [the] value of [the] field.”58 Just when he had finally been able to obtain the 
untapped oil land that he had so long been searching for, he found he no longer had the 
funds necessary to drill them. 
 In spite of such losses, Fitzhugh’s land holdings would prove the catalyst that 
finally vaulted Salt Creek from the narratological realm to the empirical. In the second 
decade of the twentieth century, Salt Creek’s title quagmire was finally beginning to 
shake out, and in the wake of the Midwest decision, large-scale production was starting to 
take place. By its nature, oil drilling demands a great deal of infrastructure—pipelines, 
heavy equipment, refineries, shipping capacities—and so it does not tend to reward the 
small, individual operations that had emerged as a result of the Placer Mining Act. This 
                                                
58 The first pipeline was constructed in 1911, with another augmenting capacity the following year. 
“Memorandum of Facts Connected with Early History of Salt Creek Field, Wyoming,” 1924, Box 3, Folder 
2, Collection 00664, Midwest Oil Corporation Records, American Heritage Center, University of 
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was especially evident at Salt Creek. As one potential investor, marveling over the visible 
surface accumulations of petroleum, logically asked, “what on earth can you do with the 
stuff out here?”59 In essence, this was the latest iteration of a question that prospectors, 
surveyors, and local citizens had been asking for years. But during the second decade of 
the twentieth century, they finally received a viable answer. The Reed Investment Group, 
a Colorado Springs outfit (recall the connections between Colorado and Wyoming from 
the Johnson County War), initially entered Wyoming in search of a quick railroad fortune 
before turning to oil. As Oliver Shoup, the company’s manager, wrote to his fellow board 
members following an initial survey of Salt Creek: “the possibilities of this oil field in 
comparison with the capital required for development, are so great that one hesitates even 
to make a computation.” Not one to miss out on the economic application of such 
findings, Shoup continued, “there is hardly an oil field in the United States today that 
does not number from one to fifty millionaires, who have accumulated their fortunes 
from the production and sale of this commodity.”60 In response, Shoup and another Reed 
headman, Berne Hopkins, gathered all of the extant geological reports in an effort to learn 
about the landscape. In a move that revealed a great deal about the thermodynamic shift 
that was beginning to take place at Salt Creek, they then supplemented this information 
by hiring their own geologist, Cassius Fisher, fresh off of a coal survey in Colorado in the 
service of the Geological Survey. Fisher charted the field and confirmed what Shoup and 
the previous reports saw, adding to the seminal Porro report. Satisfied, the Reed Group 
moved into the acquisition phase.61 
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 Although experienced businessmen, the Reed Group had very little concrete 
experience when it came to oil extraction. Ironically, this would come to be a strength, 
for what they did have was an established history of building and overseeing large-scale 
infrastructure development. By the second decade of the twentieth century, in the wake of 
Porro’s geologic findings, the Big Dutch strike, and Fitzhugh’s comprehensive 
acquisitions, oil had become a well-known commodity in Casper. But as Fitzhugh’s 
experience demonstrates, it had still yet to be translated into capital gains. Much of this 
had to do with the lack of industrial infrastructure in the region. As the Natrona County 
Tribune bemoaned, “were it possible to find a ready market for the product, this field 
would now be producing 5,000 barrels of oil daily. Until satisfactory transportation 
arrangements are made, there will be little more than a thousand barrels turned out.”62 But 
unlike the previous entrepreneurs and speculators—Fitzhugh not excepted—the Reed 
Investment Group possessed a network of financial relations that reached well beyond the 
purlieu of rural Wyoming and into the deepest pockets of continental Europe. Toward the 
end of 1910, Reed personally traveled to France with the goal of raising funds for a 
splinter company that would specialize in oil. He obtained investments from the heights 
of the country’s royalty—Marquises, Counts, and Barons alike—and returned with an 
economic plan that was focused more upon infrastructural development than immediate 
success within any single well. Unlike many of Salt Creek’s erstwhile efforts, he was 
dedicated to the long-term viability of the field.  
His plan manifested itself in three separate but interconnected objectives that 
would come to drive the field’s development. First, the Reed Investment Company would 
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build a large-scale refinery in Casper. As mentioned previously, in 1894 William 
Shannon had indeed constructed Casper’s first refinery, but it was a small, 
technologically limited affair—its maximum daily output was less than one hundred 
barrels, a painfully small total for this period, a time when technological advances were 
remaking the industry by the year—and by the first decade of the twentieth century, it 
had become an eyesore in downtown Casper, a reminder of the field’s failure to live up to 
its early promise. Eventually the town’s residents signed a petition condemning it, and 
the old building was demolished to great fanfare.63 Second, Reed would construct a 
pipeline to connect the Salt Creek field directly to Casper, thereby obviating the 
longstanding problem of transportation between the field and the refineries, the issue that 
had proved so damaging to Shannon and his epigones. And third, they would expand 
their control of the field via purchases and the patient untangling of the labyrinth of 
competing placer claims that had retarded the field’s growth for so long. For in 1910, 
when Reed returned from France fresh with investments, the company owned just a small 
corner of the field, nowhere near enough to effect the broad change that Reed and his co-
investors dreamed of.64 
 At the advice of his French backers, the Reed Investment Company renamed itself 
the following year, taking on the appellation of The Midwest Oil Company, a title that 
would come to dominate the Salt Creek fields for much of the next half-century (they 
                                                
63 Alfred James Mokler, History of Natrona County, Wyoming, 1888-1922; True Portrayal of the 
Yesterdays of a New County and a Typical Frontier Town of the Middle West. Fortunes and Misfortunes, 
Tragedies and Comedies, Struggles and Triumphs of the Pioneers (Chicago, R.R. Donnelley & Sons 
Company, 1923), 250. 
64 Roberts, 21, 69–70. 
 191 
would file the case against the federal government over the withdrawal act).65 Under their 
watch, the Salt Creek fields leveraged the latest in scientific knowledge and technology to 
transform its oil into marketable products. By December, they had constructed the 
promised refinery in Casper: five tanks were specifically devoted to the ever-growing 
problem of storage—one 55,000 barrels, one 35,000 barrels, and three 5,000 barrels. 
More importantly, this plant was far more advanced than anything in the state, at the 
technological apex of oil refining for the age. Using a process called thermal cracking, it 
rapidly heated and agitated the sludge to separate out the crude oil’s various products, 
resulting, on average, in an output of 57.5 % fuel oil residue, 21% gasoline, 16% 
kerosene, and 2.5% gas oil.66 Furthermore, Midwest erected a thirty-five mile pipeline 
connecting it to the fields of Salt Creek, and with a daily capacity of 18,000 barrels, it 
solved the bulk of the transportation problems that had plagued the fields for the previous 
two decades.67 For years similar infrastructure had been promised but not delivered. Now 
with Midwest’s entry into Casper, they became a reality. As the local Casper Press 
triumphantly claimed, “today…the question of transportation, the greatest obstacle that 
has stood between the Salt Creek oil field and fame, has been solved.”68 In just a few 
years Casper had vaulted to the technological forefront of the erumpent industry, still 
isolated but now with the infrastructure of a serious economic player. 
 The result was not merely greater efficiency but increased marketability of the 
resultant products. In addition to infrastructure, this latter fact is what separated the 
Midwest Company from Salt Creek’s earlier developers: they were committed to finding 
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new markets for products that had for so many years weighed down petroleum producers 
across the country. To give but one example, in the early twentieth century, refining’s 
biggest byproduct was something called “fuel oil residue,” a viscous, sludge-like product, 
by far the heaviest remainder from the refining process, and one that was worthless. Most 
refineries ended up simply storing it, maintaining vague hopes that a future market would 
someday open up. But Midwest opted for a different approach: they took it upon 
themselves to find a buyer to transform this waste into profit. Two months before their 
Casper refinery went online, they secured such a contract with the Chicago & North 
Western Railway, who, like the navy, had agreed to shift the engines on their passenger 
trains from coal to oil. In doing so, they committed to a contract with Midwest for their 
supply of fuel oil residue. Once again, this is the sort of science-backed entrepreneurial 
acumen that Salt Creek’s earlier speculators had so clearly lacked: it effectively enabled 
Midwest to transform a longstanding liability into an asset, freeing the company up to 
aggressively market their more profitable petroleum products—gasoline and kerosene—
over the greater Rocky Mountain region. By the time the refinery finally went online, 
they had obtained agreements with both Standard and Continental Oil to purchase all of 
the kerosene and gasoline that they produced.69 
 Such economic contracts were major triumphs for Midwest, but they were still 
inhibited by the longstanding problem of acquisition—despite his lack of funds, Fitzhugh 
still owned the bulk of the field, and Midwest was forced to rely upon leases and 
agreements by which they would purchase crude oil from patent holders—and the title 
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confusion that had plagued the field for so long. From 1912 to 1913, via a series of court 
cases and private negotiations, Midwest was slowly able to purchase significant holdings 
from the major landholders in the field—Daddy Stock, William Fitzhugh and family, and 
Cy Iba’s descendants, gaining what they thought to be the most solid of the oil land’s 
historical claims. Even so, however, the legality of any individual claim was perpetually 
threatened—and would continue to be so for a decade longer—by the nexus of 
litigational problems that arose out of the placer mining law’s inherent ambiguity, the 
lack of federal oversight in Wyoming, and the in-progress court hearings concerning 
Taft’s 1909 land withdrawal and the subsequent Pickett Act (the aforementioned Midwest 
case). Consequently, like William Fitzhugh, Midwest often reverted to simple force to 
maintain the validity of their claims, pugnaciously preventing competing interests from 
working the land.70  
 Even in the midst of all of these problems, with the refinery and pipeline both 
completed and operating at full capacity, things were beginning to look up for Salt Creek. 
The initial hopes of the 1880s and 1890s finally seemed within reach, and it was at this 
point that the Midwest Company took a critical further step in determining the future of 
the field. In December of that year, in what would become known as “The Paris 
Agreement,” Midwest merged with another local competitor, the Franco Company. The 
contract created a new entity—the Midwest Refining Company—who would put in all of 
the extractive labor on land from the three major land owning companies—Midwest, 
Little Company, and Wyoming Oil Fields Company—and would lease the resultant 
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mineral products for a period of twenty years, thereby centralizing the process and 
effectively reducing the waste involved with competition.  
 The other major development of 1913 was that Standard Oil entered the field as a 
serious player, thereby adding even more corporate, infrastructural, and scientific 
firepower to the region. The journey had begun twenty years earlier, when Clarence 
Richardson, a peripatetic miner and speculator, was in the employ of Iver Johnson, who, 
like so many of Salt Creek’s advocates during this time, owned several patent claims and 
made annual trips out to the field in order to complete the requisite improvements. But as 
Richardson said, “the problem of securing money to develop the field was of course the 
one important thing, as it always is.” Johnson therefore sent Richardson to New York 
with the goal of arranging a meeting with none other than John D. Rockefeller himself. 
As Richardson later recalled, “I had a mistaken boyish idea that I could walk right into 
their offices and present the proposition to them off hand without any trouble.” Of course 
he was wrong, and it would be five years before he was able to finally gain an audience 
with the man himself. Although Rockefeller was not interested in investing in Salt Creek, 
his response to Richardson was telling: “we know there is oil in Wyoming…but it will be 
20 years before it comes into the market, and when it does, our companies will be 
there.”71 Almost exactly two decades later, Standard Oil did indeed become involved in 
Salt Creek. It would be a game changer. 
Their first major contribution was scientific, the construction of a state-of-the-art 
“cracking plant” designed to use steam and split apart what were generally waste oils into 
smaller molecules, thereby further refining the product and, in the process, obtaining 
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more gasoline to export. It was a revolutionary process, developed in-house by Standard 
Oil employee William Merriam Burton, a doctorally trained chemist out of Johns 
Hopkins, and his partner, Robert Humphreys. Like the Midwest waste fuel contract of a 
few years earlier, it took what had been useless byproduct (“waste oils”) and transformed 
them into marketable commodities; instead of extracting energy, it produced it. By good 
fortune, Casper was one of the first locations to obtain such a plant, beginning 
construction in the summer of 1913, just a few months after a patent was issued for the 
process, and opening the following winter.72 
 Nevertheless, challenges remained. Despite Standard Oil’s involvement and a 
series of associated infrastructural developments, Midwest still had to deal with its 
disputed land claims. The problem was not limited to Salt Creek—across much of the 
country the ambiguous delineation of the Placer Act and the corollary lack of government 
oversight led to a tangle of competing claims and a general feeling of uncertainty over 
validity of any given title. As the U.S.G.S.’s Max Bull complained in 1916, “uncertain oil 
claims…made it difficult if not impossible for the operators of such claims to market 
their oil. Purchasing companies were afraid to take it lest, if the claims should be declared 
invalid, they might be made codefendants in suits to recover its value. On the other hand, 
fear of being drained by wells on adjoining lands and of ruining wells already producing 
made the operators loath to suspend production.” It was a double bind that led to all sorts 
of consternation for the nation’s petroleum industry, and in an attempt to both settle these 
disputes and encourage production for a country on the precipice of World War I, the 
federal government enacted “The Relief Act of August 25, 1914,” a piece of legislation 
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that amended the aforementioned Withdrawal Act in order to encourage production. To 
do so, it permitted the Secretary of the Interior to lease oil-producing lands (in the case of 
Salt Creek, up to 3,200 acres per claimant) in exchange for 1/8 of the profit of that oil’s 
sale.73  
In Wyoming, such changes were for the most part welcomed. Midwest saw a 
minor dip in profits, but they benefited from a firming up of the titles that had kept Salt 
Creek’s development so volatile. As a result, Salt Creek settled into a period of relative 
stability, one dominated by the Midwest Company and a hodgepodge of smaller drilling 
and refining companies. This would continue until 1917, when two major developments 
shifted the field’s trajectory. The first was the United States’ entry into World War I. 
Following the naval switch to petroleum in the years leading up to the Great War, the 
scale of the conflict exacerbated demand. From 1913-1920, American oil consumption 
increased 104%.74 The resultant spikes in both supply and consumption drove the Allied 
fleets during the war and the domestic industry at home, leading British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon to remark that the Allied forces had “floated to victory on a 
wave of oil.”75 All of this led to increased interest in proven fields like Salt Creek.  
But the second development had a more local provenance, one that related back to 
the work of Porro and Fitzhugh: during this latter part of the decade, companies began to 
leverage the latest in science and technology in order to develop a deeper understanding 
of place. In August of 1917 the little-known E.T. Williams Company was drilling over a 
mile outside of Salt Creek’s known production limits. This was out of necessity—there 
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was not much land available around the now legendary peak of the anticline. 
Nevertheless, at just over two thousand feet—far deeper than anything that had 
previously been drilled—they struck oil. Other companies quickly joined them in probing 
these new depths. Within a few months, Midwest had luck at approximately the same 
stratum. In terms of the oil produced, both of these were major strikes: the Midwest well 
came in at 1,700 barrels per day, a considerable total for a period when most wells topped 
out at just a few hundred barrels per day. But the larger impact of these findings can be 
seen from a scientific perspective. Occurring, as it did, so far outside the known limits of 
the field, the E.T. Williams strike called for a new place-based narrative with which to 
understand the subterranean geology of the field. Instead of a single pool of oil at the 
apex of the Salt Creek anticline, the Williams strike revealed a “vertical distribution of 
stacked, segregated pools.”76 As a result, the Natrona County Tribune wrote, “the 
conclusion is that between 3,000 and 5,000 acres may be added to the productive area of 
the field as a result of the Williams and Midwest discoveries.”77 Such a statement proves 
to be the rare underestimate in the history of the American West; in actuality, the second 
sands encompassed a swath of land far greater than had been previously excavated: in 
total, it added approximately 22,000 acres to the field. Unlike the first sand (the level that 
had been previously drilled, at the anticline’s peak), the second sand was “essentially 
filled to the spill point,” consisting of a strata of sandstone that was completely filled with 
oil.78 As seen in the 1913 Paris Agreement and the geological surveys that had 
precipitated it, geologists and drilling companies previously thought that the field was 
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heavily bounded and that it would therefore be drained within twenty years; in the wake 
of the E.T. Williams strike, however, a new narrative emerged, one that “definitively 
established that the second sand is productive on practically all the land inside the 
escarpment,” confirming that Salt Creek was over four times larger than had previously 
been assumed.79  
 
Figure 12: Cross-Section of Salt Creek Showing Second Sands 
R.W. Mallory, “The Salt Creek Oil Field,” in Wyoming Geological Association Fourth Annual Field 
Conference in the Powder River Basin Guidebook (Laramie: 1949), 90. 
 
Abrupt as it may have seemed, such a thermodynamic shift fits firmly within a 
series of geological and narrative adjustments that had defined the field for the previous 
thirty years. Nearly a decade had passed since the first gusher at Big Dutch, and yet in 
that intervening period, although production had been higher than any of the previous 
decades’ totals, it never matched the initial hopes of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries, when Salt Creek had been lauded as the “Pennsylvania of the 
West.”80 But in hindsight, many of these delays—and the corresponding frustration—can 
be explained by the field’s geology and the diachronic changes in place-based 
knowledge. In the 1890s, Shannon and the Pennsylvania Company based their 
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exploration on a number of attractive but misleading surface clues. As a result, they 
drilled well north of Salt Creek’s anticline, and their oil was understandably limited in 
both quality and quantity. Dr. Cesare Porro brought a cutting-edge understanding of 
science to the region and used it to map Salt Creek’s subterranean geology. 
Consequently, when Big Dutch hit at the apex of the anticline in 1908, its benefits and 
limits could similarly be explained by this shift in thermodynamic knowledge. It was the 
first time that drilling had penetrated down to the first sands oil, but drilling had not 
progressed any deeper. And in 1917, the E.T. Williams Company became the first to 
infiltrate the second sands.81 Whereas prior to this discovery, the entire field of Salt Creek 
was producing approximately 10,000 barrels of oil per day, after it there would be single 
wells that produced that much.82 Between 1917 and 1924, production from the second 
sands grew to dwarf that of the first sands: 106.5 million barrels to 15.3 million barrels.83 
What we have, then, is a field that was steadily resolving into view over time, of its 
subterranean geology growing more and more defined as the decades passed, enabling an 
excavation of energy on a scale previously unknown in the region. 
                                                
81 Roberts, Salt Creek Wyoming, 120. 
82 Wegemann, 9; Sullins, 17. 
83 Edward L. Estabrook, Clarence M. Rader, “History of Production of Salt Creek Oil Field, Wyoming,” 
Mining and Metallurgy, September 1925, 14. 
 200 
 
Figure 13: 1920s Postcard of the Salt Creek Fields 
“Oil Camp Photos,” Wyoming Tales and Trails, http://www.wyomingtalesandtrails.com/oilcamp.html. 
 
As the 1920s dawned, then, Salt Creek was finally entering into a full-on boom, 
establishing itself as one of—if not the—premier oil producers in the country. In addition 
to the aforementioned discovery of the second sands—and the corollary narratological 
refinements—much of this improvement had to do with Standard Oil’s entry into the 
field, and the effect that they had on finally resolving the title maze that had plagued the 
field for so many years. From 1919 to 1921, Rockefeller’s company became more 
directly involved in the acquisition of Midwest, officially gaining a majority interest (and 
thereby gaining control of the Salt Creek field) in July of 1921. It is no coincidence that 
this coincided with the rise and eventual apogee of the Salt Creek field. As was evident 
from the past, the mere existence of oil in any given geological structure was never 
sufficient for a boom. Of the utmost important was an ability to locate, refine, and 
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transport both crude oil and its finished products—to find markets for them from the 
isolation and underdevelopment of northern Wyoming. Standard Oil inherited a robust 
refinery operation that they had contributed to since the opening of their cracking plant in 
1914, but the biggest change that occurred under the Standard regime was an increase in 
exports. In 1921, the year they took over Midwest, Standard Oil signed a deal by which 
they would export gasoline from the Casper refineries, shipping it via the Burlington 
Railway down to Baton Rouge, whereby it would then be loaded onto ocean tankers 
bound for Europe. For every night for the next two years, trains would depart the 
northern plains, bound for the Gulf of Mexico and the shores of Europe.84 Instead of 
being relegated to the role of a minor regional producer, Salt Creek was now powering 
the world. 
 Also contributing to this growth was the fact that the title controversy was finally 
solved with the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. This law expanded the 
framework of 1914’s Temporary Relief Act, permanently dismantling the old placer 
mining system—which had grouped oil, gas, and coal with the hard-rock mining of gold, 
silver, copper, and lead—and creating a new category of leasing for energy sources in its 
place. Under the original 1872 law, there had been no royalty or rents, and the states had 
received none of the extracted income. As a result, individuals and companies were able 
to extract mineral wealth with minimal interference from the state, a framework that not 
only led to the overproduction and profligate wastefulness that eventually spawned 
Teapot Dome—the subject of this chapter’s next section—but that encouraged 
individuals to file claims on any and all land that held even the faintest hope of oil. In 
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contrast, by building upon the anti-monopoly sentiments of the period, the 1920 Mineral 
Leasing Act stated that companies could only own up to 3,200 acres, upon which they 
would pay a small up-front fee to lease the land. As drilling commenced they would pay 
a royalty consisting of 1/8 of their revenue on the sale of any extracted minerals, half of 
which royalties would go back to the state government. Companies would no longer be 
able to patent and own the land that they worked on.85 
 The result was the boom that Casperites had been predicting and waiting upon for 
nearly three decades. In 1922, production reached 19,000,000 barrels, a high for the field, 
but a number that was eclipsed the following year—Salt Creek’s peak—when 35,301,608 
barrels were produced. In a single day, the field yielded an astonishing 132,000 barrels. 
In total, this 20,000-acre ellipse grew to account for approximately five percent of the 
United States’ production, a total rarely approached either before or since.86 Such a 
shift—from geological dud to the premier oil producer in the United States—can be 
explained by the application of the latest in geological knowledge to further define and 
understand Salt Creek’s mysterious subterranean topography. Unfortunately, just as 
Casperites were devoting such minute attention to the specifics of place, an increase in 
the nation’s oil consumption was catalyzing a corresponding shift in the other direction, 
ripping energy sources from the specifics of place. In an unexpected twist, such changes 
would begin next door, in a little-known Powder River oil field whose name would soon 
grace the front pages of newspapers across the globe. 
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Teapot Dome 
 Contiguous with, but southwest of the main Salt Creek field, there exists a 
geological formation that, thanks to a unique and highly visible sandstone outcropping, is 
popularly known under the sobriquet “Teapot Dome.” Like the Salt Creek field of the 
late-nineteenth century, this field remained deserted through the early-twentieth century, 
a sandstone plain that had escaped the sporadic drilling that had defined Salt Creek. In 
1911, Carroll Wegemann provided the first outline of Teapot Dome’s geology within the 
larger Salt Creek structure. “The Salt Creek anticline,” he wrote, “considered as a whole, 
is an arch of strata about 18 miles long by 6 or 8 miles wide, trending in general 
northwest-southeast.” Within this anticline, however, there were “two distinct domes.” 
The first was “the northern or principal dome,” upon which the Salt Creek oil discoveries 
had been made. But there was also “the southern or smaller dome,” to which Wegemann 
applied the popular cognomen “Teapot Dome.” Seeing as no actual prospecting had been 
completed on this latter field, Wegemann’s descriptions were decidedly cursory. In his 
examination, “no surface indications of oil were found,” but he acknowledged that there 
had been an oil seep reported by a former employee of the Land Office, Thomas H. 
Harrison, who, writing to Wegemann, described a spot where “several springs of water 
came from the banks here, all alkaline, and the surface of the water and the ground 
showed oil. These springs came from the Parkman [sands], and I took it that the oil was 
brought from the Pierre shale below, through one of the small faults which cross the 
anticline.” In Wegemann’s interpretation, this purported discovery was geologically 
significant, for it pointed to “the possible existence of oil in the southern extension of the 
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anticline.” 87 Four years later, Woodrow Wilson would use such geological insight to 
withdraw the field from the public domain, designating it as U.S. Naval Reserve No. 3. 
Although he could not have known it at the time, in doing so he unwittingly took the first 
step in catalyzing one of the greatest political scandals the country has ever seen.  
 The Teapot Dome Affair has long been a flashpoint of American history. Burl 
Noggle, author of one of the most respected accounts of the scandal, called it “garish, 
[and] at times weird,” in effect a “tragicomedy of American politics without beginning or 
end.”88 Due to its exceptional nature, almost all of the scholarly accounts take a decidedly 
political tack in their examinations, threading the scandal into histories of Progressive Era 
politics, business interests, and the political lead-up to the Great Depression.89 Rarely, 
however, has the scandal been situated within either a deeper, place-specific history, or a 
larger environmental context. This is peculiar, for at root Teapot Dome was an oil 
reserve, and at least initially the case was deeply concerned with the extraction and use of 
natural resources, traditional fodder for environmental histories, particularly given its 
early-twentieth century, Roosevelt-and-Pinchot roots. Further, when viewed from an 
environmental and narrative-centered context, the scandal illuminates critical trends and 
developments in the way that place and environmental-resources have been viewed in 
American history. For in addition to being one of the most dramatic and shocking 
political scandals in American history, the Teapot Dome Scandal represented a major 
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turning point in American energy use and resource extraction: while the conversation and 
controversy initially surrounded questions centered upon a scientific understanding of 
place, as time went on and the scandal gained in notoriety, the issues became increasingly 
abstract; the concrete place in question—an isolated oil field in Wyoming—was pushed 
to the periphery as political questions of responsibility, ownership, and blame took over. 
In doing so, however, the Teapot Scandal can be seen as representing a larger trend in 
American energy history. As oil became increasingly common and central to the 
country’s progress, the association between thermodynamic resources and their 
provenance—place—similarly shifted, becoming both less important and refigured into a 
more modern imaginary, one that was far less explicitly tied to the land from which it 
was produced.90  
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Figure 14: Location of Teapot Dome in Relation to Salt Creek 
“Teapot Oil Dome Fight,” The New York Times, May 7, 1922 
 
 Although the scandal broke in 1922, its origin reaches back to 1910 and the 
aforementioned concerns over conservation and energy shortages, particularly in times of 
war. It was a period during which the federal government feared losing all of its mineral 
reserves to private interests. At its core, such a phobia was most concerned with military 
matters. As Secretary of the Navy Joshua Daniels wrote to Woodrow Wilson in 1914, 
“henceforth, all the fighting ships which are added to the fleet will use oil, and the 
transition from coal to oil will mark an era in our naval development almost comparable 
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with the change from black powder to smokeless powder for our guns.”91 Although the 
withdrawal was originally limited to two California fields (Naval Petroleum Reserves 
Nos. 1 and 2), in 1915 Wyoming’s Teapot Dome was added to the list, creating three 
Naval Petroleum Reserves and resulting in Teapot Dome’s official designation, Naval 
Petroleum Reserve No. 3. As we shall see in the next chapter, the U.S. Navy—like so 
much of the country—was attempting to modernize during this period, to shift from coal, 
which was viewed as dirty, difficult to ship, and eminently of the nineteenth-century, to 
oil, which was more clean, portable, modern, and, as developments in Texas and other 
locales showed, was abundant in large, untapped quantities, often in the country’s 
isolated and under-populated regions.92  
The purpose of such reserves lay in a strategic, utilitarian sense of preservation, 
the idea that the federal government needed to keep resources in the ground for times of 
martial emergency. In practical terms, what it amounted to was a natural form of storage. 
But such initially virtuous interests went curiously and unsuspectingly awry on April 7, 
1922. On that day Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall leased the Teapot Dome Reserve 
to Harry Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil Company. There was no public announcement or 
ceremony, but rumors of the deal quickly spread throughout Wyoming and much of the 
West. Days later, Wyoming Senator John B. Kendrick petitioned the Department of the 
Interior for explicit information concerning the sale. The department denied that any 
transfer had been made, a refutation that became problematic when, just four days later, 
the Wall Street Journal publicly confirmed the sale, opining that the lease marked “one of 
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the greatest petroleum undertakings of the age and signalizes [sic] a notable departure on 
the part of the government in seeking partnership with private capital for the working of 
government-owned natural resources.” According to the article, a planned pipeline was 
already in the works, one that would exist at a greater scale than anything previously 
imagined—even within the immoderate booster literature that had defined Salt Creek’s 
rise—and that would transfer the raw oil 1,500 miles down to Houston’s refineries. From 
there, the Sinclair Navigation Company would deliver the finished product to the navy’s 
international fueling stations. 
Initially, there was no inkling of any deeper scandal. The story’s surprise arose 
mainly out of the clandestine nature of the lease. Not surprisingly, however, Congress 
wanted more information on the deal, particularly those senators and representatives 
hailing from the West, who felt that the Departments of the Interior and Navy had gone 
behind their backs for the negotiations. The day after the Wall Street Journal article 
appeared, Senator Kendrick introduced a resolution calling for an investigation into the 
Department of the Interior and Navy’s actions.93 He demanded that the Secretaries of the 
Interior and Navy “inform the Senate, if not incompatible with the public interests, 
whether such negotiations are pending, and if so…whether opportunity will be given the 
public for competitive bidding for the operation of these lands, or whether it is proposed 
to award a lease or other operating contract or agreement for the entire area to one 
person, corporation, or association.” In addressing the conflict, Kendrick outlined his two 
biggest concerns regarding the lease. First, “whether there is any present need for the 
development and operation of…Teapot Dome.” Second, “if there is such need, whether 
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the interests of the Government would be best preserved by a private or a public sale.” In 
essence, Kendrick’s complaint was that, if drilling could indeed be demonstrated to be 
the best course of action, the people of, first, the state of Wyoming, and second, the 
United States, had a right to be informed “before any arrangement by contract or 
otherwise is made for the development of this field.” The Senate agreed without debate: 
the initial stages of the investigation were to commence.94 
In doing so, Kendrick effectively set the stage for what would become one of the 
greatest political scandals in American history. As he stated in his initial remarks, the 
main question driving the case’s early development was decidedly simple: was there any 
reason to open Teapot Dome for drilling? According to the Department of the Interior, 
this was a matter of simple conservation: in the years leading up to the scandal, the 
federal government had begun to drill on the California Naval Reserves after they 
realized that vast mineral deposits were being lost to contiguous fields owned by private 
companies and individuals.95 According to government officials, by 1921, “twenty-two 
million barrels of oil had been lost through failures of the Wilson administration to drill 
protective offset wells there. This loss was irrecoverable, and the best that the Interior 
could do would be to inaugurate a drilling campaign to save the oil that still remained in 
the ground.”96 As such, if the Teapot Dome field could be demonstrated to be similarly 
situated, it made sense from even the most rigidly conservationist standpoint to drill. But 
as Senator Kendrick outlined in his initial resolution to the Senate, “this is not the 
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condition that prevails in the Teapot Dome. There…no wells have been drilled in the 
vicinity through which by any possibility this reserve could be drained. It would appear, 
therefore, that there is no danger of the oil in the Teapot Dome being removed until the 
Government acts.”97 The case would depend upon how the field was understood. 
Like the state-sponsored geological surveys that had played such a major role in 
Salt Creek’s rise, the question here was both scientific and place-based: what was the 
subterranean geology of the Teapot Dome field? More specifically, was it a geological 
component of the Salt Creek field? Were the massive quantities of oil that were being 
extracted at Salt Creek (which was at its peak during the Teapot Dome Scandal) actually 
the property of the United States Navy? As noted earlier, Salt Creek Dome was 
geographically contiguous with Teapot Dome, located immediately to its northwest (see 
Figure 14). But the subterranean geology—the physical composition of these oil sinks—
remained, as it did during the numerous surveys and bulletins that had been produced 
over the previous decades, products of conjecture. Proponents of the lease—most notably 
Secretaries of the Navy and Interior Denby and Fall—could and did claim that the 
geological structure of the field and its proximity to the thriving Salt Creek Dome made it 
so that Teapot Dome, like the California fields, was losing thousands of barrels of oil by 
the day.98 Because Salt Creek was then producing at its peak, such a claim had a ring of 
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credibility to it. As Secretary Fall proclaimed, “the undeniable facts, in so far as human 
judgment can ascertain them from expert evidence and otherwise, are that at least a 
certain portion of the north part of the Teapot Dome is now, or will be, disastrously 
affected through drainage by drilling upon the lands outside the reserves which drilling is 
now being carried on from day to day."99 But Fall was a politician, and much as the states 
had brought in professional geologists to conduct surveys and to communicate their 
findings to the people, he flew in his own scientific experts. In May, less than a month 
after the scandal broke, he was able to obtain testimony from Wyoming State Geologist 
G.B. Morgan, who stated definitively that “Teapot Dome and Salt Creek are separate 
structures with practically no possibility of draining Teapot through Salt Creek wells.”100 
Not satisfied, Fall contracted a pair of eastern scientists, going to New York and flying 
Frederick G. Clapp and James O. Lewis to examine Teapot Dome themselves. In their 
report, the two men proclaimed that the reserve was “being steadily drained and now 
contains less than 70 per cent of its original estimated storage of 150,000,000 barrels.”101 
Much as with the case with the California fields, Clapp and Lewis alleged that immediate 
action was needed to prevent the theft of government resources. In what would appear to 
be a contradiction in terms, the government needed to begin drilling in order to protect 
the country’s natural resources. 
 On the other side of the debate, opponents such as Kendrick, Wisconsin Senator 
Robert LaFollette, and a handful of competing geologists claimed that the Salt Creek 
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formation was unique in that it was incapable of being drained by surrounding fields. 
They argued that it possessed a 2,500-foot deep water line that effectively divided it from 
the adjacent Salt Creek field. As such, it “was one of the few oil fields in the world which 
cannot be drained by wells in contiguous territory.” To illustrate this point, the New York 
Times included a large map of the Salt Creek and Teapot Dome fields, illustrating their 
layout and the aforementioned water line that delineated the two (see Figure 14). Once 
again, this was a conjectural picture, a narrative representation via image that was 
presented as if a mimetic reality. But they also printed rebuttals to Fall’s geologists, 
particularly the aforementioned Clapp and Lewis. One week after their report was 
published, the Times printed a letter to the editor disputing these findings. Chester W. 
Washburne, an established member of the United States Geological Survey but someone 
who was, at the time, writing as a private citizen, opined that the Times article “commits 
a serious error” by presenting Clapp and Lewis’s finding as if they meant to say thirty 
percent of the reserve had been drained by surrounding wells. Washburne then proceeded 
to detail that this loss would actually result from the decreases in pressure that naturally 
accompany mining—that is, it would occur whether there was any drilling on the 
surrounding land or not. He went on to give a rather convoluted and, for the average 
citizen, detailed account of how the “hydrostatic pressure of the water in the oil sand” 
could, and most likely would, be restored over time. Crucially, however, he then pivoted 
to a more humanistic attack: by leasing and subsequently drilling the reserve, the 
government “destroyed the navy’s insurance of an oil supply for the expected time of 
serious need.” In doing so, they “had no more right to do this at a time when we have 
enough oil for pleasure cars and everything than a father would have to sell his life 
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insurance.”102 In concert with Washburne, other proponents claimed that, “by leasing the 
field the Government did not lose but made a bargain that will mean the saving of 
millions of dollars to the nation.”103 In effect, they argued that Fall, Denby, and their 
associates had made the initial lease without proper attention to the specifics of place: 
instead of looking at the particulars of Teapot Dome, they had imposed their 
understanding of California oil fields onto the very different geology of Wyoming.104 It 
was the perils of the Cattle-Bison System of ranching all over again. 
 By waging such attacks, La Follette, Kendrick, and other opponents produced a 
potent counter-narrative, portraying the reserves as remaining full and safe, effectively 
enduring in the same condition as when they had been originally protected in 1910. But 
what is most notable about this first stage of the Teapot Dome Scandal—roughly 
contiguous with the calendar years of 1922 and 1923—is that both sides employed a 
similar tactic: focusing on the concrete location of the oil field, they debated scientific 
details concerning Teapot Dome’s geology, the proximity of surrounding oil claims and 
drills, and the possibility that said claims could leach oil out of the Naval Petroleum 
Reserve. Their stories contained maps and references to particular locations in the state of 
Wyoming in order to situate a largely eastern audience. Further, much like the states that 
had financed the initial mineralogical surveys, they tended to lean upon testimony from 
professional geologists for authority and clarity. It was a conflict over the scientific 
understanding of place. 
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This all changed in 1924, when “testimony began to creep in that had no bearing 
on the scientific phase of the subject. The relations between Mr. Fall, former Secretary of 
the Interior, and Mr. Sinclair, the lessee of Teapot Dome, came to have paramount 
importance."105 In late-November and early-December of 1923, rumors had started to 
percolate concerning Secretary Fall and his actions. For years Fall had owned a farm—
the Three River Ranch—in his home state of New Mexico. By all accounts it was a run-
down, decidedly humble property, with one neighbor going so far as to describe the ranch 
during the late-teens and early-1920s as “completely broke.”106 But in late-1923, officials 
in Washington began to hear about the ranch’s sudden éclat, one that coincided rather 
fortuitously with the Teapot Dome Lease. In January of the following year, it came out 
that Fall had received a loan of $100,000 to improve his ranch in exchange for signing 
the lease.107 At first, it was not clear if the loan was from Sinclair or from another 
associate, but before this could be properly sorted out, Theodore Roosevelt’s son of all 
people, Archie, an (at this point, former-) employee of Sinclair, testified upon his own 
volition before the Senate, stating that he had resigned his job over suspicions of 
Sinclair’s wrongdoing in relation to the lease. Under oath, he claimed that Sinclair’s 
private secretary had informed him, Roosevelt, that, he had made a payment at Sinclair’s 
request to the foreman of Fall’s Three River Ranch for $68,000. In response to this claim, 
the foreman was subsequently called before the Senate, asserting that the payment was 
for far less than what Roosevelt claimed, only “six or eight cows.” Nevertheless, the 
rumor and Archie Roosevelt’s appearance had forever altered the case’s trajectory, 
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effectively turning “what had been a somewhat tiresome investigation into a national 
sensation.”108 Carnage soon followed. On February 18, Secretary Denby unexpectedly 
resigned. The next month the Senate passed the Wheeler Resolution, calling for a full 
investigation of Attorney General Dougherty and his failure to prosecute Fall, Sinclair, 
Doheny, and the other major players of the affair. On March 28, Dougherty resigned, an 
event that catalyzed a tangle of subsequent court proceedings which would drag on for 
years, ultimately resulting in a void of the lease and Fall’s conviction in October 1929, 
the first United States cabinet member to serve a prison sentence for crimes committed 
while in office.  
It was an end that nobody had foreseen just a few years earlier; a scandal that had 
been so explicitly concerned with place and geology had somehow devolved into one 
concerning greed, backroom dealings, and the flagrant abuse of government power. As 
The New Republic’s Bruce Blevin complained in the investigation’s latter stages, “the 
fact that hardly anyone anywhere cared about the case as long as it concerned only the 
violation of our policy of conservation, and the looting of 30,000 acres of public lands 
containing a quarter of a billion barrels of our rapidly diminishing reserve of oil. Only 
when the matter developed a personal scandal, the bribery of a high government official, 
did the public suddenly wake up and lick its lips.” And while in many ways such a shift 
seems to be a mere consequence of the case’s larger development—of the revelation of 
certain bribery-related information—it is emblematic of larger shifts that were affecting 
the United States at the time. Throughout the first part of the twentieth century and 
accelerating during the 1920s, we see the rise of what has variously been dubbed 
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“sensational” or “jazz journalism,” prose that more readily latched onto scandal and 
excitement than the more conservative pillars of objective journalism.109 Newspapermen 
such as Glenn Frank, editor of The Century, bemoaned this shift, claiming that, “the 
editor [today] is frequently more concerned with capturing the reader’s ‘interest’ than 
with discovering and discussing the reader’s ‘interests.’”110 The effects can be seen in the 
Teapot Dome case itself, not merely in the shift from empirical geology to what 
amounted in many cases to simple gossip, but also in the specific rhetoric that journalists 
employed. In one of the most conspicuous examples, the Washington Times portrayed the 
case as having “all the atmosphere of a murder trial, combined with the bated breath 
excitement of the opening of King Tut’s tomb.”111 This is also a narratological move, one 
that shifted the focus away from place and toward the melodramatic and the tawdry. For 
the thing about murder trials and politic scandals is that their appeal stems largely from 
their predictability, the universal formula upon which they rely.112 Under such a structure, 
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the specifics of place and situation naturally recede into the background, overtaken by the 
exigencies of scandal, the guilty what-will-happen-next sorts of questions that readers 
and viewers grow to love. In short, place was abstracted, erased in favor of a medley of 
non-thermodynamic concerns. 
What resulted was not merely one of the most sensational political scandals in 
American history, but also a critical turning point in American energy history: a moment 
in which the material basis of our energy use was permanently pushed out of sight, 
transformed into an abstract, placeless space. As the Wyoming Reporter summed it up in 
early 1924, “much has been said in the past year, about the Teapot lease, but seemingly 
little is known by the world at large of the dome itself, which is situated in Natrona 
county.”113 As the navy shifted from coal to oil—and as Americans more broadly settled 
into a period of readily available electricity, heating, and gasoline-powered vehicles—the 
material basis of such energy use slowly receded out of mind, obviated by such source’s 
increasing availability.114 Oil’s status as something subterranean and therefore only partly 
known opened it up to political maneuvering: it was able to support the weight of 
competing claims, many of which were vastly different but no less true. Far from being 
random or desultory, then, this shift in the Teapot Dome case—from a focus on place, 
science, and conservation to a focus on political corruption that is divorced from the 
land—represented a larger trend in American energy history. Although energy extraction 
was on the rise thanks to detailed geological understandings of place, energy production 
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worked to simultaneously erase these efforts, paving the way for an experience of use 
that would soon forget the western provenance of much of the country’s energy.   
 
Conclusion 
 It is ironic that the Teapot Dome Scandal coincided with the Salt Creek field’s 
peak years of production. In 1923 and 1924, two new refineries were built in Casper just 
to handle the increased production, but even they couldn’t keep up with the supply of oil 
that was flowing in from the fields. This forced all of the producing companies to band 
together and build a series of 80,000-barrel storage containers on the northern end of 
town to handle the excess. These tanks would eventually store more than fourteen million 
barrels, much of it remaining there, untouched, until the late-1930s, when the Great 
Depression and the corollary decline in oil production enabled the companies to process 
it.115 By that point, however, the Teapot Dome lease had been cancelled and Senator Fall 
had already served his prison sentence for bribery, been released, and was feeling the 
effects of a long-term illness that would eventually kill him. 
The two stories at first seem—and are often portrayed as—disparate affairs, 
conceptually and geographically isolated. But when viewed together, it becomes evident 
that not only are they intimately connected, but that they share a single story, one that 
reveals a great deal about the development of early-twentieth-century energy extraction 
and use. The stuttered rise of Salt Creek shares much in common with its close 
chronological and geographic neighbor, the Johnson County War. Like the Cattle-Bison 
ranchers, the earliest oil prospectors revealed a stunning ignorance when it came to the 
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local landscape. Although the work of Shannon and others drew much initial praise, it 
never amounted to anything concrete. In the ensuing years, a string of university-
educated geologists worked to understand the local thermodynamic landscape, slowly but 
surely unearthing the baroque subterranean topography of the Powder River Basin. In 
combination with a number of technological breakthroughs, they helped propel Salt 
Creek to the apex of the American oil industry in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century. But where the Johnson County story ends, the Salt Creek narrative continues. To 
the southeast of the field, the abutting Teapot Dome ignited a nationwide political 
scandal. As fossil fuel use entered into mainstream American use, it began to be stripped 
of its local provenance. Instead of an augmented scientific understanding of place, 
narrative began to take on increased weight, ultimately emerging as the defining 
characteristic of the West’s twentieth- and twenty-first-century energy industry. All of 
this begins by reconceptualizing one of the great scandals in American political history as 
one of the defining events in the country’s environmental past. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Powder River Coal: 
The Cultural Construction of the Energy Capital of the World 
 
 Just over a year into his new role as president and C.E.O. of Peabody Coal 
Company, thirty-two-year-old Jack Peabody was still trying to make his mark on the 
family business. He had inherited the company from his father, Frances Stuyvesant, who 
had transformed it from a single wagon selling home-heating-coal door-to-door in 1880s 
Chicago into one of the country’s preeminent energy providers.1 But by 1920 the elder 
Peabody was gone, retired to an estate in upscale Oakbrook, and the coal market was 
similarly waning. In his brief time as president, Jack had done his best to staunch the 
decline and to expand the company’s holdings, reaching beyond Peabody’s initial 
Midwestern base into Kentucky, Virginia, and, most recently, northern Wyoming, where 
he had purchased a series of mines along the Tongue River, north of the burgeoning 
agricultural center of Sheridan. These properties were perhaps the most intriguing and 
risky in the whole of the Peabody portfolio; unlike the eastern and Midwestern mines, 
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which harvested high-BTU bituminous coal to be sold to power companies and railroads, 
the Wyoming mines produced soft sub-bituminous coal for which there was not yet a 
ready market. Not only did this latter coal provide little heat when compared to 
bituminous (roughly one-third to one-fourth lower), but it was also located far from the 
traditional markets and population centers that claimed so much of Peabody’s business. 
True, the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad ran along the Tongue and through 
the properties, and that company had recently gone through the trouble of developing a 
custom-made grate “with modified fire boxes and stacks” for burning the region’s boggy 
product, but in the grand scheme of things that market was small, limited to the northern 
plains and a few remote slices of the Pacific Northwest.1 Unfortunately, so too were the 
region’s domestic needs, emerging as they did from a small population of wood-poor 
northern Wyomingites who burned whatever they could simply to heat their homes and 
survive the brutal northern plains winters. What Jack Peabody needed was a new 
approach to the mines. What he needed was a new story. 
 In January 1922 he made an odd but in many ways prophetic proposal: he 
announced that the company would hold a christening contest for the newly acquired 
Sheridan properties. Employees at Peabody’s Chicago headquarters were asked to create 
a new epithet for their Wyoming product, one that would transform the as-of-yet tertiary 
coal into something coveted and unique. The new cognomen would be copyrighted and 
bandied about in regional newspapers and weekly glossies, thrust into the everyday 
lexicon as the company expanded its Wyoming holdings and branded the name to a 
number of associated camps. Furthermore, the employee who generated this name was to 
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be awarded $50—roughly $650 in 2018, by no means a paltry sum. Unfortunately for us, 
the names of the abortive attempts have been lost to history. What we do know is the title 
of the winner’s submission. By the second week of January, one of the company’s 
stenographers had formulated the peculiar neologism “Kleenburn” as his entry, and Jack 
Peabody had loved it: the name called attention to what he saw as the defining 
characteristic of Powder River coal, what differentiated it from the more established 
eastern products. In contrast to the tussive smog that defined the everyday experience of 
modern coal, Powder River coal was a comparatively aseptic fuel, defined by its limited 
output of ash and smoke. And while we can only speculate as to why the winner swapped 
in that garish K for the more traditional C, it for some reason appealed to Peabody, giving 
the name a unique promotional flair, a bit of Joycean élan to usher in the opening of a 
new thermodynamic frontier on the northern plains.2 
 Over the next few years Peabody Coal embraced this novel approach, advertising 
Kleenburn as different—indeed better—than competing coals. Promotional slogans such 
as “Kleenburn Coal is all that the name implies,” “High in Heat—Low in Ash,” and “The 
Really Clean Coal,” smothered regional newspapers.3 Over time the company grew so 
besotted with the new name that they rechristened one of their mining towns—the 
erstwhile Carneyville—renaming it Kleenburn, a designation that remains etched in the 
Wyoming landscape to this day.4 For its time, this was all revolutionary, an attempt at 
what we would now term rebranding, something akin to Apple’s turn-of-the-century 
                                                
2 “’Kleenburn’ is New Trade Name,” Sheridan Post, January 13, 1921, 3. 
3 Advertisements in Sheridan Post, May 15, 1921; Sheridan Enterprise, December 22, 1922; Wyoming 
Labor Journal, September 2, 1927. 
4 Although no longer a town, the name Kleenburn is still a part of the Wyoming landscape as the Kleenburn 
Recreation Area, just north of Sheridan. 
 223 
“Think Different” campaign.5 Unfortunately for Peabody, however, it did not produce 
anything like the same results. Despite all of the promotional clamor, sales slumped in the 
ensuing years, and by 1924 the Kleenburn mine was permanently shut down. A decade 
later, the whole town was unceremoniously abandoned, the latest addition to the West’s 
ever-swelling roster of ghost towns.6 For the next few decades Peabody continued to 
market Kleenburn Coal from the Tongue River’s abutting mines, though like so many 
other operations of the era, these too eventually closed, with the last Sheridan mine 
shuttering its doors in 1953.7 
                                                
5 Ronald E. Shields, “The Force of Callas’ Kiss: The 1997 Apple Advertising Campaign, ‘Think 
Different,’” Text and Performance Quarterly 21, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 202–19. 
6 “Carneyville an Important Part of Area History,” Sheridan Press, March 11, 2014 
7 This is the Monarch Mine, formerly owned by Wyoming Coal Co. 
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Figure 15: 1920s Kleenburn Advertisement 
Sheridan Enterprise, December 22, 1922 
 
 It was a dismal end to an initially promising notion, one that had held so much 
hope for transforming the country’s coal industry. And yet if we fast forward to today, 
nearly a century after Peabody’s initial attempt to rebrand Wyoming coal as a paragon of 
clean fuel, we find that Peabody Energy is now the largest privately owned coal provider 
in the world. Its operational jewel, the North Antelope Rochelle Mine (N.A.R.M.), 
located in the heart of the Powder River Basin (just south of Gillette), is the largest coal 
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mine the world has ever seen. If Peabody were to hypothetically secede and form its own 
corporate country, it would rank as the ninth biggest provider in the world.8 Seventy years 
after Jack Peabody’s death, his company has managed to achieve everything that he could 
have hoped for and more, marketing Powder River coal as a cheap, clean, and affordable 
energy source for the twenty-first century. 
 The story of how this happened is the subject of this chapter. It is a tale of energy 
conflicts and competing narratives in the country’s struggle to find a cheap and reliable 
source of domestic fuel, of the unlikely origins of the world’s largest energy cache. For 
ultimately what is most intriguing about the late-twentieth-century rise of Powder River 
coal is its counterintuitive history, both deeper and far more complex than heretofore 
realized. Like the Teapot Dome Scandal, it begins with a battle over narrative: the 
aforementioned failure to rebrand Powder River coal in the 1920s. From there, however, 
it shifts to technology; unlike the oil strikes that preceded it, coal did not need to be 
discovered in the region—it quite literally covered the landscape. As such, the struggle 
was not for an increased understanding of place but for a method in which that 
overabundant coal could be efficiently excavated and sold. Beginning in the 1970s, these 
two approaches—narrative and technology—combined to give rise to the largest coal 
mines on the planet. It is a remarkable story of the transformation of a thermodynamic 
landscape. But despite what many modern commentators would have us believe, the 
monolith that is the Powder River coal industry is not a new or even a recent entity; 
rather, it is the product of the region’s past failures at harnessing and exporting the 
                                                
8 Peabody Energy, Peabody Energy: Celebrating Our First 125 Years, Shaping Our next 125 Years, (St. 
Louis: Peabody Energy, 2008), 119. 
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region’s energy bounty.9 In order to understand this most recent thermodynamic surge 
and its future, then, we need to unearth the deep history of Powder River coal.  
 
The Birth of Coal and the Death of Kleenburn 
 Although popularly known as an unvarying landscape of sere grass and the odd 
meandering stream, the northern plains’ ostensible uniformity shrouds a much deeper and 
far more complex history. More than half a billion years ago, what is now the Powder 
River Basin possessed a tropical climate, a damp, sultry environs akin to modern day 
Sumatra or Borneo. In large part, this was due to its location, just north of the equator, 
sandwiched between a vast western ocean (known variously as the Western Interior 
Seaway or the Niobrarian Sea) and an eastern landmass of similarly sticky climes.10 
Across hundreds of millions of years the ocean periodically flooded this terrain, invading 
and retreating until, roughly a quarter of a billion years ago, in the midst of the Permian 
period, when the mountain chain that would become our modern Rockies began to rise 
and slowly sequester the ocean, transforming the future Powder River Basin into a 
swampy miasma of brackish backwater and the prodigious flora of the Permian and 
Triassic epochs. Here the primal P.R.B. settled into a relatively staid existence, passing 
hundreds of thousands of years as a quiet tidal marsh, until sixty million years ago, when 
the Big Horns began to rise and the P.R.B. to conversely sink, ultimately settling as a 
dished continental floodplain fed by the nascent rivers of the Yellowstone and its 
tributaries. Over millions of years, huge hypertonic ferns and leggy cypresses rose and 
                                                
9 See the conclusion to this chapter for one example of such polemics, the work of a handful of modern 
environmentalists. 
10 Joshua S. Slattery, “Late Cretaceous faunal dynamics in the Western Interior Seaway: The record from 
the Red Bird Section, eastern Wyoming,” Master’s Thesis, University of South Florida, 2011, 3-10.  
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fell, forming a dense bed of ever-accruing peat across the land. Through a combination of 
heat, compression, and a geological steep of millions of years, this peat was slowly 
transformed into coal, first lignite, the low-grade, sod-looking mineral we still see used in 
Germany, then sub-bituminous, the low-heat, low-sulfur product for which the Powder 
River Basin has become so renowned. Given more time, it would have become denser 
still, evolving first into bituminous, the fuel of the industrial revolution and the eastern 
U.S., and ultimately anthracite, the lacquered, blue-burning rock still found in parts of 
Pennsylvania and the more mountainous regions of Virginia.11  
 Because this coal was so shallow—often literally at the surface—it was hard for 
later migrants to miss. Oral histories record the region’s indigenous inhabitants using coal 
for a number of medicinal purposes, identifying it as čhaȟlí, a Lakota word still in use 
today.12 And while such yarns may or may not be apocryphal, what is clear is that by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, as American military expeditions and settlements 
penetrated the region in increasing numbers, people began to talk more broadly of the 
basin’s bounty. In 1859, a full thirty years before the bloodshed of the Johnson County 
War, Colonel William F. Reynolds led an exploratory expedition from Fort Pierre 
(present-day South Dakota) overland to the headwaters of the Yellowstone River.13 The 
group’s naturalist was a Massachusetts geologist by the name of Ferdinand Vandeveer 
Hayden, a Union veteran and later head of the U.S.G.S. In his published report on the 
                                                
11 Adam Rankin and Kathy Brown, “What Lies Beneath,” Gillette News-Record, November 18, 2001. Note 
that the coal of the West and the Powder River Basin is decidedly younger than that of Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, and other eastern and Midwestern states, created during the Paleocene Epoch approximately 55 
million years ago. It is for this reason that it is so low in sulfur and heat 
12 Richard Martin, Coal Wars: The Future of Energy and the Fate of the Planet (New York City: Palgrave 
Macmillan Trade, 2015), 97. Another translation of the word is “gunpowder.” See Lakota Dictionary 
Online, www.lakotadictionary.org. 
13 Unlike Lewis and Clark and the region’s later traders, the Reynolds Expedition proceeded across land, 
bringing it over the undulating landscape of the Powder River Basin. 
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expedition, Hayden noted that “the whole region from the Platte to Pumpkin Buttes is 
covered with the true lignite beds… more or less pure.”14 Of course he was wrong about 
the grade of coal—we now know it to be sub-bituminous, one level higher and far more 
valuable than lignite—but he was right about the quantity: Hayden may well have been 
the first to publicize the prodigious coal of the modern Powder River Basin. 
 It would be decades before any commercial use was made of the material. Settlers 
did not begin to infiltrate the region in significant numbers until after the Indian Wars, in 
the late-1870s, with immigration peaking from the late-1880s on into the following 
decade. During this era, coal slowly evolved into a valuable domestic resource for early 
ranchers and homesteaders. This was because on the Powder River Basin—as on the 
plains more broadly—the traditional nineteenth-century heating source, wood, was 
largely absent. Settlers were therefore dependent upon a number of alternative energy 
sources to get them through the ruthless winters.15 Due to its ubiquity, coal became the 
most obvious choice on the Powder River Basin. Settlers erected scores of small family-
operated drift- and slope-mines in the vicinity of nascent villages and ranching outposts.16 
Tongue River residents would later recall how at that time “everyone had a little coal 
mine on their place,” while farther north, in Decker, Montana, one family went so far as 
to erect a primitive strip mine—perhaps the first in the state—that locals traveled to from 
“miles around.”17 And as early as 1906, the Burlington Northern was advertising 
                                                
14 F. V. Hayden, Geological Report of the Exploration of the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869), 72. 
15 Recall chapter one and the impact that steamboats had in denuding the region of its limited tree growth. 
16 Drift mines enter hills horizontally. Slope mines angle down to a level where coal can be mined, then 
proceed horizontally. Both of these were either manual or animal-powered. In rare instances, rails were laid 
down into the mines to aid in excavation. Dan Daley, “Old Mines Lie Beneath Gillette Area,” The News-
Record (Gillette), February 13, 1986. 
17 Helen Fraser Interview, OH 1856, Montana Historical Society; Lavorna Benedict Interview, OH 1858, 
Montana Historical Society.  
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homesteads on the Crow reservation, promising prospective settlers “fuel is no problem 
there…extensive coal mines are numerous at no great distance,” while local chambers of 
commerce claimed that “practically all of eastern Montana is underlaid with vast deposits 
of coal.”18 In short, well before Peabody came into town, settlers were making use of the 
Powder River’s ample coal supplies. 
Nevertheless, early coal use was largely limited to domestic settings. It was not 
until the last decade of the nineteenth century that more commercial attempts were made. 
All across the country, coal use was on the rise, surpassing wood as the country’s 
preferred energy source in 1885. Eight years later, Sheridan’s C.H. Grinnell—local cattle 
baron, prolific landowner, and later town mayor—attempted to take advantage of this 
shift by starting the Sheridan Fuel Company. He broke ground on their first mine on the 
Tongue—the Dietz—four miles north of town. By November of that initial year it was 
producing 450 tons a day. Although this was a respectable number for western coal, the 
S.F.C.’s early years were nevertheless rather ad hoc and bumbling: while eastern 
companies were marketing their product to the nation’s burgeoning rail lines, the S.F.C.’s 
primary market seems to have been a local furniture store.19 In addition to the limited 
local population, the problem was that regional railroads—even the Chicago, Burlington, 
and Quincy Railroad, along whose line the Dietz mines were located—shied away from 
burning the local product.20 Like all locomotives of the era, the its engines were ill-suited 
for burning sub-bituminous coal, which was significantly softer than eastern bituminous 
                                                
18 “Opening of the Crow Indian Reservation: Yellowstone and Big Horn Valleys, Montana,” PAM 4448, 
Montana Historical Society, 9; MHS, “In the Heart of the Yellowstone: Information for Homeseekers,” 
PAM 120, Montana Historical Society, 19. As late as 1890, Wyoming’s territorial geologist opined that, 
“the coal of this district has little use other than that of supplying a local market.” Rankin and Brown, 
“What Lies Beneath,” 2. 
19 Kuzara, Black Diamonds of Sheridan, 55–57. 
20 This line of mines roughly parallels Goose Creek (a tributary of the Tongue) north of Sheridan, just to the 
east of today’s 1-90. 
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and had a tendency to disintegrate when heated, what rail engineers termed 
“decripitation.” This was particularly true in the limited space and strong drafts of 
operating trains. The resultant particles were then either blown from the stack—in 
essence, representing wasted energy—or dropped between the grates of the fire box, not 
merely symbolizing bits of lost energy but also gumming up furnaces, requiring greater 
maintenance and increasing the threat of fire.21  
In time, however, the cost and convenience of Sheridan coal won out, spurring a 
series of technological innovations. By 1901, the Burlington had managed to manufacture 
a custom grate that employed a more capacious furnace and a modified fire box for the 
softer coal. The next year they contracted with Grinnell’s S.F.C. for 400-800 tons per 
day, the number varying according to seasonal need and supply.22 As Sheridan’s first 
significant commercial market, this development attracted a number of new investors, 
and over the next few decades the Powder River mining industry’s ecological footprint 
grew, spreading farther north along the Tongue River’s banks. The Monarch and 
Carneyville mines (later to become Peabody’s Kleenburn) opened in 1903 and 1904, by 
which point Dietz had expanded its own operations to seven veins, excavating a total of 
1,200 tons per day, enough, they claimed, to last ten generations.23 Three years later, the 
Kooi opened southeast of the Tongue’s big bend, followed in 1911 by two of the region’s 
most accessible and shallow mines, the Acme and the Model. Finally, in 1918, what 
would grow to become one of Sheridan’s most important mines, the Hotchkiss, came 
onto the scene. Less than a decade later it would set the world-record for coal-mining 
                                                
21 Kuzara, Black Diamonds of Sheridan, 183. 
22 “Agreement Between the Sheridan Coal Company and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad 
Company,” Sheridan Post, December 11, 1902.  
23 “Dietz Items,” The Enterprise (Sheridan), December 4, 1902. Here the “ten generations” claim seems to 
imply that, if excavated at the rate of 1,200 tons per day, the mine’s coal would last for ten generations. 
 231 
efficiency: 19.5 tons of coal per man per day.24 By that point, more than a dozen mines 
(counting all of the various Dietz mines) splayed out north of Sheridan, spreading nearly 
ten miles alongside the waters of the Tongue.  
Such a boom, although brief, reflected both a shift in the regional demand for 
Sheridan coal and industry-changing approaches to extraction. In addition to the 
Burlington, the Northern Pacific began to take on a chunk of the Powder River product, 
contracting in 1910 for more than 1,000 tons daily for its trains. As a result, many of the 
aforementioned operations constructed small power plants at their mines, not for the 
purpose of generating marketable power but rather for electrifying their own operations, 
thereby increasing output: subterranean tunnels were lighted and lined with rails, upon 
which motorized cars were employed to haul out the harvested coal. Not surprisingly, 
production soared: by 1914, Sheridan’s mines were producing close to two million tons 
annually, with three mines individually generating more than a quarter million each.25 
The jump in output mirrored coal’s growing reputation in the region: as Wyoming’s 
Secretary of State bragged, “Wyoming has enough [coal] to run the forges of Vulcan, 
weld every tie that binds, drive every wheel, change the north pole into a tropical region, 
or smelt all hell!”26 No longer a bit domestic player peddling coal in local furniture stores, 
by 1920, the Powder River coal industry was morphing into a major player in the newly 
formed western market. Like the Salt Creek oil fields that preceded it, it was on the brink 
of becoming nationally known. 
                                                
24 “Hotchkiss Coal Company Makes World’s Record,” Wyoming Post Enterprise, December 5, 1925. By 
1901, as one visitor put it, “A visit to the mines will reveal the fact that from 40 to 50 cars of coal are 
loaded and set to point on the Burlington to give warmth at the fireside of thousands of residents who till 
the soil of the level plains.”  
25 Kuzara, Black Diamonds of Sheridan, 184–87. 
26 Quoted in John Thilenius and Gary Glass, “Surface Coal Mining in Wyoming: Needs for Research and 
Management,” Journal of Range Management (September 1974), 337. 
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It was into such an ostensibly fecund climate that Jack Peabody brought his 
Midwestern firm. By that point, Peabody Coal had blossomed into one of the largest coal 
providers in the country, operating a total of thirty-six mines across the U.S. and Canada. 
Their Sheridan acquisition represented an attempt to diversify their holdings and break 
into the promising but unproven western territory. In many ways this approach was 
prescient—instead of limiting themselves to local rail markets, Peabody attempted to 
increase its thermodynamic footprint by leveraging what William Cronon has called the 
“new capitalist logic [that the railroad introduced] to the geography of the West,” and 
expanding into eastern-dominated markets.27 By highlighting the material differences of 
sub-bituminous coal not as a deficiency but as a boon, Peabody was paving the way for 
the future titans of the industry.  
This shift began with narrative. During the early twenties, Kleenburn’s half-page 
advertisements dominated many of the region’s newspapers—the Sheridan Post, 
Wyoming Labor Journal, and Sheridan Enterprise, with the Post alone printing nearly 
two hundred of their promotions over a year-and-a-half span. These ads inevitably built 
upon the original Kleenburn conception, attempting to portray Peabody’s Wyoming 
product as the original clean coal: “No soot, three percent ash, very little smoke and lots 
of heat,” “Kleenburn Coal is all the name implies,” and the most prevalent, the straight-
to-the-point “The Really Clean Coal.”28 Not willing to be left behind, Sheridan’s regional 
competitors began to ape Peabody’s tactics, similarly highlighting the area’s unique blend 
of soft, young coal. The aforementioned Hotchkiss mine, a half mile north of Dietz, 
promoted what they described as “Nature’s Finest Coal. More Heat, Less Ash, No Dust,” 
                                                
27 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 
81. 
28 Wyoming Labor Journal September 2, 1927; Sheridan Enterprise, November 8, 1922.  
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even taking a syntactical move out of the Peabody playbook, briefly (re)branding the 
company as “Hot-Kiss.”29 Wyoming’s other mines soon took notice: in the Powder River 
Basin, Buffalo’s Gray Coal advertised their product as “Good Clean Coal,” while farther 
afield, on the eastern edge of Yellowstone National Park, Cody’s aptly named Buffalo 
Bill Mine informed readers of “Orders Taken for good clean coal.”30 By the mid-1920s, it 
seemed that the push for clean western coal was in full swing. 
What is important to realize is that despite the diversity of these approaches, this 
clean coal narrative was essentially the same argument that the federal government would 
make half a century later. Unfortunately for Peabody and the other Sheridan purveyors, 
however, such rhetoric had a negligible impact on Jazz Age consumers. While pollution 
and smoke were certainly legitimate worries in the first half of the twentieth century, they 
were not to such a degree that consumers were willing to forego the patent 
thermodynamic superiority, cheapness, and overwhelming availability of eastern 
bituminous coal. Part of this had to do with perceptions of air quality, health, and 
pollution. In many of Colorado’s turn-of-the-century coal towns, for instance, residents 
rhetorically equated the presence of smoke and pollution with prosperity.31 Similar claims 
emanated out of Butte, where the notorious copper baron and mining-city bigwig William 
Clarke heralded the city’s infamously hazy air, asserting that the arsenic transformed 
Butte women into the most beautiful in the world.32 With such a blissful—and, we would 
now say, naïve—outlook, it should not be surprising that Peabody and the other Sheridan 
                                                
29 Wyoming Post Enterprise, October 26, 1923.  
30 Buffalo Bulletin, January 19, 1922; Cody Enterprise, January 9, 1924.  
31 Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 65–66.  
32 Timothy J. LeCain, Mass Destruction: The Men and Giant Mines That Wired America and Scarred the 
Planet (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 68. 
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producers were bound to fail. When the inevitable crash finally did come, it was 
remarkably swift. Dietz saw its output fall from 115,000 tons in 1921 to 45,000 the 
following year. Two years later, Kleenburn laid off 300 workers and closed its principal 
mine, the former Carneyville, citing a lack of orders. The bulk of the region’s competing 
operations were similarly shuttered within the decade. A few—Acme and Monarch—
hobbled on through the depths of the Great Depression, managing to carve out niche 
supplies of domestic and limited railroad coal, lasting until 1940 and 1953 respectively.33 
Put simply, the initial promise of the Tongue River mines failed to manifest. The clean 
coal narrative simply never gained a foothold amongst Jazz Age consumers unconcerned 
with urban and domestic pollution. As Kleenburn and the rest of the Sheridan producers 
were finding out, it would take more than a name change to put Powder River coal on the 
map. It would take a fundamental shift in the country’s relation with both air and coal. 
 
New Technologies: Colstrip and the Shift to Open-Pit Mining 
Part of the issue was efficiency. While the Sheridan mines had introduced 
electricity into their operations for the very purpose of improving production, their output 
per man was nevertheless materially circumscribed. These were cramped underground 
mines after all, spatially restricted and thereby limited in the amount of coal that was 
available for any person to mine at any given time. Even post-electricity, horses and 
mules were routinely employed to haul loads to the central rail artery, where a motorized 
cart would bring them to the surface. In other words, despite the availability of 
electrically powered machinery, and despite the fact that Powder River coal had the 
                                                
33 Kuzara, Black Diamonds of Sheridan, 111, 149. 
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thickest seams that anyone had ever seen, the technology was still that of eastern small-
seam mining. Peabody and the rest of the Powder River companies were stuck trying to 
replicate the long-established eastern methods on less valuable coal.34 Not surprisingly, 
they failed.  
The Northern Pacific Railroad (N.P.) was the first to realize the absurdity of this 
approach. Completed in 1883, the N.P. was the northernmost of the (American) 
continental railroads, stitching Lake Superior to the Puget Sound. Its Montana path traced 
the banks of the Yellowstone, passing through Glendive, Miles City, and Billings (at the 
northern reaches of the Powder River Basin before continuing west). Since the late 
1890s, the railway had relied upon their mines at Red Lodge, Montana, just northeast of 
Yellowstone National Park, for most of its northern plains fuel supply. Run by the 
Northwestern Improvement Company (N.I.C.), a subsidiary of the Northern Pacific, the 
mines at Red Lodge produced a steady and reliable supply of coal through the early-
twentieth century. During and after World War I, however, they began to experience a 
number of labor conflicts: both 1919 and 1922 saw extended strikes that put the N.P.’s 
northern plains operations in question. Consequently, the Red Lodge mines, for so long a 
reliable producer, began to grow increasingly expensive, proving themselves unable to 
keep up with growing railroad demands.35 
In an effort to alleviate themselves of such financial woes, the N.I.C. looked to the 
grasslands of southeastern Montana, thirty miles south of the Forsyth, in the sagebrush 
plains surrounding the Yellowstone and its southern branches. The land there was 
                                                
34 Ibid., 117. 
35 For coal and land grants, see Ross Ralph Cotroneo, “The History of the Northern Pacific Land Grant, 
1900-1952,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Idaho, 1967). For Red Lodge, see Rita McDonald and 
Merrill G. Burlingame, "Montana's First Commercial Coal Mine," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 47 
(1956). 
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sparsely settled and, thanks to a long drought that presaged the ensuing Dust Bowl, 
becoming more so every day. According to one estimate, 70,000-80,000 people moved 
into eastern and central Montana between 1909 and 1918, but by 1922, when the N.I.C. 
was looking to enter the region, 60,000 of those had already departed.36 In the wake of the 
Red Lodge troubles, the N.P.’s Chief Engineer, H.E. Stevens, and Lochren Donnelly, son 
of the N.P.’s chairman, surveyed what would later become known as the “Rosebud 
Seam.” It was by all appearances the answer to the company’s northern plains 
difficulties, one of the richest and shallowest coal lodes they had ever seen. To harvest it, 
they recommended that the N.P. build a thirty-mile branch line down to the field at a cost 
of just over one million dollars. And while the younger Donnelly claimed that “the 
Rosebud bed covers such a large area that the work required to get an accurate estimate 
of the amount of coal is impractical,” a series of experimental shafts and core samples led 
to an average estimated seam thickness of twenty-eight feet and 240 millions tons of 
mineable coal on Northern Pacific lands. Although it was of lower quality (as measured 
in energy output, BTUs) than that found in Red Lodge, the coal’s proximity to the surface 
meant that it could be mined for one-fifth the cost. The only problem was its isolation. 
The coal was transportationally remote, in land inhabited by just a few ranchers at the 
upper edge of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. As a result, the Northern Pacific 
decided to adapt Stevens’ and Donnely’s proposals, building a new rail branch to the 
location and, in the proper Montana tradition, erecting a company town that they dubbed 
Colstrip.37 
                                                
36 K. Ross Toole, Twentieth-Century Montana: A State of Extremes (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1972), 26. 
37 The Montana tradition here is that of Anaconda, who created a similar company town, the eponymous 
Anaconda, west of Butte in the 1880s. Also similar to Colstrip, the original proposed name for Anaconda 
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The name was a nice play on words, a corporate neologism in the style of the 
erstwhile Kleenburn. But what brought Colstrip its eventual success was not wordplay 
but brute technology, in particular the heretofore little-used method of open-pit or strip 
mining, in which electrified shovels dug coal from above and loaded it onto rail cars, 
thereby both reducing labor costs and increasing production.38 In the United States, this 
method had been employed in hard-rock extraction for close to two decades, but such use 
had been limited to other industries, the most notable being the cavernous copper mine at 
Bingham Canyon, Utah, and the iron operations of Minnesota’s Messaba range. Historian 
Timothy LeCain has coined the term “Mass Destruction” to describe the socio-
technological revolution that this switch from subterranean mining unleashed, explaining 
it as powered by “the relentless drive for efficiency” that characterized twentieth-century 
America.39 Under its domain, the days of skilled workers drew upon years of experience 
to identify and extract underground veins were obviated; in their place came great cranes 
that dug up as much earth as possible, leaving science and technology to handle the 
resultant sorting.  
                                                                                                                                            
was “Copperopolis,” one that was abandoned only because it was already taken. William B. Evans and 
Robert L. Peterson, “Decision at Colstrip: The Northern Pacific Railway’s Open-Pit Mining Operation,” 
The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 61, no. 3 (1970): 129–33; Louis Tuck Renz, The History of the Northern 
Pacific Railroad (Fairfield, WA: Ye Galleon Press, 1980), 240-241. 
38 There was initially debate over whether to employ open-pit methods at Colstrip. Interestingly, one of the 
primary motivators for making the shift was the fact that it involved fewer employees and therefore had 
less chance of suffering from the labor issues that plagued Red Lodge. Evans and Peterson, “Decision at 
Colstrip,” 134–35. 
39 LeCain, Mass Destruction, 111. 
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Figure 16: Open Pit Mining at Colstrip 
Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels” Scientific American, April 1930, 298. 
 
In essence, open pit mining took factory Taylorism and transported it to the open 
world of large-scale metal extraction. In doing so, it effectively created the template for 
the region’s later coal empire, working out the complex, technologically infused world of 
getting coal from the ground to the furnace. Everything about this new mode revolved 
around the notion of efficiency. As it did with copper mining, the process began with 
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brute destruction: black powder—used in so much of the great railroad building boom of 
the late-nineteenth century—was piped into a series of narrow holes that had been drilled 
at precise, pre-calculated distances in order to effect the desired damage. It would then be 
ignited, the resulting explosion loosening the overburden and cracking the subterranean 
coal into more manageable chunks. Next came the loading stage, during which huge 
electric-powered shovels (the original plan was to use steam) picked up and loaded the 
shattered slabs onto trains.40 According to one observer, “from an esthetic point of view, 
the appearance of the landscape is not enhanced by stripping operations, but the working 
present an interesting picture, particularly from an airplane,” where it “assume[d] the 
appearance of a series of miniature mountain chains placed side by side.”41 From there, 
the trains brought the coal chunks to the company’s central processing plants, where 
sorters and hoppers further crushed the coal to the desired consistency while filtering out 
impurities. Finally, the finished product was loaded onto transcontinental trains for its 
final destination. 42  
For the northern plains and the coal industry more broadly, this was a new way of 
operating, one that inspired—and continues to inspire—an odd mix of awe and near-
dystopian fear. As the first mine in the country to be completely electrified, Colstrip was 
a minor media sensation. National media outlets sent reporters west to describe the 
technological innovations for distant coastal readers. The Scientific American attempted 
to convince its audience how, “man’s domination of the earth is appreciated when one 
                                                
40 The problem with using steam was two-fold. First, eastern Montana is a notoriously arid climate. Second, 
the water that is available is extremely alkaline, which would have caused major corrosion and mechanical 
headaches for the upkeep of the machinery. Foley Brothers Inc., an Eighty Year Story. (Saint Paul, Minn.: 
The Corporation, 1957), 8; 
41 Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels” Scientific American, April 1930, 297. 
42 LeCain, Mass Destruction, 111, 136–37. 
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witnesses the gargantuan work of a new electrically-driven machine, operated by one 
man, which bites a hole in the ground large enough to serve as the cellar for a house, and 
deposits the 15 tons of excavated earth a full city block away, perhaps at a height 
equivalent to that of a 10-story building. Within one minute the operation is complete, 
and the shovel is back for another 15-ton bite.”43 The equipment referred to here, a 
Marion 350 stripper, had the “longest operating range of any shovel in the world.” Over 
the course of a day, it and its partner, the nearly as large Bucyrus-Erie 175-B, could load 
20,000 tons. As one Montana newspaper opined, “Goliath would have stood aghast at the 
Northern Pacific Railway Company’s mine at Colstrip, Montana.”44 When stitched into 
the Taylorist model that was open-pit mining, these machines operated at scales and 
paces that made Sheridan look like a pick-and-shovel pastime.45   
 
Figure 17: Colstrip’s Marion 350 Stripper 
Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels” Scientific American, April 1930, 298. 
                                                
43 Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels”, 296-297. 
44 “Huge New Shovel Scoops Up Coal From Open Pit of N.P. Mine at Colstrip,” January 24, 1930, Colstrip 
Vertical File, Montana Historical Society.  
45 Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels”, 296-297.  
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The results were remarkable. By the start of World War II, Colstrip was 
producing 2.5 millions tons of coal per year, roughly double that of all the Sheridan 
mines combined at their peak. (Sheridan’s greatest single-mine, single-year output was 
approximately 350,000 tons).46 This was possible thanks to round-the-clock operation and 
a new addition to the mine’s infrastructure, a three-million pound shovel capable of 
lifting thirty tons at a time.47 For years on end this steel bit down into a seam of coal 
closer to the surface and thicker than any previously known, each gouge adding to the 
company’s profits. Over its first three decades of operation, the mine excavated some 
forty-four million tons from the grounds, supplying two-thirds of the Northern Pacific’s 
coal and saving the railway more than $50 million.48 In doing so, it became the first 
unequivocal success story in the Powder River Basin’s coal history, paving the way for 
the Gillette-area empire in the process. 
It all sounds eerily similar to the technologically transformation that had rocked 
the copper industry a few decades earlier. But what is important to realize is that Colstrip 
was not simply parroting the methods of other non-coal open-pit operations. There was a 
key difference between the “Mass Destruction” described by LeCain and that practiced in 
the Powder River Basin. The driving belief at Bingham Canyon (and later Butte’s 
Berkeley Pit) was that modern copper mines were “more often made than discovered.” 
Open-pit mining came to the copper fields precisely because the metal was of such low-
grade: the high-density copper of Michigan and Butte was by this point diminished, and 
                                                
46 “Montana Coal Forum Proceedings: September 20-22, 1984,” Butte, Montana. S 622 M662S No. 93, 
Montana Historical Society, 24. 
47 “Montana Power Leases Colstrip Property for future Power Source,” Industrial Horizons, 4, no. 5, (May-
June 1959): 2.  
48 “Colstrip History,” Colstrip Vertical File, Montana Historical Society.  
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the quantity of extant copper per acre or ton of land (less than two-percent) was so low 
that the only way to make a profit was to go through it with speed and power. The sheer 
scale of strip mining meant that copper could, in essence, be coaxed from ever-
diminishing percentages, the whole operation ultimately progressing to the point where 
concrete copper presence was infinitesimal and yet, paradoxically, had little effect on the 
ultimate outcome. “It was obviously a cultural construction,” LeCain writes, “a product 
of engineering and technology rather than a national treasure that had been discovered.”49 
It was abstract and intangible; you could neither see nor touch the copper veins. The 
determining factor was not so much the quantity of copper in the ground as it was the 
ability to strip away huge chunks of land (i.e., that there were not people living there).50 
You could technically do it anywhere.  
This was decidedly not the case in the Powder River Basin. Not only could you 
patently see the coal that lay there, slicing up through the surface in thick seams and 
cutbanks, but as early settlers were quick to point out, in many spots you could quite 
literally harvest it with your bare hands. (An old joke in Gillette is that the only thing you 
need to mine coal there is a three-iron.)51 Further, this coal existed in quantities and 
concentrations never before seen: seams two- and three-hundred-feet-thick stretched like 
black waves across hundreds miles of prairie, drawing the sort of histrionic descriptions 
that nineteenth-century explorers usually reserved for the region’s earliest buffalo herds. 
                                                
49 LeCain, Mass Destruction, 119, 124. 
50 This, of course, was the key issue in Butte during the second half of the twentieth century: how can you 
strip mine when people inhabit the land? The result was the Berkeley Pit and the erasure of the 
communities of Meaderville, McQueen, East Butte, and parts of Dublin Gulch. Brian James Leech, The 
City That Ate Itself: Butte, Montana and Its Expanding Berkeley Pit (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 
2018), 62–72. 
51 Robert Godby, Roger Coupal, David Taylor, Tim Considine, “The Impact of the Coal Economy on 
Wyoming” University of Wyoming Center for Energy Economics and Public Policy, Report prepared for 
the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority, February 2015, 15. 
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Instead of an abstract, cultural creation, place and efficiency were the heart of Colstrip’s 
thermodynamic revolution.52 Strip mining may have come to the P.R.B. through Utah, but 
it had a different cause: it was precisely because the coal was so pure and potent, so 
concretely prevalent, that strip mining took—and continues to take—hold there.53 
 In effect, then, Colstrip represented an important alternative to Sheridan’s 
Kleenburn narrative. It was not in opposition to the latter, but neither was it identical; it 
was rather a separate branch from the same narrative stream. Through the use of the 
strange, solecistic neologisms, both Kleenburn and Colstrip attempted to craft new 
narratives that presented western sub-bituminous coal not as defective and second-rate 
but as superlative, not equal to but in many ways superior to the eastern and Midwestern 
bituminous coal that had for so long dominated the American market. Whereas Sheridan 
(via Peabody) had attempted to market the coal as cleaner than any other product, 
Colstrip took a more business-oriented approach: they promoted Powder River coal as 
superior because it was the easiest (and cheapest) to extract. They brought eastern and 
Midwestern factory methods to the plains, in the process transforming the industry into 
one built upon efficiency and output.  
And for a while, the proficiency narrative seemed poised to succeed where 
Kleenburn’s had failed. Throughout its life, Colstrip mined far more coal than Sheridan 
ever did.54 But it too never made the jump to the industry’s acme, remaining for the most 
                                                
52 Workers averaged ten times that of those at Sheridan and in other traditional tunnel mines. In the words 
of Scientific American, “it is required that fewer men working under more favorable conditions shall 
produce more goods at less cost.”. In other words, “daybreak at Colstrip meant twilight at the deep mines.” 
Hough, “Mining Coal with Mammoth Shovels,” 298. 
53 LeCain, Mass Destruction, 181. 
54 The difference is 44 million tons in comparison to approximately 20 million Note, however, that these 
are estimates: no totals exist for Sheridan. The latter number was calculated by tallying annual totals and 
estimating the missing data. This is probably an overestimate. Data from Kuzara, Black Diamonds of 
Sheridan. 
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part relegated to the tertiary western market. Nevertheless, the differences in their failures 
are telling. Ultimately Colstrip suffered not so much from the perceived problems with 
Powder River coal as with coal generally. As we saw in the previous chapter, by the 
1920s coal was well on its way to becoming domestically obsolete. The industry’s 
primary market—transportation—was in the midst of a much-needed shift to more 
affordable and efficient diesel oil (recall chapter three and the lead-up to the Teapot 
Dome Scandal). The requisite technology—the diesel engine—had been around since the 
late-nineteenth century, but it had been hampered by a series of developmental snags: it 
was too heavy, too expensive, and prone to frequent and untimely breakdowns. In the 
wake of World War I, however, General Motors developed diesel-electric motors for the 
Burlington and the Union Pacific’s passenger trains, both of which set records for 
distance without stopping and time, and by the late-1930s, many freight operations—the 
bulk of the industry, in fact—had begun to experiment with these engines. Like open-pit 
mining, its greatest virtue was its efficiency. With a single tank of oil, it was able to 
conduct the same amount of work that a steam engine would need eight carloads of coal 
to complete. This ability to efficiently convert fuel into energy also meant less time lost 
to maintenance: by the 1940s, diesel engines operated on average 50% more hours than a 
comparable steam engine. And like open-pit mining, it required far less labor: the big rail 
companies estimated that for every five men needed for steam engine maintenance, a 
diesel engine required just one.55 In short, they were the epitome of “the modernist drive 
for efficiency.”  
                                                
55 N. C. Dezendorf, “The Maximum Economies of Diesel Motive Power,” The Analysts Journal 7, no. 3 
(1951): 43. 
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The problem was that diesel engines did not depend upon places like Colstrip. A 
few coal companies held out through the 1930s, but the onset of World War II 
permanently shifted the thermodynamic debate, “usher[ing] in a diesel revolution.” From 
1942 to 1955, the percentage of locomotives running diesel increased from a mere 3.7% 
all the way to 79.6%.56 During that period, rail’s annual coal consumption fell from 
135,000 to 15,000 tons.57 Not surprisingly, the Northern Pacific held out longer than 
many of the other big operators, resisting calls from the company’s mechanical 
department, who argued that a switch to diesel engines would provide far more efficiency 
for the line. 58 Management’s counterargument was that efficiencies aside, it simply did 
not make economic sense: thanks to economies of scale, Colstrip’s coal was so cheap that 
it obfuscated the technological eminence of the diesel engine. And of course there was 
the added factor that, in addition to providing it with energy, Colstrip also produced cargo 
in the form of coal to be shipped.59 As a result, Colstrip continued to mine railroad coal 
for decades after the rest of the country had moved on to oil. 
But by the 1950s, even these comparative benefits were beginning to collapse. 
Long-range trucking and a host of more efficient, diesel-powered railroad companies cut 
into the northern plains’ business. And so in 1959, the Northern Pacific finally joined the 
rest of the nation’s rails. It closed its Colstrip mines, selling the town to the Montana 
                                                
56 Thomas G. Marx, “Technological Change and the Theory of the Firm: The American Locomotive 
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57 Sam H. Schurr et al., Energy in the American Economy, 1850 - 1975 (Johns Hopkins, 1960), 76. 
58 Evans and Peterson, “Decision at Colstrip,” 135–36. 
59 This was a common refrain for many of the rail companies that delayed the switch to diesel. As Thomas 
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and the Theory of the Firm,” 4-5. 
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Power Company, who planned to construct a series of coal-fired power plants there.60 
Over more than three decades, the operation at Colstrip had proved that coal was both 
abundant in the region and that it could be extracted more cheaply and efficiently than 
anywhere else in the country. As the former Secretary of State had observed half a 
century earlier, the Powder River Basin was full of energy, but the problem was that by 
the middle of the century nobody wanted it.  
 
A Land on Fire: The Mid-Century Fall of Powder River Coal 
As these technological changes were working their way through the coal industry, 
so too was a narrative shift. By the 1930s, the mere presence of coal in the region was 
beginning to be viewed not merely as a problem but as a legitimate threat, one that posed 
economic and health hazards. According to legend, the region’s indigenous inhabitants 
had informed the first Campbell County settlers that coal fires had been burning in the 
Powder River for as long as anybody could remember. This put the timeline of these 
smolderings at a century plus, though they may well have been burning for millennia. 
Their origin lay in lightning strikes, grass fires, or even spontaneous combustion, the 
latter of which was (and is) the most common igniter in the Basin. The reason these fires 
were so prevalent in the Powder River Basin is the same reason that the Northern Pacific 
strip-mined there: because it lay so close—often directly on—the surface, the coal was 
constantly exposed to fire’s most important nutrient, oxygen. Once started, the resultant 
burns could smolder and spread across decades, often lurking unbeknownst underground. 
Over time, they baked and melted the rocks above them in a process not unlike to that 
                                                
60 The plant opened in 1973. “Northwestern Energy: A 104-Year Timeline,” Montana Standard, May 20, 
2016.  
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used to fire bricks, turning the stone into the distinctive rust-colored rocks we know as 
clinker. Across geologic epochs, billions of tons of coal have burned in this fashion, 
enough to cover 4,100 square kilometers of the present Powder River Basin with the 
stuff. Of this, approximately four hundred square kilometers is in the area immediately 
east of present-day Gillette and Wright, in the heart of the world’s coal industry, where 
modern open-pit mines often experience spontaneous combustion.61   
Such coal fires were a regular presence in the early history of the Powder River 
Basin, many of them so well-known as to garner long-standing nicknames. The most 
famous was Devil’s Kitchen, a coal-fueled fire thirty-five miles south of Gillette, near 
today’s Cordero Rojo mine. There the heat was so intense that “the flames shoot up and 
at night can be seen for miles.” Not surprisingly, the other-worldly existence of this burn 
brought a combination of fear and childlike fascination to the region’s residents, many of 
whom steered well clear, citing, among other things, the smell.62 But others took to the 
fires more blithely, packing picnic lunches in which they would boil coffee, fry steaks, 
and roast “wienies” in the ambient heat. One particularly droll remark comes to us from a 
professor visiting from Colorado, who wrote, “I have always heard of the lower regions 
which burn with fire and brimstone and little thought I would ever live to see the reality, 
                                                
61 Edward L. Heffern, Peter W. Reiners, Charles W. Naeser, and Donald A. Coates, “Geochronology of 
Clinker and Implications for Evolution of the Powder River Basin Landscape, Wyoming and Montana,” in 
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62According to one fire chief, “Once you smell it [a coal fire], you never forget it. Even if you’re out here 
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Perrin Stein, “Hunters Find Burning Coal Seams North of Gillette,” Gillette News Record, October 10, 
2017. According to one origin story, the Powder River was so named precisely for this reason: originally 
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but here it is at my feet and I am able to go back home and tell about it.”63 Although no 
doubt offered in jest, the remarks would in any ways prove to be prescient.64 
 As was the case with Colstrip, the reputation of these coal fires witnessed a 
marked decline during the 1920s and 1930s. While the country’s population increased 
and people filtered into the West, the former enjoyment and use of the fires devolved into 
a latent fear, one that received unexpected attention. Like so many other communities 
during the Great Depression, Gillette was assigned a number of camps from the Civilian 
Conservation Corps. The brainchild of Franklin Roosevelt, the C.C.C. employed more 
than three million young men (largely eighteen to twenty-one, largely rural) from 1933 to 
1942, assigning them to a sweep of public works projects ranging from planting trees to 
building roads to laying early telephone lines. The goal was not only to ease the financial 
difficulties of young men in the midst of the Depression but also to educate them, to 
improve their post-camp employability and thereby aid the country’s mid-century 
progress. But there was also an underlying environmental ambition, a program 
specifically tasked “to provide for the country's depleted natural resources and the 
advancement of an orderly program of useful public works.”65 Gillette’s C.C.C. camps 
                                                
63 Mrs. Johnson, “Burning Coal Mines,” in Rockpile Museum (Gillette, Wyoming), Coal Vertical File; 
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were in many ways built upon these initial goals and therefore similar to other camps 
across the country. But there was one important distinction, a regional quirk that 
differentiated Gillette’s camps from these others and provides insight into the shifting 
cultural conceptions of coal: they were the only C.C.C. division in the country whose sole 
purpose it was to extinguish coal fires.66  
Originally working out of Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Company 886 (also known as 
Camp GLO-1-W) made its way to northern Wyoming in the mid-1930s. Not surprisingly, 
the bulk of its members were from these two states, with a smattering of young 
Coloradans and Texans thrown in as well. Many of the men were out-of-work miners—
the superintendent and twelve of the camp’s foremen were former Wyoming coalmen—
with experience in the industry. For the first few years the camp operated seasonally, 
limiting its work to the summer months. Beginning in 1937, however, Company 886 
established year-round residency, erecting permanent barracks, offices, and a mess hall in 
place of the tents that had previously dotted the hills. It was a shift in mindset that 
reflected not merely the demand for their services, but, more importantly, the scope of the 
problem at hand.67 During their eight years there, the company completed over a million 
man-hours of work.68 And yet the fires continued to smolder. 
Company 886’s approach to each burn depended upon a number of variables. The 
smallest fires were combatted directly. Burning material was removed from the area and 
mixed with dirt until extinguished. Then the combustible area was covered with layers of 
sod to prohibit future ignition. Such a hands-on method was only feasible on the smallest, 
                                                
66 Rankin and Brown, “What Lies Beneath.” 
67 History of the Civilian Conservation Corps in Colorado and Wyoming, 56-57. 
68 “Gillette History,” Campbell County, Wyoming Government, https://www.ccgov.net/DocumentCenter/ 
View/509/Gillette-History. 
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most easily accessible fires. For ones that burned deeper underground, a more indirect 
method was employed. In such cases, it was not unusual for ground to be sunken and 
cracked.69 As one modern rancher has described such scenarios, “it sounds like you’re 
riding on a pumpkin. The ground is hollow underneath and then it caves in and sloughs 
because it burns the coal away and there is nothing left to fill the void.”70 In order to 
eliminate these fires, the C.C.C. worked to fill in all of the cracks and chasms that 
allowed oxygen to seep down below and feed the fire. The scale of such work was often 
immense, requiring “dump trucks, draglines, power shovels, bull dozers, tractors, and 
fresnos” to help lessen the burden and increase efficiency.71 
The final method is perhaps the most interesting. In instances where the fire was 
shallow but could not be easily removed, the C.C.C. employed something called 
“trenching.” This approach required the corps to dig a deep channel around the fire, 
attempting to halt its spread by isolating it. The theory behind the method was similar to 
that which has been employed against forest fires for close to a century: fuelbreaks, three-
hundred-foot-wide strips of land where trees, brush, and other flammable flora were 
removed, thereby (in theory, if not always in practice) halting a fire’s expansion.72 Unlike 
wildfires, however, smoldering coal spread at a much slower pace. As such, the idea was 
to cut the burning coal off from the non-burning coal, thereby prohibiting the flame’s 
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extension. This accomplished, the trenches would be backfilled with dirt and the fire 
would be allowed to burn itself out.73 
Although Camp 886 left town in 1942, there would be a brief reprisal of the 
C.C.C.’s efforts during the 1950s, when the federal Bureau of Mines took bids to 
extinguish a number of remaining coal fires in Campbell County (where Gillette is 
located). The most notable of these were the Padlock Fire, thirty miles northwest of 
Gillette, and the Little Thunder Fire, sixty miles southeast of Gillette. Congress 
authorized funding to suppress these fires, along with a handful of others in New Mexico 
and Colorado. Contracts were eventually awarded to the Nugget Coal Company out of 
Denver, the Barker Brothers out of Sheridan, and J.D. White out of Weston. The resultant 
work took nearly a year and cost the government just under $100,000. Nevertheless, the 
Bureau of Mines declared the operation a success, claiming that the fires would have 
continued undeterred, consuming twenty million tons of coal and extending across whole 
decades if not for the government’s efforts.74  
Like the C.C.C.’s efforts before it, what is most interesting about these bids is the 
shift that they represent in the region’s coal imaginary. Whereas Colstrip and Kleenburn 
had attempted to capitalize on Powder River coal, transmogrifying popular opinions of 
western energy resources via narrative and technology, the actions of the C.C.C. and the 
Bureau of Mines reflect a competing narrative, one that would win out until the 
legislative changes of the 1970s. From the Great Depression on through the end of World 
War I, coal was viewed mostly as a problem for the basin, a hindrance to further 
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development. Ranchers and settlers alike complained and worried about the uneasy 
ground beneath their feet, the toxic fumes, and the threat of potentially devastating 
wildfires. According to this narrative, the coal was not simply less valuable then eastern 
bituminous coal, it was outright dangerous. And the only way to effectively neutralize 
that threat was to get rid of it, to snuff it out both literally and figuratively. The C.C.C. 
and the Bureau of Mines attempted to do this, throwing heavy equipment, millions of 
man hours, and the latest in fire-fighting theory at the conflagrations. But their impact 
was necessarily limited. The problem was not resources or approach; the real issue was 
that the Powder River had too much coal to ever be legitimately contained. In proper 
hydric fashion, for every fire they extinguished, two more seemed to emerge. There was 
simply too much energy underfoot to remain inert. Sooner or later, it would release itself 
back into the atmosphere; the only question was what fashion it would take. 
 
“Making Coal Lovable”: The Rise of Powder River Coal 
 Like most of the Monongahela’s mid-century towns, Donora, Pennsylvania was a 
steel city both by product and by character. The bulk of the town’s 14,000 residents were 
employed at American Steel and Wire’s blast furnaces and zinc works, a huge industrial 
plant stretching nearly 4,000 feet along the river’s snaking front. Like most company 
towns of the time, it was far from pollution-free, but on October 27, 1948, things were 
worse than usual. Overnight a cold front had drifted in, and over the course of the 
morning the normal a.m.-haze never burned off; instead it just kept building up in 
density, until by mid-afternoon all of the street lights were on and residents reported 
being unable to see the curb at their feet. Nevertheless, American Steel and Wire 
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continued to run as it did every day, pumping out exhaust around the clock. For three 
days the smog continued to thicken, taking on an almost viscous, jaundiced quality. 
Residents brandished handkerchiefs in ad hoc attempts to protect their lungs; senior 
citizens collapsed as emergency services trucked in oxygen tanks and other potentially 
lifesaving supplies; and even young, healthy students complained of headaches, 
vomiting, and difficulty breathing. On Sunday, American Steel and Wire was finally 
forced to give in, announcing that they would shut the factory down for the day, giving 
the workers a rare day off. As if on cue, a rainstorm washed in, dissipating the smog and 
finally releasing the town from its bondage.75  
By Monday, seventy had been declared dead (including Stan Musial’s father) 
while thousands more were filling the area’s hospitals with all manner of respiratory 
ailments. And although it was thought to be an atmospheric anomaly, four years later 
4,000 perished in a similar but far more virulent outbreak in London.76 The culprit, it 
turned out, was sulfur dioxide, a colorless gas that, in sufficient concentration, can prove 
fatal to both humans and ecosystems more broadly. Although occurring in nature—most 
notably in volcanic eruptions—it is more often human-produced by burning sulfur-
containing fossil fuels such as coal, fuel oil, and gasoline. Not surprisingly, the highest 
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concentrations tend to arise in the vicinity of large-scale industrial facilities. At American 
Steel and Wire—and at other steel producers around the world—the gas was produced 
during metal smelting, particularly through the process of extracting sulfide ore. At small 
concentrations, it causes irritation to the nose, throat, and lungs; heavier exposures can 
have adverse effects on respiration, particularly for the very young, very old, and 
asthmatic; in particularly dense or entrapped environments—such as those found in 
Donora and London—it can cause death.77 
 
Figure 18: Donora, Pennsylvania in the Midst of the Killer Smog 
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/04/deadly_smog_in_pa_town_paves_w.html 
 
As a result of such high-profile tragedies, sulfur dioxide took on increased 
narrative weight during the 1950s and 1960s, transforming itself from a recondite 
                                                
77 “Sulfur Dioxide,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, https://eospso.gsfc.nasa.gov/sites 
/default/files/publications/SO2poster_508.pdf. ALSO “Sulfur Dioxide,” Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tfacts116.pdf 
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chemical compound to a concrete atmospheric presence that posed a tangible threat to 
everyday Americans. In the words of one environmental expert, “before Donora, people 
thought of smog as a nuisance. It made your shirts dirty. The Donora tragedy was a wake-
up call. People realized smog could kill.”78 Such a cultural transformation was aided by 
the work of the 1960s environmentalists—Rachel Carson, Stuart Udall, Paul Ehrlich and 
countless others—who further emphasized the danger of unseen pollutants, helping to 
solidify a narrative of veiled ecological threat in the eyes of the American public by 
“cultivat[ing] powerful new metaphors for chemical threats to public health.”79 Spurred 
on by such fears, in 1968 President Nixon commissioned an advisory group to examine 
the country’s most pressing environmental issues. Chaired by former vice president of the 
World Wildlife Fund and later head of the E.P.A. Russell Train, the task force presented 
their report to Nixon in December of that year. The president used its findings and 
recommendations as the foundation for a special message to Congress in which he 
outlined a comprehensive plan for overhauling the country’s approach to environmental 
protection. “Our current environmental situation calls for fundamentally new 
philosophies of land, air, and water use,” the president said, “for stricter regulation, for 
expanded government action, for greater citizen involvement, and for new programs.” 
Two months later, twenty million Americans participated in the country’s first Earth Day, 
planting and protesting in the name of environmental reform.80  
                                                
78 Quoted in Kiester, “A Darkness in Donora.” 
79 Emily Alice Swanson, “Natural Arguments: Popular Discourse and Environmental Legislation, 1945-
2007,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2007), 59.  
80 Erwin Mauricio Escobar, “Nixon and the Environment: Clean Air, Automobiles, and Reelection,” 7-12. 
Another critical response to the environmental movement was 1970 creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (from by the National Environmental Policy Act (N.E.P.A.), signed into law in 1970), 
the seminal—if now often maligned—division tasked with maintaining and enforcing environmental 
legislation.  
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One of the results of these efforts was the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act 
(C.A.A.), a bill designed to improve air quality by centralizing regulation and limiting a 
handful of particularly noxious emissions, among them sulfur dioxide, lead, carbon 
monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and a catch-all group known as particulate matter. 
The legislation contained a maze of sections and sub-sections, but from the perspective of 
the coal industry, the regulations on sulfur dioxide were the most momentous.81 In 
addition to the specter of “killer fogs,” by the late-1960s scientists had hypothesized 
sulfur dioxide as a key contributor to a host of environmental maladies: smog, acid rain, 
and global warming more broadly, among others.82 In the blunt estimation of one 
researcher, “global warming during the 20th century was primarily initiated by a rapid 
increase in the rate of anthropogenic emission of sulfur by man…the SO2 reduced the 
oxidizing capacity of the atmosphere, leading to an increase in methane, water, and other 
greenhouse gases.”83 As such, lowering sulfur dioxide output became a central goal of 
both the Nixon administration and the inchoate E.P.A., not merely to cut back 
anthropogenic impact, but also from the perspective of energy autonomy, so that what 
became known as “clean coal” could be used as a more productive energy resource, 
                                                
81 It is crucial to note here that the legislation applied almost entirely to coal-burning plants that were built 
after the act’s passage. I.e., those already extant were “grandfathered in” against many of the requirements. 
This has had a major effect on coal use in the U.S., effectively disincentivizing the construction of new 
plants. As one author puts it, “if you require new power plants to spend upwards of $100 million on 
scrubbers, but you don’t impose any comparable cost on existing plants, suddenly it becomes much more 
attractive to continue operating existing plants. Even now, 45 years into the Clean Air Act, we have in 
operation plants that were deemed to be close to the end of their useful life back in 1970 when the statute 
was enacted.” Richard Revesz, ed. “Grandfathering Coal: Power Plant Regulation Under the Clean Air 
Act,” Environmental Law Reporter, July 2016, 10542. 
82 Michael Greenstone, “Did the Clean Air Act Cause the Remarkable Decline in Sulfur Dioxide 
Concentrations?,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Including Special Symposium 
Section from the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Advances in Empirical 
Environmental Policy Research, 47, no. 3 (May 1, 2004): 588; Christopher J. Bailey, Congress and Air 
Pollution: Environmental Policies in the USA (Manchester University Press, 1998), 137.  
83 Peter L. Ward, “Sulfur Dioxide Initiates Global Climate Change in Four Ways,” Thin Solid Films 517, 
no. 11 (April 2, 2009): 3198. 
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enabling the country to “take advantage of our enormous coal resources.”84 For all new 
coal-burning power plants, the 1970 amendments set a maximum output of 1.2 pounds of 
sulfur dioxide for every million BTU’s. To comply, offending plants were left with just 
two options: they could install sulfur scrubbers (also known as flue gas desulfurization 
equipment) to their smokestacks, technology that was prohibitively expensive, 
representing as much as ¼ the cost of producing electricity; or they could shift their coal 
supply: instead of continuing to burn the high-sulfur eastern coal that had served as the 
lifeblood of American coal consumption for nearly a century, they could switch to low-
sulfur western coal, which, thanks to geological processes, was both younger and 
possessed far less sulfur (though also fewer BTUs).85   
From a cultural perspective, Nixon’s public declarations and the passage of the 
Clean Air Act served as the public announcement of a belief that had been percolating 
amongst the American public ever since Donora: sulfur was something to be feared—a 
chemical threat to humans—and the federal government needed to take steps to protect 
its citizens from its wrath. From an energy perspective, this meant that almost overnight 
coal took on a nefarious reputation—getting tagged as an ecological threat akin to 
Carson’s D.D.T.—for it was not only abnormally high in sulfur, but burning it for fuel or 
electricity released that sulfur directly into the air, potentially spawning apocalyptic 
tragedies of the Donora- and London-variety. By putting the emphasis on sulfur and 
denoting it as deleterious, then, the Clean Air Act effectively flipped the erstwhile coal 
narrative: up until that point, coal’s value had essentially been correlated (positively) with 
                                                
84 United States Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard 
Nixon, 1971: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President (Government 
Printing Office, 1999), 703-705. 
85 Robert Henry Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy (Duke University Press, 1983), 28–29. 
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its sulfur content. This was not a direct relation but rather the result of the fact that having 
more sulfur meant having more heat (i.e., energy). In contradistinction, the Clean Air Act 
transformed low-sulfur product into the most desirable of all coal genera.86 Along with 
Nixon’s political addresses, it helped to create a newer, more powerful iteration of 
Kleenburn: the counterintuitive concept of “Clean Coal.” Although the term was not used 
by Nixon in any of his energy addresses, it began to enter the public’s consciousness 
during the 1970s, appearing sporadically in the New York Times and other major 
publications. In doing so, these outlets—and the Clean Air Act more broadly—were 
reproducing something that Jack Peabody and the West’s countless geologists and 
railroad executives had known for more than a century: the largest and cleanest coal 
reserves in the country lay in Montana and Wyoming’s Powder River Basin. By crafting 
a neo-clean-coal-narrative, the federal government was hoping to succeed where 
Kleenburn had failed. 
The Powder River Basin was the logical destination for such a narrative to 
become reality. Not only did the region have a long history of marketing their coal as a 
clean, healthy alternative to the nation’s more popular bituminous coal (e.g., Kleenburn), 
but it also had extensive experience mining that coal more efficiently and cheaply than 
anyone else (e.g., Colstrip). When the boom finally did come, however, it was not in 
Sheridan or Colstrip or any of the other sites of early mining success; rather it emerged in 
the Powder River home of the Civilian Conservation Corps’ fire brigades, a narrow 
eighty-mile strip stretching south from the tiny cattle town of Gillette, Wyoming. 
Founded in 1890 as “Donkey Town,” a tent city on the leading edge of the Burlington 
                                                
86 As the New York Times put it, “because of increasing resistance to lowering air pollution standards this 
very low-sulfur coal has now become an extraordinary prize.”  Ben A. Franklin, “Coal: It’s Cheap, but 
Dirty and Hard to Dig,” New York Times, June 16, 1974. 
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and Missouri Railroad, it was later renamed after B&M surveyor Edward Gillette.87 The 
first cattle shipment was sent out of town in August of the following year, just two days 
after the tracks reached town.88 And although still a ranching settlement at heart, one that 
continues to run cattle and domestic bison today, mining has long existed in Gillette. 
Some of the earliest iterations of coal strip mining—first using horse-drawn scrapers, 
then hydraulic mining of the type seen in late-gold-rush-era California—stretched back to 
1923, when the Kirby Coal Company and Homestake Coal Company both opened mines 
east of Gillette.89 But what was so appealing about Gillette was not the history but the 
vast scope of the supply. It possessed the Wyodak bed, the biggest expanse of 
recoverable coal in the country, an unbroken 120-by-10 mile strip of the stuff. And unlike 
the thin, fissured coal of the eastern United States, these seams averaged 70-120 feet 
thick, with some reaching as much as 200, an unheard of breadth.90  
Such limited overburden had helped to fuel the fires that the C.C.C. had worked 
to extinguish during the thirties and forties. But it also meant that the Gillette-area belt 
was a prime location for modern, large-scale strip mining, that extractionary method 
pioneered by the Northern Pacific and its subsidiaries at Colstrip half a century earlier. 
Like that former coal town, Gillette too required an initial injection of infrastructure 
before it was able to overcome its isolation and produce. In 1972, the Burlington 
Northern (B.N.) built a nineteen-mile spur line from Donkey Creek south to the Belle 
                                                
87 According to local legend, the city was named for Gillette after his engineering efforts saved the 
company millions by saving miles and bridges built in comparison to the line’s original survey. “Edward 
Gillette, Engineer, Politician, and Namesake of Gillette,” in “Gillette—History (General)” Vertical File, 
Rockpile Museum. 
88 “Steve Gardiner Oral Histories About Gillette, Wyoming,” Collection Number 12570, American 
Heritage Center (Laramie), 2. 
89 “Time Exposure: Homestake Power Plant,” Gillette News-Record, November 27, 1989; “Campbell 
County’s Mining History,” Gillette News-Record, September 17, 1992; “Horses and Half-Yard Scrapers 
First Used to Uncover Coal Beds at Old Wyodak Mine,” Gillette News-Record, June, 1975, 4.  
90 “Steve Gardiner Oral Histories About Gillette, Wyoming,” 6.  
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Ayr, the first Gillette-area mine to take advantage of the Clean Air Act’s. Four years 
later, the B.N. began construction on the largest new stretch of rail in America since 
1931, a 126-mile line stretching south from the Belle Ayr all the way to the B.N.’s main 
line at Shawnee Junction, stitching the proposed Powder River fields to vital eastern and 
Midwestern markets. By the time they were finished, the Gillette area mines had 
individual connections to the bulk of the country’s power plants: a central route that 
traced through Lincoln, Nebraska on its way to Kansas City, Iowa, and Illinois; and a 
southern line that pushed down to Denver before continuing onto Texas (see Figure 19). 91 
With such an infrastructure in place, they were ready to take the next technological step: 
the implementation of large-scale coal strip mining on a scale never before seen. 
                                                
91 Fred W. Frailey, “Powder River Country,” Trains: The Magazine of Railroading, November 1989, 57. 
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Figure 19: Map of Powder River Rail Lines 
Note the addition appears in the lower right-hand corner of the map, connecting Gillette and Shawnee Jct. 
http://www.bnsf.com/ship-with-bnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/pdf/Mine-Guide-2018.pdf 
 
 
The mining methods that took root were modern intensifications of the open-pit 
approach that had been pioneered half a century earlier. Overburden—anywhere from 
fifteen to fifty feet in Gillette—was first blasted to expose the coal beneath. Electric-
powered 25- to 35-cubic-yard shovels would then come in to load the unwanted sod into 
170-ton haul trucks (today 400-plus-ton), which would then deposit it along the pit’s 
perimeter for later reclamation. In the largest Powder River mines—North Antelope, 
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Black Thunder, and Cordero—such shovels were relinquished in favor of draglines: 
huge, hypertrophic cranes with excavating buckets of 160 cubic yards—six times greater 
than the average electric shovel—and price tags of $50-100 million. Some of the largest 
mobile machines ever built, draglines were the latest attempt to increase the speed and 
efficiency of operations. In their wake, shovels would then load the coal into the same 
haul trucks, which would transport and dump the product into a crusher. The crusher 
broke the coal into the desired size, after which the finished product would be transported 
via large conveyor belts to hoppers: 200-foot-tall concrete storage silos erected over 
company-specific railroad spurs that were capable of holding 13,000 tons of material. At 
this point, unit trains—industry argot for the one-hundred-car, mile-long coal trains—
would set up under the ever-full hoppers. There they would be loaded via an automated 
system, the train moving at approximately one m.p.h. below the tipple, each car getting 
weighed to minimize variation.92 Then the train would be off, heading for a distant power 
plant along either the Burlington Northern or the Chicago and Northwestern’s tracks for a 
distant power plant, and a new train would take its place under the hopper. This process 
continued around the clock, every day of the year, embodying a level of efficiency and 
cumulative output far beyond anything early Kleenburn and Sheridan-area producers 
could have imagined: mines in the Powder River Basin averaged more than forty tons of 
coal per employee per hour as compared to a mere 4.4 for competing mines.93 By taking 
the coal-mining method pioneered at Colstrip and adapting it to the modern age, the 
P.R.B. mines leveraged technology to achieve rates and quantities of extraction not seen 
                                                
92 “Coal Trains Familiar Sight,” The News-Record, May 2, 1977, 9. 
93 Kenneth R. Miller and James L. Long, “Evolution of Mining Equipment in the Powder River Basin,” 
Mining Engineering, 50, no. 7 (July 1998): 49–53. Rail routes from Frailey, “Powder River Country,” 40-
63; Timothy J. Considine, “Powder River Basin Coal: Powering America,” Natural Resources, December 
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in the industry before or since. It was LeCain’s culture of mass destruction with a potent 
coal-specific twist. 
 
Figure 20: Powder River Coal Train Leaving the Belle Ayr Mine 
Photo by the author 
 
As Gillette’s first mines worked through the early stages of this technological 
escalation, Nixon and his predecessors continued to trumpet a neo-Kleenburn narrative to 
the American public. In the words of the New York Times, the challenge was “Making 
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Coal Lovable.”94 In this they were unexpectedly helped by the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (O.P.E.C.) famous 1973 oil embargo, a pronouncement 
that not only sent oil prices skyrocketing in the U.S. but also increased demand for 
alternative resources. One month after O.P.E.C.’s edict, Nixon launched “Project 
Independence,” a plan to wean the country off of foreign oil by cultivating domestic 
energy resources. Not surprisingly, coal was at the top of this list. In the wake of the oil 
crisis and this announcement, western coal prices spiked, rising from $10.67 to $31.95 a 
ton over the course of a year.95 Following Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford intensified 
the plan for domestic energy independence. In his 1975 State of the Union address, he 
told the country, “I have a very deep belief in America’s capabilities,” before outlining a 
comprehensive energy program for the next decade that included not only the 
construction of nuclear plants and oil refineries, but also 250 “major” coal mines and 150 
“major” coal-fired power plants. In doing so, he referenced the pioneering beneficence of 
F.D.R., comparing the program to the ambitious but for the most part successful federal 
program to build 60,000 new military aircraft in the midst of the Great Depression. “They 
did it then,” Ford said, “we can do it now.”96 Such executive action not only further 
solidified the clean coal narrative, but it gave narratological weight to the aforementioned 
technological advances of large-scale strip mining. A few months later, Ford vetoed a 
proposed strip-mining bill that would have curbed coal production in the West, 
particularly in the Powder River. In taking such unprecedented action, Ford described the 
critical role that coal played in the dream of American energy independence: “as the one 
                                                
94 Ben A. Franklin, “The Technological Fix: Making Coal Lovable,” New York Times, July 31, 1977. 
95 Steven Rattner, “The Battle for Western Coal,” February 27, 1977. 
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abundant energy source over which the United States has total control, coal is critical to 
the achievement of American energy independence. In the face of our deteriorating 
energy situation, we must not arbitrarily place restrictions on the development of this 
energy resource.”97 Two years later, Jimmy Carter took such rhetoric even further. 
Although he didn’t tour Wyoming coal mines specifically, he did visit smaller low-sulfur 
mines in Kentucky, opining “I would rather burn a ton of Kentucky coal, than to see our 
nation become dependent by buying another barrel of O.P.E.C. oil.”98 Not only was the 
extraction and use of low-sulfur coal an ecological statement, it was now a patriotic one, 
becoming “a moral responsibility” not unlike war.99  
With such a burgeoning narrative foundation, the Powder River mines continued 
to grow into the 1980s.100 During that decade Gillette became home to seven of the ten 
biggest coal mines in the country: Black Thunder, Jacobs Ranch, Belle Ayr, Rawhide, 
Eagle Butte, Cordero, and Caballo.101 With the exception of the latter, all produced more 
than ten million tons of coal annually, and Black Thunder, a Peabody-owned operation 
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and the largest mine in the country by nearly twofold, produced just under twenty-five 
million tons (more than all Sheridan mines combined did in their lifetime).102 Even the 
Cordero Rojo—a middle-of-the-pack Gillette operation—produced at a rate of 212 tons 
of coal per man per day shift, more than ten times Hotchkiss’s world record of half a 
century before.103 In 1988, for the first time in its history, the state of Wyoming reached 
the apex of American coal, becoming the number one coal-producing state in the country, 
passing Kentucky, which had held the position since 1971. But whereas Kentucky’s totals 
came from 2,086 different mines, Wyoming’s came from just thirty. Fourteen of these 
mines—contributing close to ninety percent of Wyoming’s total—were located in the 
Gillette area, which also saw its highest ever excavation total, at 135.7 million tons.104 
These jumps in production were enabled not only by increasing developments in 
and sophistication of technology, but by a more powerful narrative foundation—a 
clarification of the clean coal approach—as well. Throughout the 1970s, the low-sulfur 
coal story had lacked the pithy metaphorical node that most great narratives possess. 
During the 1980s, this changed. Although the term “clean coal” had been used sparingly 
by the media the decade previously, during the 1980s it was adapted by Congress to 
describe the new low-sulfur narrative.105 In 1987, the Department of Energy (D.O.E.) 
took the next big step by officially codifying this phrase when it released “America’s 
Clean Coal Commitment.” In this paper, the D.O.E. outlined three separate delineations 
of clean coal. The first two involved removing sulfur before it was released into the 
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atmosphere—flue gas scrubbing and pre-combustion coal cleaning. The third, however, 
was “coal switching,” which entailed “the substitution of a typically higher priced, lower 
sulfur coal in a power plant that previously burned high sulfur coal.”106 This was the 
narrative that the Powder River Basin was working to solidify, the one that led to the rise 
of the region’s leviathan mines.  
On the ground, both local residents and coal companies joined in the effort to 
market clean coal as the smart, responsible alternative, one that had a deep history in the 
Powder River landscape. Casper College historian Bill Bragg gave a notable speech to 
this effect entitled “A Little Pollution is Good for Tourism.” Bringing to mind William 
Clark’s comments on early Butte, Bragg defended the criticism that many of the mines 
were facing—for, among other things, disfiguring the grasslands landscape—by placing 
the industry in a long historical line of polluters in Wyoming history, a list that included 
the region’s indigenous inhabitants, overland migrants, and ranchers. Like many coal 
town residents, Bragg reserved his harshest criticism for environmentalists. In a perhaps 
misguided attempt to appeal to history, he even noted that the Johnson County War was 
carried on by environmentalists not unlike those trying to regulate the northern plains, 
“leading an invasion of environmentalists into Johnson Country [sic] with a hit list of 70 
friendly polluters led by Sheriff Red Angus.”107 Other residents took to the patriotic 
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energy arguments of Nixon and Ford. Local rancher Doris Wagensen testified to the 
“moral responsibility” of harvesting Powder River Coal. “We need energy,” she said, 
“our whole civilization is dependent on energy. Is it morally right for any part of the 
county to say, ‘I don’t care if you need what we’ve got, we’re not going to let you have 
it? We’re not going to let you in here. We’re not going to sell you any property. We’re 
not going to meet any of your demands.’ I think there is a moral responsibility to provide 
for the well-being of the nation, and perhaps that is to deliver coal so that OPEC nations 
are not as important and as powerful in our national politics.”108 By grounding the clean 
coal narrative in the past and a larger moral imperative, locals like Bragg and Wagensen 
were adding a regional flair to the large-scale industry narrative, further solidifying coal’s 
cultural transition in the process.  
We can see similar developments taking place among the Gillette-area coal 
companies of the time. Since their inception in the seventies, many of these operations 
had been plainly visible from the road, great seams of black bordered by buffalo grass 
and blue grama, with mile-long conveyor chutes angling up to silos the size of space 
shuttles. For years Amax and Carter Mining had given tours to the most pestering of 
visitors, but there were neither advertisements nor public encouragement for such actions. 
The mines remained private property, blocked by lurid signage and cyclone fencing, and 
engagement with the public was purposefully restricted. This approach began to shift as 
the clean coal narrative gained credence during the late-eighties. Two local producers—
Cam-plex and Wyodak Resources—teamed up to construct a small tourist point east of 
the town, a tread-plate overlook perched up above Wyodak’s northeastern mine. The 
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viewing stand still exists today—or rather the latest version of it does. Thanks to the ever-
expanding footprint of surface mining, the original platform has been relocated a number 
of times, moved back as the mine chews up more and more land. Today, the Chamber of 
Commerce has joined with another coal company, Alpha Natural Resources, to offer two-
hour, twice-daily tours of Eagle Butte. Headed by a retired employee, these bus tours take 
visitors not only to the aforementioned viewing stand but onto mining premises itself, 
where they are able to get an up-close look at Gillette’s mammoth machinery and watch a 
Burlington Northern unit train load at the Eagle Butte tipple.109 Not surprisingly, the trip 
seeks to wed the technological and the narratological into a comprehensible whole: the 
one big photo-op takes place in front of a thirteen-foot tire off of one of the company’s 
trucks, where the tour guide offers to take pictures of families and groups, explaining that 
each individual tire costs upwards of $100,000.110 
In doing so, companies like Alpha and Cam-plex effectively wedded the 
approaches of Kleenburn and Colstrip: they would perform large-scale strip mining, but 
they would also consciously shape how that mining was perceived. LeCain describes 
similar public relations shifts that took place in mid-century Butte, where “Anaconda and 
other producers of raw materials attempted to link what had previously been rather 
straightforward places of industrial extraction with the burgeoning culture of 
consumption” by building an overlook above the (at the time operating) Berkeley Pit.111 
During the 1980s, however, Powder River coal companies took this approach a step 
further. In addition to showcasing the scale and importance of their operations, they also 
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began to draw upon myths and popular conceptions of the American West. This can be 
seen most patently in campaigns’ images around reclamation. A prime example is a now 
well-known photograph taken by a Black Thunder employee.112 The image shows two 
elks locking antlers in foot-high prairie grasses, Black Thunder’s monolithic crushing and 
loading facilities framing the background. It is the sort of image that represents 
everything the coal companies could hope for: the virile stubbornness of the West’s 
rugged individualism, the harmonic co-mingling of nature and industry, and the 
purported success of mining reclamation efforts. Not surprisingly, the photograph has 
been circulated widely, used as a popular regional postcard and, more recently, has even 
served as the inspiration for the eponymous Two Elk Power Plant, a proposed—and often 
maligned—“clean coal plant” near Wright.113 In choosing that name, they were 
attempting to connect coal to the region’s fauna and thereby to the natural Powder River 
landscape, in the process fighting back against the older cultural associations birthed by 
Donora and London. Like Kleenburn and Colstrip before it, Two Elks has realized the 
power that a name has to tell a story.  
                                                
112 Mary Kelley and the Campbell County Rockpile Museum, Coal in Campbell County (Charleston, South 
Carolina: Arcadia Publishing, 2013), 84. 
113 The plant has been delayed multiple times over the past decade. Nevertheless, it could be constructed 
and online within the new few years. Jonathan Gallardo, “Two Elk could be home to $100 million coal 
plant,” Gillette News Record, November 9, 2017. 
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Figure 21: Two Elks Photograph Outside Black Thunder Mine 
https://www.wyofile.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/two-elk.jpg 
 
Over the last few decades, these narrative efforts have been bolstered by the latest 
version of the Clear Air Act, which established a new system for regulating sulfur 
emissions.114 The C.A.A.’s previous amendments (1977) had provided little choice when 
it came to reducing sulfur dioxide. Under that system (known in economics as a 
“command and control” approach), power plants were required to install scrubbers to 
reduce their emissions. Beyond that there was no incentive to burn low-sulfur coal. You 
either met the limit or you did not; there were not any savings for decreasing past the 
                                                
114 The shifting approaches of the three sets of amendments can be confusing. To simplify, the 1970 
amendments required all plants built between 1971 and 1977 to emit fewer than 1.2 pounds of sulfur 
dioxide per million BTUs. Plants built prior to 1971 were not federally regulated, though states had the 
option of doing so. The 1977 amendments required all plants built after September 18, 1978 to install 
scrubbers. The 1990 act established a permit system for all plants, regardless of year constructed. By 1995, 
the rate was 2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million BTUs. By 2000, that rate was lowered to 1.2 pounds 
per million BTUs. 
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minimum.115 In contrast, the 1990 rendition removed this technological mandate, 
imposing a quantitative limit on sulfur expulsion (2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide per 
million BTUs by 1995; 1.2 pounds per million by 2000) and leaving it up to the plants 
themselves to decide how they would meet it. In doing so, they generated a new market 
for tradable emissions: as one economist has described it, this “created an implicit 
marginal willingness to pay for reductions in sulfur content as this would translate into 
fewer SO2 emissions, freeing permits to be sold.” In other words, the federal government 
was essentially putting a price on sulfur, encouraging plants not merely to reach the bare 
minimum in sulfur reduction, but to limit emissions as much as possible (thereby freeing 
up permits to be sold and increasing cash flow). In place of the command and control 
approach, the latest rendition of the Clean Air Act applied this “market-based” method to 
the power industry.116  
The result was another boom in Powder River coal production, this one far greater 
and longer lasting than most could have imagined. In the decade following the 1990 
amendments, Wyoming coal production nearly doubled.117 In 1996, the U.S. Department 
of Energy predicted that power plants would look increasingly to low-sulfur coal 
suppliers (i.e., the Powder River Basin) to comply with its stricter stage II (2000) 
requirements, and that increasing amounts of that coal would come from west of the 
                                                
115 Note that this was why there was such a focus on “clean coal technology” during the 1980s. 
116 As one group of authors put it: “The value of low-sulfur coal to a power plant depends on how its 
emissions are regulated. Under an emissions standard, a power plant is willing to pay a premium for low-
sulfur coal, but only up to the amount necessary to comply with the regulatory limit. In contrast, an 
allowance market rewards marginal reductions in emissions: every ton of pollution abated saves the price 
of an allowance. Meghan R. Busse and Nathaniel O. Keohane, “Market Effects of Environmental 
Regulation: Coal, Railroads, and the 1990 Clean Air Act,” The RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 4 
(2007): 1161. Lange, “Investigating the Effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,” esp. 32-35. 
117 Shelby Gerking and Stephen F. Hamilton, “What Explains the Increased Utilization of Powder River 
Basin Coal in Electric Power Generation?,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90, no. 4 (2008): 
161. 
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Mississippi, in particular from the climes of the Powder River Basin. The limited eastern 
supply of sub-bituminous coal—most notably from southern West Virginia—was 
becoming increasingly scarce, and Gillette was in a powerful position to take on the 
growing demand: not only was the nation’s largest mine, the Black Thunder, set to 
expand for the second time in as many years, but Triton Coal was in the process of 
constructing the North Rochelle mine, a thousand-plus acre behemoth that would come to 
dominate the global coal industry and recalibrate expectations of size and extraction.118 
Per-capita production peaked in 2004, with each worker in the basin averaging 81,000 
tons. Four years later, overall production hit its own crest as Wyoming produced just 
short of half a billion tons.  
From those halcyon years, however, production has since fallen into the long-
predicted decline. Between that 2008 and 2016, the state’s coal production dropped 17%, 
a downturn that has been attributed to falling natural gas prices, a country-wide recession, 
growth in the use and popularity of renewable energy, and rail congestion brought on by 
the abutting Bakken oil fields.119 It remains to be seen whether the new Republican 
administration will be able to return the industry to its previous growth pattern of ever-
increasing peaks. 
                                                
118 “Report Sees Coal Growth in Campbell,” The News-Record, August 16, 1996. Notable here is also a 
Salt-Creek-like growth in reserves: The Department of Energy report estimated 496 billion short tons of 
mineable coal remained available in the country, 22 billion short tons more than their earlier estimate “due 
to better coal mapping information and updated assessment criteria.” Other analysts concurred. Resource 
Data International, a Boulder company specializing in coal forecasting, predicted a steady growth in 
Powder River Basin exports: 348 million tons in 2000, 382 million in 2005, 442 million in 2010, over half 
a billion in 2015. Deb Holbert, “Growth Predicted, but How Much?” The News-Record, July 27, 1997. 
119 97% of Wyoming coal is from the Powder River Basin. Additionally, it is important to note that, despite, 
the post-millennia declines, the percentage of U.S. coal supplied by Wyoming increased from 32% in 1990 
to 54.5% in 2009. Robert Godby, Roger Coupal, David Taylor, Tim Considine, “The Impact of the Coal 
Economy on Wyoming” University of Wyoming Center for Energy Economics and Public Policy, Report 
prepared for the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority, February 2015, 2. 
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Figure 22: Peabody Coal “Coal Can Do That” Advertisement 
https://coalcandothat.wordpress.com/ 
 
Even in the wake of this wane, however, narrative efforts have intensified. While 
the federal government has, for the most part, continued to push a clean coal narrative, 
the coal companies themselves have increasingly come to embrace the tools of modern 
advertising to shape the thermodynamic narrative.120 In 2008, during the initial stages of 
coal’s decline, Peabody Energy—the same company of Kleeburn fame—launched the 
award-winning “Coal Can Do That” advertising campaign. The platform’s chief goal—
and one that has been increasingly embraced—was to make Americans aware of just how 
dependent they were on the coal industry. Full-page spreads appeared in magazines and 
                                                
120 The main exception to this was the Obama administration, who began to push back against the coal 
industry. 
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newspapers, picturing huge pieces of anthropomorphized coal wearing sunglasses, 
images of electric appliances and guitars plugged into pieces of coal, and adolescents 
using laptops atop chair-sized chunks of coal with captions such as, “Promising research 
shows 9 in 10 dentists use Coal”, “Coal: Help you quit smoking,” and “Play a tune. Flip a 
switch. Send an e-mail. The technologies that surround you are fueled by clean coal.” 
The gist of the campaign was the punchy refrain “Yeah…coal can do that.” In essence, it 
attempted to marry basic thermodynamic education with a casual, ironic syntax aimed at 
reaching younger generations. It was an approach that was reiterated throughout the 
decade, gradually intensifying in volume. According to Peabody C.E.O. Gregory Boyce, 
one of the more vociferous proponents of both coal and a heavy public-relations 
approach, “black is the new green…coal is the fuel of the future…clean coal is essential 
to solving the world’s energy security concerns and advancing climate solutions.”121 
Instead of being something out of sight and out of mind, the Powder River Coal industry 
was becoming more culturally proactive, working to bring its past narrative efforts into 
the twenty-first century by reminding Americans how much coal still factored into their 
everyday lives. Unlike Kleenburn and Colstrip, they were not satisfied with a regional 
market. In the words of the Gillette visitor’s center, they were “Proud to Provide 
America’s Energy.”122  
                                                
121 See archived examples of ads as coalcandothat.wordpress.com. More recently, in 2014, Peabody put out 
a new advertising campaign, what they called the “Advanced Energy for Life,” campaign, which portrayed 
coal as a key driver of global equality. As Boyce described it, “Energy inequality is the blight of energy 
poverty, limiting access to basic needs like food, water and medicine; stunting education; and cutting lives 
short. Every one of the U.N. Millennium Development goals depends on adequate energy, yet today one 
out of every two citizens lacks adequate energy and over 4 million lives are lost yearly due to the impacts 
of this scourge.” Not surprisingly, environmentalist reaction was strong. The Sierra Club compared the 
campaign to the tobacco industry denying scientific evidence that connected cigarette use to cancer. Daniel 
Cusick, “Peabody Energy Pitches Coal as the Cure for Third World Poverty,” E&E News, April 11, 2014. 
 
122 Sign at the entrance to the Gillette Visitor Information Center, just off of I-90. 
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Conclusion 
The journey from Jack Peabody’s failed Kleenburn brand to the largest coal-
mining region in the world has not been without its snags. This has been particularly true 
of Peabody’s namesake company. In Edward Abbey’s classic environmental caper, The 
Monkey Wrench Gang, we read of Hayduke, Seldom Seen, and crew driving by the 
“ever-growing strip mines of the Peabody Coal Company,” conveying “fifty thousand 
tons. Every day. For thirty-forty-fifty years. All to feed the power plant.”123 The 
eponymous Monkey Wrench Gang blows up a nearby railroad bridge, destroying a 
Peabody Coal train in the process. More recently, William Vollmann has provided 
another fictional account of the company: his as-of-yet unfinished book, The Cloud-Shirt, 
one of two remaining pieces to his monumental Seven Dreams: A Book of North 
American Landscapes series, details the historical and modern-day conflicts between the 
Navajo nation and Peabody Coal, a strife that the author sums up with a quote from 
Hobbes: "This question, Why Evill [sic] men often Prosper, and Good men suffer 
Adversity,…hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and 
which is more, of the Saints.”124 From Frances Stuyvesant Peabody’s door-to-door 
business to the biggest private coal corporation in the world, it is safe to say that no 
modern coal company has figured more prominently in the field of American fiction. And 
almost without exception, this has been as a target, an evil empire looming large against 
the beneficence of the common man. 
                                                
123 Edward Abbey, The Monkey Wrench Gang (Lippincott, Williams, and Wilkins: Philadelphia, 1975), 
148-149. 
124 William T. Vollmann, “The Cloud-Shirt,” Grand Street, no. 46 (1993): 212. Italics in original. 
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Much the same can be said for the genre of the essay. Over the past forty years, 
Abbey, Alvin Josephy, Rick Bass, and countless others have offered their pens in service 
of an ecological counter-narrative to offset the more dominant clean coal storyline.125 Of 
these, perhaps the most notable has been the late K. Ross Toole, the popular partisan 
professor at the University of Montana. During the 1970s and continuing on until his 
untimely death in the early 1980s, Toole was a tireless defender of the northern plains. In 
this vein, his most forceful book was The Rape of the Great Plains (1976), in which he 
detailed the Powder River Basin’s early post-Clean Air Act coal efforts. Drawing upon 
his extensive work in both the archives and the legislature, Toole argued that if nothing 
were done to stop the big coal companies from taking over the region, the northern plains 
would soon become “A National Sacrifice Area.”126 He rued the country’s descent into a 
nation of gluttons, equating the notion of reclamation with “lipstick on a corpse” and 
proclaiming that Montana “is a national heritage. And the heritage is not spelled C-O-A-
L.” Drawing upon the textual structure of an earlier generation of environmental writers, 
Toole went on to juxtapose what he saw as the true unsullied West and the corrupted 
version of modern coal companies. “For six years I ran a thousand head of yearlings in 
the remote foothills of the Beartooth Mountains of southwestern Montana,” he wrote. “It 
is on those great, rolling foothills that the Great Plains begin…If I look southward…I can 
see my eleven-year-old son on a fractious Appaloosa horse, headed fast for the 
                                                
125 See, for instance, Alvin M. Josephy Jr., “Agony of the Northern Plains,” Audubon, July 1973; Rick Bass 
and David Hanson, David T. Hanson: Colstrip, Montana, (Fairfield, Iowa: Taverner Press, 2010); Edward 
Abbey, The Journey Home: Some Words in the Defense of the American West (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: 
Plume, 1991), 159-160. Original article was printed under the same title in Playboy, December 1975. 
126 Since this time, the rape rhetoric associated with coal mining in the West has continued unabated. See, 
for example, Timothy Egan’s Lasso the Wind: Away to the New West, in which the first chapter is entitled 
“The Rape of the West,” or artist and activist Alaina Buffalo Spirit who, in worrying about coal companies 
coming onto the Northern Cheyenne reservation, observed “They will rape the land, the water, the air, and 
then they will leave in 20 years.” Marc Gunther, “Warren Buffett’s Coal Problem,” Sierra Magazine, 
May/June 2013, http://vault.sierraclub.org/sierra/201305/warren-buffett-coal-3.aspx. 
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neighboring ranch.” In contrast to this Edenic locale, Toole describes “the great coal and 
energy companies now descending upon the land…It is infuriating to hear them 
cry…while their monstrous machines are eating at our vitals.” Like so many before him, 
Toole elevated this rhetoric with an appeal to a romanticized past: “give me this small 
bow and this small arrow and let me fire just once in the name of the eternity they are 
about to steal from us.”127 Under such worldview, there is no room for the energy 
extraction that we have seen time and again in the region’s history. It is on the wrong side 
of an idealistic dichotomy. 
In short, there has been no dearth of powerful and well-supported counter-
narratives to that embodied by Peabody and the Powder River coal industry more 
broadly. And yet, in spite of all of the controversies and criticisms raised by Abbey, 
Toole, and others, the P.R.B. continues to lead the world in coal production, housing not 
only the largest coal mines, but also harboring the greatest untapped supply of energy in 
the world.128 For more than a hundred years now, locals and scientists alike have been 
aware of this unique thermodynamic bounty, but it is only in the last half-century that the 
                                                
127 K. Ross Toole, The Rape of the Great Plains: Northwestern America, Cattle, and Coal (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co, 1976), 9-10, 244. Toole was far from the politically correct professors we think of today, 
commencing lectures with confessions such as, “I am biased, I am prejudiced, I am bigoted, I am one-
sided, I am subjective.” Partly as a result of this, and partly due to the ostensibly un-academic nature of his 
work, Toole was much maligned by many of the academics of the day, both at University of Montana and 
elsewhere, decried as a “silver-tongued charlatan” who wrote literature, not history. “K. Ross Toole’s 
Montana,” Lecture Two: The Price of Space and Natural Resources,” VID 978.6 T618K PT. 1; Jael Marchi 
Prezeau, “An Interpretive Biography of K. Ross Toole: A Legacy of Leadership in Montana,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Montana, 303). Note that we see the same sort of romanticized rhetoric in more 
recent works decrying Powder River Coal. Rick Bass writes, “I stopped at the Little Bighorn on my way 
home from Colstrip, I went in and looked at the markers, walking between the gravestones over the 
warriors and soldiers sleeping forever just below. Maybe, I thought, the coal—only a little farther down—
could stay buried and sleeping too. Maybe it could sleep forever, like the soldiers who once, and not so 
long ago, in their arrogance and impatience, made a fatal mistake…I lingered longest at the marker for a 
warrior who died, the simple inscription says, ‘defending the Cheyenne way of life.’ What will we give to 
change ours?” Bass and Hanson, Colstrip, Montana, 91. 
128 Estimates place the P.R.B.’s reserves at 3,616 Quadrillion BTUs. In order to equal that total, you need to 
combine the next ten largest energy reserves in the world. Considine, “Powder River Basin Coal: Powering 
America,” 517.  
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region has emerged as an energy capital. As this chapter has shown, this boom has come 
about not as a result of any new discovery or technology; it has emerged thanks to a 
propitious combination of chance and the reintegration of the region’s past failures.  
During the 1920s, a young Jack Peabody made the first attempt to market the 
region’s coal based upon its difference from the country’s most popular eastern 
bituminous product. He singled out its relative lack of pollution, its ability to burn clean 
and give off less particulate matter than that used by the majority of the country. In this 
effort he was an unequivocal failure. Nevertheless, a decade later the Northern Pacific 
Railroad entered the region not with a new advertising plan but with a technological 
model lifted whole cloth from the copper industry. Through the first large-scale 
application of strip mining to American coal, the N.P. managed to extract the product at 
rates and costs previously unknown. For a few decades, they managed to supply their 
fleet for far cheaper than had previously been possible. But they too ultimately failed, a 
casualty of shifting public opinion and a mid-century narrative that portrayed coal as 
dirty and antiquated, a fuel of the past. It was not until the 1970s that these two foundered 
methodologies—narrative and technology—merged into something far more powerful 
and lasting than either had been individually. The erstwhile Kleenburn was resurrected 
via the Clean Air Act as the new “Clean Coal” approach to American energy, while 
Colstrip’s technological innovation was brought to life in a steroidal, modernized version 
that saw trucks and draglines the size of skyscrapers brought into one of the more isolated 
regions of the country. The result is Peabody Coal’s crown jewel, the North Antelope 
Rochelle Mine (N.A.R.M.), which has become the largest coal mine in the world, 
extracting close to three tons of the stuff per second—a pace that continues, unceasing, 
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twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.129 In 2016, it shipped its 
two billionth ton of coal, the equivalent of seventeen million train cars—five thousand 
times more than what Kleenburn shipped in its entire lifetime.130 The scale is quite 
literally awesome.131 
There are without question both positives and negatives to such large-scale 
ecological extraction and destruction. On the one hand, the industry contributes untold 
jobs and infrastructural development to the region, bringing a billion dollars a year to the 
state in taxes, royalties, and fees.132 On the other, despite all of the promises that the coal 
industry has made to return the land to its original state, only 2.4% of the disturbed land 
has been reclaimed to this point.133 None of this is beyond consideration. Nevertheless, 
the important historical point is that coal mining has long been—and continues to be—a 
critical part of the Powder River landscape. The region’s earliest ranchers were operating 
hill mines out of Buffalo and Casper in the nineteenth century; Hemingway was writing 
about Sheridan’s great Tongue River mines in Scribner’s in the 1930s; and since the 
1980s, the region as a whole has been the world’s leading coal provider.134 As Richard 
White has written about the Columbia River, “we have neither killed the river nor raped 
it. Nature still exists on the Columbia. It is not dead, only altered by our labor.”135 The 
                                                
129 Suzanne Goldenberg, “The Real Story of US Coal: Inside the World’s Biggest Coalmine,” The 
Guardian, November 10, 2014.  
130 Benjamin Storrow, “North Antelope Rochelle Ships its 2 Billionth Ton of Coal,” Casper Star-Tribune, 
January 23, 2016.  
131 Peabody Energy is now the largest private-sector coal company in the world. 
132 Wyoming Mining Association, Wyoming Coal: The 2017-2018 Concise Guide, 2018, http://www. 
wyomingmining.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2017-18-Concise-Guide-to-Wyoming-Coal.pdf, 5.  
133 Michael Illiano, “PRBRC Report Shows Slow Rate of Mine Reclamation,” Gillette News Record, July 
20, 2018. 
134 The Hemingway story is “Wine of Wyoming,” a piece about the outdoors and prohibition in the 
Sheridan area, in which one of the main characters works at the Tongue River mines. Ernest Hemingway, 
“Wine of Wyoming,” Scribner’s 88, no. 2 (1930). 
135 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1996), 59. 
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same can be said for the Powder River Basin. The region is and has long been a center of 
world energy production; to either forget or deny that is to misrepresent the West, falling 
back upon the fantasy of horses and bison instead of accepting and attempting to 
understand the far more complex reality of coal, oil, uranium, grass, and the scores of 
other thermodynamic manifestations that have defined it as a region. Today, Gillette calls 
itself the Energy Capital of the Nation. There is nothing false about such a claim. But 
then, too, there is nothing new about it either. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Five years after the events of Sarpy Creek, the Crow nation received a very 
different type of visitor to their Absaloka Mine: newly elected Vice President Mike 
Pence. The former Indiana governor was on a western swing of the country, passing 
through Montana to stump for the upcoming special election, but according to his staff he 
also wanted to visit one of the region’s innumerable mines. As noted in the previous 
chapter, since 2008 the coal trade had been in a rather steep and steady decline. Some 
blamed this downturn on the climate change policies of the Obama administration; others 
saw it as a result of the aggressive promotion and growth of natural gas and oil 
exploration. Regardless of who held the fault, one thing was certain: businesses and 
communities across the country suffered from the slump, and the Crow were right up 
there among the hardest hit. Just one year after Westmoreland had threatened to close the 
Absaloka, the Crow’s number one employer and primary source of income, the tribe had 
reluctantly agreed to reduce their own profit percentage. As such, Pence’s visit was one 
that augured change—the records are incomplete, but all signs point to him being the first 
vice president to visit a Powder River mine.1 And although nothing concrete had changed 
by the time of his tour, the tribe had seen a few promising signs under the new 
administration: in March, the Department of the Interior had lifted a mining 
                                                
1 As far as I can tell, no president has either. 
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moratorium on federal lands, and by the time Pence came to Crow Agency, the Tribal 
Chairman, A.J. Not Afraid, had already been to the White House twice to provide input 
on future energy policies. Now the Crow Nation was hoping for more overt action from 
the vice president: a promise to make permanent the Indian Coal Production Tax 
Credit—a tax break on reservation-produced coal—and a federal push to open West 
Coast export terminals, thereby opening paths overseas, where demand for the product 
was still high.1 
The resulting visit turned out to be yet another thread in the Powder River Basin’s 
long line of oddly imbricated energy resources. When Pence arrived, he joined U.S. 
Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke, Vice Chairman of the Crown Nation Carlson Goes Ahead, 
and a handful of associated political and Crow Nation staff for a horseback tour of 
Westmoreland’s mining facilities. The scene was like something out of a Costner film: 
eight middle-aged men hunched up on horses, cowboy hats in abundance, without 
exception every one of them wearing jeans and button-down shirts, Pence’s own rolled 
up with two or three crisp cuff-turns. The resulting media photos frame the crew in 
rolling fields of knee-high wheatgrass, a prodigious plains horizon at their backs. But of 
course this was not just another leisurely stroll across the prairie; it was a tour of one of 
the largest coal mining facilities in the country. And like all of the Powder River Basin’s 
mines, the Absaloka features some of the most advanced technology in the industry: a 
dragline the size of an office complex, 150-ton wheel loaders, and trains that run 
24/7/365, carrying millions of tons of coal across the country in the process. But instead 
of taking four-wheel-drive trucks, of showing off the transportational technology and 
                                                
1 Jackie Yamanak, “Pence Told Crow Tribe ‘War on Coal Is Over’ During Absaloka Mine Visit,” 
Yellowstone Public Radio, May 15, 2017. Article available at http://www.ypradio.org/post/pence-told-
crow-tribe-war-coal-over-during-absaloka-mine-visit#stream/0. 
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resources that today’s miners actually use, the vice president dipped into the mythology 
of an earlier era. He told those assembled about the joy of being “able to sit on a horse 
and see that glorious panoramic view that has been the legacy of the Crow Nation for 
more generations than we can count,” citing Reagan’s observation that “there’s nothing 
better for the inside of a man than the outside of a horse.” As they rode alongside 
Westmoreland’s past and future mining sites, Goes Ahead explained to the vice president 
the Crow’s recent troubles with Westmoreland and the coal industry in general, declaring 
that coal was “the lifeblood of the Crow.” In response, Pence did his best to ease Goes 
Ahead’s fears, informing the vice chairman, “I am here to announce the war on coal is 
over.”2 With a new administration and a personal assurance from none other than the vice 
president himself, the Crow were hoping to move on from the discord of Sarpy Creek and 
the plummeting returns of the past eight years. They were hoping for a return to the 
thermodynamic riches of the past. 
                                                
2 David Caplan, “Mike Pence in Montana: Tours Coal Mine on Horseback, Stumps for GOP Candidate,” 
ABC News, May 13, 2017, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mike-pence-montana-tours-coal-mine-
horseback-stumps/story?id=47386520; http://westmoreland.com/location/absaloka-mine-montana/.  
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Figure 23: Mike Pence Visiting the Absaloka Mine, May 2017 
https://billingsgazette.com/news/vp-mike-pence-says-war-on-coal-is-over-during/article_42469654-6f28-
54fc-aed7-0e13898d9726.html 
  
It should not be surprising that nobody mentioned the Sarpy Creek incident. On 
top of all the discord and strife, by 2017 it had been legally resolved, and the focus was 
on the future of the industry and the “great work” Westmoreland and the Crow Tribe 
were doing.3 Four years earlier, a case concerning the bison bones had reached the 
Billings District Court. It was brought against members of the Crow Tribal Historic 
Preservation Office (C.T.H.P.O.), the branch of the tribal government that was (and is) in 
charge of monitoring any work on the reservation that “may disturb tribal lands,” 
activities such as “utilities, construction, energy exploration, development.” To facilitate 
this oversight, the tribe received funds from the U.S. Department of the Interior, the 
National Park Service, and the company that was doing the work (in this case, 
                                                
3 Despite Pence’s promises, Westmoreland’s stock continued to plummet in the wake of his visit, dropping 
from $45 a share in mid-2014 to its all-time low, seven cents, by the beginning of 2018. 
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Westmoreland). The job of the C.T.H.P.O. was “to monitor the project to insure [sic] that 
lands of cultural of historic importance are not destroyed.”4 In other words, they were 
tasked with preventing precisely the sort of tragedy that occurred at Sarpy Creek. 
 All of the payments for these services first had to go to the Crow Tribal 
government, who would then pay the individual monitors for their work. During and after 
the Sarpy Creek incident, however, Dale Old Horn, the (at the time) Tribal Historic 
Preservation Officer, worked with Westmoreland and other associated companies in 
order to have the businesses pay the monitors directly, without the funds first passing into 
the Crow Nation’s coffers. According to the 2013 court case, from July 2008 to 
November 2011, more than half a million dollars were diverted in this way for “the 
personal use and benefit of the employees of the CTHPO.” Three men in particular—
Mark James Denny, Larkin Troy Chandler, and Frederick Paul Deputee Jr.—were the 
monitors for the Sarpy Creek expansion. In that position, they took what amounted to 
bribes in exchange for not showing up to work, receiving pay for labor that they did not 
do and—more importantly—allowing Westmoreland to expand without any tribal 
oversight.5 In May 2013, U.S. District Judge Richard Cebull sentenced all three men to 
five years of probation, with Denny owing $73,046 in restitution, Chandler $44,546, and 
Deputee $6,130.6 
 Unlike the bison bones and the atlatl darts, the sentencing did not make the 
national news. Coverage was limited to a handful of local papers; most carried no 
                                                
4 “Mark James Denny Sentenced in U.S. District Court,” The United States Attorney’s Office, District of 
Montana, May 1, 2013, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mt/pr/mark-james-denny-sentenced-us-district-court. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Lorna Thackeray, “3 Sentenced in Crow Fraud Investigation,” Billings Gazette, May 1, 2013. Article 
available at https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/sentenced-in-crow-fraud-
investigation/article_2d78dd47-e24f-5278-9df1-4966539c83c1.html. 
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mention of the case. In many ways, however, such quietude fits the region’s past rather 
well. For hundreds of years, the Powder River Basin’s thermodynamic resources have 
played a critical role in the development of the West, the country, and the continent as a 
whole. And yet for the most part this has been done quietly, beyond the purview of the 
bulk of the country. This trend began with behind-the-scenes transformations of the 
Teapot Dome scandal and has only become more pronounced through time, even as the 
Powder River coal industry has grown and asserted itself as the chief coal producer in the 
world. For instance, just this past summer, the ever-prolific writer and National Book 
Award winner William Vollmann produced the latest and perhaps the most 
comprehensive tome on the country’s energy history. Coming in at a meaty 1,265 pages, 
his two-volume Carbon Ideologies is a look back at the industries and worldviews that 
have driven American energy production and consumption over the past century. 
Narrated from the perspective of a global future in which such resources are far more 
scarce, it is meant to be a dense but accessible book that represents our conceptions of the 
country’s energy past and present. Vollmann covers everything one could expect of such 
a text: coal, oil, fracking, natural gas, nuclear energy, and solar power as he travels the 
globe to interview experts, excavators, and average citizens from West Virginia to 
Bangladesh, California to the United Arab Emirates. The Washington Post described it as 
“an elegant indictment of the mundane behaviors that require immense amounts of 
carbon-emitting fuel, and the ways we’ve structured our world around fulfilling and 
continually augmenting energy demand…a feverish, sprawling archive of who we are, 
and what we’ve wrought.”7 What is surprising, then, is that in these thousand-plus pages, 
                                                
7 Meara Sharma, “Why Have We Done So Little to Tackle Climate Change?” The Washington Post, April 
6, 2018. Article available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-have-we-done-so-little-to-
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neither Wyoming nor the Powder River Basin is mentioned even once.8 The world’s 
largest provider of coal for more than three decades now is not even a footnote to 
American’s energy history; it is outright invisible. 
 From a material standpoint, it is impossible to debate the Powder River’s modern 
impact. It is—and has long been—the greatest cache of energy on the planet.9 And yet in 
spite of the patent evidence, the coal portion of Vollmann’s study (2013-2015) focuses on 
West Virginia and Kentucky. During that time, Wyoming produced four times as much 
coal as West Virginia and nearly seven times as much as Kentucky. In fact, Wyoming 
excavated as much coal as the closest six states combined. And yet, as this dissertation 
has argued, one of the underlying reasons for omissions like Vollmann’s (and Pence’s) 
has to do with narrative. Despite all of the thermodynamic advances and technological 
fixes that have emerged over the years, our stories about coal remain stubbornly mired in 
nineteenth-century notions of manual labor and individualism. Almost without exception, 
these narratives focus on underground mines, highlighting murderous labor disputes and 
the plight of the exploited worker. West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky are the 
inevitable settings of such stories, though even when the narrative does occasionally 
venture West, it does so through the guise of the underground mine.10 One only needs to 
                                                                                                                                            
tackle-climate-change/2018/04/06/d62710dc-2baf-11e8-8688e053ba58f1e4_story.html?noredirect=on& 
utm_term=.11e4309a6333 
8 It is mentioned twice in tables. Once listing caloric efficiency of Wyoming sub-bituminous coal (211), 
once in a description of what sub-bituminous coal is (555). William T. Vollmann, No Immediate Danger: 
Volume One of Carbon Ideologies, 1st Edition edition (New York, NY: Viking, 2018). 
9 As noted in chapter four, current estimates place the P.R.B.’s reserves at 3,616 Quadrillion BTUs. In 
order to equal that total, you need to combine the next ten largest energy reserves in the world. Considine, 
“Powder River Basin Coal: Powering America,” 517. 
10 This seems to be due to our popular understandings of the West, its past, and its landscape. For instance, 
see K. Ross Toole (discussed in chapter four), whose arguments against Powder River coal mining is based 
on a regional history that is largely horseback. This, it seems to me, is the main reason Pence and his crew 
took to horseback to tour the Absaloka Mine: he needed to draw upon this romanticized view of the West—
men riding horseback across the grasslands—in order to interact with or justify this alternative narrative—
coal mining—that is supposedly modern and antithetical to the American West as an ecological space. One 
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look at perhaps the most well-known fictional description of the industry in the United 
States, Upton Sinclair’s King Coal and its sequel, The Coal War, which focus on 
Colorado’s Ludlow Massacre, the subject of Thomas Andrews’s much later academic 
history, Killing for Coal.11 In concentrating on such a narrow and in many ways dated 
approach to energy excavation—tunnel mining—Vollmann’s work both draws upon and 
perpetuates a discourse for viewing the country’s relationship to coal, one that subtly 
shrouds the more prominent and far more impactful endeavor of strip mining. 
 Something similar can be said about our histories of the American West. Despite 
the New Western History and all of the revisions that it has brought about, the field is still 
weighted down by the paradigm of boom and bust. 12 Patricia Limerick and others have 
pushed back against this, encouraging scholars to view the West as a place of continuity, 
what she refers to as an “unbroken past.” And yet in that same work she asserts that the 
West “provid[es] the prime example of the boom/bust instability of capitalism.”13 Of 
course the very notion of boom and bust is, by definition, predicated upon 
discontinuity—something happens, massive numbers of people flow into a place, 
                                                                                                                                            
only needs to look at the bounty of traditional and modern songs on coal mining in the U.S.—Darrell 
Scott’s “You’ll Never Leave Harlan Alive, Merle Travis’s “Dark as a Dungeon,” Woody Guthrie’s “The 
Dying Miner,” to name a few—to see that, without exception, they are about underground mining in places 
like Kentucky and West Virginia. There are no romantic songs about open-pit mining in the West. What 
there are is a bevy of music on cowboys. Even the Johnson County War has been the subject or inspiration 
of a number of songs—Patterson Hood’s “The Range War,” Chris Ledoux’s “The Johnson County War,” 
the traditional “The Ballad of Nate Champion,” not mention movies like Shane. Ariel Arden Downing even 
wrote an entire dissertation on music in the “cowboy culture” of the Powder River Basin. This sort of 
dichotomized popular perception is what this dissertation has been trying to illuminate as historically 
specious. Ariel Arden Downing, “Let’er Buck!: Music in Cowboy Culture of the Powder River Basin, 
Wyoming, (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 1997).  
11 Upton Sinclair, King Coal: A Novel (Macmillan, 1917); Upton Sinclair, The Coal War: A Sequel to 
“King Coal” (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 1976). Note that Killing for Coal and the original 
edition of The Coal War use the same image from the Ludlow Massacre for their cover. 
12 Limerick’s call for the West as a place of continuity rather than as a region defined by starkly delineated 
progressions is most in debt to Earl Pomeroy, “Toward a Reorientation of Western History: Continuity and 
Environment,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41, no. 4 (March 1, 1955): 579–600. 
13 Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: 
WW Norton & Co, 1987), 27, 29, 142–143. 
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something else happens, nearly all of those people leave. Similar contradictions can be 
seen throughout the field of western history. Even the bulk of “New Indian” histories 
tend to unintentionally perpetuate them. For decades now, scholars have rhetorically 
assaulted the 1890 end of the frontier, going back, as so much does in western history, to 
Turner’s infamous frontier thesis. And yet that 1890 divisor nevertheless persists—if 
implicitly—in the majority of our histories. Almost without exception, every one of the 
major award-winning texts from the New Indian History concludes prior to the 
reservation era.14 And so despite their theoretical flaws, the boom-and-bust paradigm and 
the frontier binary persist precisely because they fit our popular understandings of the 
West: they neatly delineate bison, horses, coal, and oil, putting each into its own sterile 
temporal compartment, ensuring that they never overlap or conflict in any sort of 
problematic way. 
It is these sorts of histories that enabled the vice president and his supporting cast 
to don Wranglers and cowboy hats as they toured the Crow reservation’s cutting edge, 
twenty-first-century mines on horseback. In doing so, they were reasserting popular 
                                                
14 Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven; Dallas, 
TX: Yale University Press, 2009); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008); Ned Blackhawk, Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early 
American West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and 
U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); 
Elliott West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, & the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence, Kan.: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998); Daniel K Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the 
Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1992); Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Milwaukee, WI: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: 
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); 
Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); James Brooks, Captives & Cousins: Slavery, 
Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Omohundro 
Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, University of North Carolina 
Press, 2002); Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 
1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Brett Rushforth and Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History & Culture, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel 
Hill; Williamsburg, Va.: University of North Carolina Press ; Published for the Omohundro Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, 2012). 
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understandings of the American West as the land of horses and cattle, not the land of 
strip-mined coal. At the same time, however, they were (unknowingly) bringing forth the 
region’s submerged energetic imbrications, thermodynamic ragouts that every so often 
bubble up through the surface, demanding explanation. This dissertation began with the 
Sarpy Creek incident, an ostensibly atypical instance of ancient coal and ancient bison 
bones intertwining across space and time. It ends by arguing that this sort of historical 
plaiting is not merely normal, but is perhaps the quintessence of the region. From the 
quiet rise of Crow thermodynamic dominance to the complex energy histories of Johnson 
County, Salt Creek, and Gillette, what these places and moments reveal is the often 
messy, contradictory nature of the past. Even when we try to cordon such histories off, to 
focus singularly on a particular energy source or method of extraction, a closer look 
reveals overlapping sources. In other words, no matter what we do, any serious archival 
examination unearths a multitude of thermodynamic sources: time and again, energy in 
all of its manifestations rises through the cracks of our historical models, splintering and 
challenging our traditional understandings of the American West. 
To bind all of these ostensibly disparate events and epochs together we need to 
focus on the presence and extraction of energy through time. Although we tend to think 
of the history of the American West as that of aridity and “independence, self-reliance, 
and individualism,” this dissertation has revealed that it is just as much—if not more—
the story of energy in all of its manifestations.15 In doing so, it has demonstrated the 
power that a thermodynamic history has to recast even the most important events in the 
history of the American West. It has shown that the Crow were not the weak victims of a 
                                                
15 White, “It’s Your Misfortune,” 57. 
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Lakota advance but instead the first to transform the thermodynamic bounty of the 
Powder River Basin into an energy empire; it has proclaimed the archetypal open range 
conflict in our continent’s history to be far more about science and ideas surrounding 
energy production than anything class-based; it has revealed the greatest political scandal 
in American history to be a turning point in the country’s long energy narrative; and it 
has uncovered the century-plus buildup to the largest coal mines that the planet has ever 
seen. In disinterring the submerged thermodynamic roots of these paradigmatic western 
moments, this dissertation has recast the history of the region as a whole. For the 
American West has been many things for many different people over time: the land of 
cattle and cowboys; of indigenous peoples and bison herds that numbered in the millions; 
of pioneers and austere sod abodes. One thing it has never been, however, is the land of 
energy.  
This dissertation has laid bare the problematic nature of such a claim. The West is 
and has long been a haven of American energy production. Even today, if you drive 
through the Powder River Basin, taking Route 59 north from Wright to connect onto the 
main I-90 corridor, you will pass by a small sign welcoming you to the town of Gillette. 
It is hard to miss. You need to look just past the bowling alley, directly across from 
Wyoming Machinery, the one with the big Caterpillar sign and all of the excavators lined 
up along the road, booms bent up in salute. It is a six-by-four stone rectangle with the 
words “Welcome to Gillette.” But look closer. Up above it sits an epithet. Stamped on an 
arched white cutout, it reads “Energy Capital of the Nation.” It is the sort of histrionic 
rhetoric you would expect from the nineteenth century. Booster fare. But this is different 
somehow. More fitting. Although few people would recognize such a claim today, the 
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numbers tell us that there is really no other way of interpreting the modern 
thermodynamic landscape. Over the past two hundred years, you could even argue, this 
whole region has been the energy capital of the world.  
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